



MILITARY GLOBALIZATION

Max Ostrovsky

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To Elysia, our new edition to the family,
and the extended family.

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PREFACE

Since my schooldays, I have been mesmerized by the imperial expansions which throughout history gradually enveloped the world, culminating in a perceivable world-system circa 1900. This state of affairs set the stage for two World Wars, the Cold War and eventually the “unipolar moment” (precisely the year I graduated secondary school). When I first heard the word *globalization*, I was sure it referred to self-same world-historical process of expansion and consolidation. Excited, I reached the library section on globalization to discover research on... *economic globalization*.

Works concerning other aspects of globalization prove to be rare exceptions. Among those exceptional works, some deal with political globalization. The latter is about the League of Nations, the United Nations and several other international institutions composing the abstract “World Governance” rather than the world of *realpolitik* I was at once puzzled and disappointed, overcome with the sense that the research on globalization missed its main target. This feeling only grew stronger in the course of studies as I learned new topics certainly pivotal to globalization but consistently overlooked in the research on globalization:

- What were all imperial and colonial expansions, if not the beginning of globalization?
- What is the *world system*, if not the accomplished globalization of those expansions?
- What is *World War*, if not the accomplished globalization of warfare?

- What caused the United States to turn from Isolationism to Interventionism, if not some basic force of globalization?
- What is the *bipolar* world, if not the accomplished globalization of conflict?
- What is the *Truman Doctrine*, if not the globalization of the *Monroe Doctrine*?
- What is the *Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP)*, if not the accomplished globalization of strategy?
- What are the *Global Strike Command* and the *Space Command*, if not the accomplished globalization of power projection?
- What is the current *unipolarity*, if not indication of the dominant centripetal force of globalization, a force unperceived when dealing with economic and other conventional globalizations?

These topics combine for a kind of tectonic, geopolitical, or hard-core globalization shaping the foundations of world order. During two decades of studies, as a university student and independent scholar, I have engaged in collecting material relevant to this “unconventional” globalization. Ordering this material chronologically reveals a dynamic world-historical process attaining its most explosive momentum during World War II and subsequently undergoing progressive stabilization perhaps approaching its *globality*—a certain end-state of globalization.

The first version of this essay on globalization (2015) I contributed as a chapter to *Wikipedia*’s article “Globalization.” The *Wikipedia* Editors chose to create for this chapter a separate article, entitling it “Military Globalization.” A year later, however the article was almost

entirely deleted because *Wikipedia* is not a platform for original research. The Editors instructed to write basing only on works which explicitly deal with the subject. The complication was that there are almost no such works. The only one known to me is the 1999 chapter by David Held.¹ All *Wikipedia* could find by 2017 sufficed for a stub article. Consequently I decided to contact a publisher of original research. As to why, given so vast literature on globalization, military globalization today remains a field of original research is an intriguing question unto itself.

I acknowledge the vital contributions of Elio Pasetto and my parents without whom I would not be publishing this and other works. My heartfelt appreciation goes to my managers—Eli Blich of *Shani* Hotel and Leonid Sheferkin of *Mikud* Security Company—for permission to pursue this research during my shifts. Studying while working seems to be the singular opportunity of “paid” research in social sciences. Finally, yet importantly, I thank my colleague Shani Hachmon for her inestimable generosity to share with me her student password. This opened for me the online part of library.

¹ Held et al 1999.

INTRODUCTION

One element common to the related subjects of *globalization*, *world system* and *hegemonic stability* is the economic focus. Whenever these concepts come under discussion, the focus will invariably shift to the sphere of economics. This approach deserves a research of its own, certainly being not simply due to the famous presidential-campaign quip, “It’s the economy, stupid.” Whatever its causes, the result of this pervasive shift in focus to the economic arena is a disregard for the significant military dimension of the phenomena. This work is intended to partially fill the military gap for globalization.

David Held defined *military globalization* as:

[The] process which embodies the growing extensity and intensity of military relations among the political units of the world system ... Understood as such, it reflects both the expanding network of worldwide military ties and relations, as well as the impact of key military technological innovations (from steamships to satellites), which over time, have reconstituted the world into a single geostrategic space.²

To the above definition, this work adds two elements. First, an emphasis is added on the increase of range within which military power has been projected in the course of history. Military globalization entails the increase in range and

² Held et al. 1999: 88.

decrease in time of power projection necessary to accomplish objectives (compression of space-time factor).

Second, military globalization is precluded with pre-modern regional military expansions (*archaic* globalization). Globalization was a direct continuation on the global scale of the preceding regional expansions. The regional and global stages actually constitute two different scales of essentially one continuous process. Indeed there were more than two “scales.” The process represented a *punctuated equilibrium* pattern with long stable periods punctuated by short transitions to wider systems (such as the formation of first territorial states c. 3000 BC, the Amarna period and the Axial Age). The Columbian period was only the last and most expansive phase.

Prior to the Columbian period, the view presented here is not Eurocentric. Spatially the process was much broader and is described as such under synoptic view. This view challenges another Eurocentric concept—that military globalization had been reversed with the coming of what in the European periodization is referred to as the *Middle Ages*. The synoptic view, extended to regions beyond Europe, demonstrates that the process has actually continued unaltered.

The book includes political developments intersected with military globalization, such as expansion of political systems, imperial expansion and alliance politics. *Political system* is defined here as a militarily interrelated, international system. Such political systems completed their globalization c. 1900. It was then that the entire world had been divided among sovereign territories, each controlled militarily by a certain state. Synchronously, the revolution in the technology

of warfare and communication resulted in a drastic reduction of the time required for projection of power worldwide, sidestepping the final logistic barriers for the phenomenon of *World War*.

In contrast to economic globalization, military globalization is not only about formation of the interrelated worldwide system (described in Part I). Military globalization, having formed the world system around 1900, underwent a drastic strategic centralization (Part II). The most intensive phase occurred during World War II, in large measure intensified by the ascension of Air Power. The number of political poles around the globe decreased dramatically—shrinking to bipolarity and eventually to unipolarity. The unipolar power—the United States—developed a global strategic reach and a global network of alliances. Thus, in contrast to economic globalization, military globalization appears to be a centripetal process.

The passage from multipolar to unipolar military globalization does not suggest that the United States became the exclusive, or privileged, source of new strategic doctrines and technological military innovation, but rather that the United States projected its strategic control globally and integrated a global network of alliances under its coordination. In the strategic sphere, the initially multipolar globalization converged into a unipolar one. The bipolar period is included in Part II ("Unipolar Globalization") because already from 1945, the world political system has displayed a significant unipolar dimension.

The work is organized chronologically. Occasionally however reference is made to events and documents from

centuries or even millennia ago in purpose to emphasize mankind's spatial and technological accomplishments.

Unless explicitly noted, all emphases in citations are as they appear in the original. The abbreviation "esnp" denotes "electronic source with no pagination."

Part I
MULTIPOLAR GLOBALIZATION

PRELUDE

Archeological evidence for prehistory finds no evidence of extensive territorial control. Certainly until the Neolithic Revolution (c. 8000 BC), there were no political units larger than small independent tribes whose holdings did not much exceed their own camps or caves. Most likely, the process of military globalization began some time in the Neolithic (between 8000 and 3000 BC), as the very first written evidence c. 3000 BC already presents extensive territorial kingdoms and hegemonies (according to the Mesopotamian tradition, city-state Kish established its hegemony over all Sumer immediately after the Flood). Hypothetically, Neolithic independent tribes, or city-states, existing in close proximity within the Fertile Crescent began to wage wars and, in the process, passed the *point of no return* towards ever-larger territories controlled by a single center and towards ever-farther projection of military power.

Archaic military globalization is well documented in some of the earliest inscriptions. Around 3000 BC, in the river valleys of Egypt and Mesopotamia appeared first territorial units of size visible on the world map. Rein Taagepera³ marks this apparent cohesion as one of three “sudden increases in polity sizes,” along with the Axial Age (mid-First millennium BC) and the Columbian epoch. The formation of Lower and Upper Egypt, he estimates, suddenly ten-folded the size of prehistoric polities and with the unification of Egypt yet doubled.⁴ Mesopotamian sources claim that Sargon of Accad

³ Taagepera 1997: 475-476.

⁴ Ibid, 480. King Narmer conquered all Egypt c. 3000 BC.

conquered “all from sea to sea,” meaning from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf.

The second significant expansion occurred in the mid-Second millennium BC. In the Near East during the Amarna age, civilizations of the Fertile Crescent merged to form one political system all parts of which were in diplomatic and military contact⁵. Military expansion during this period used to outpace the expansion of geographic knowledge—knowledge notable for its limitations: the Egyptian Army of the New Kingdom, when it reached the upper Euphrates, were surprised to discover a river flowing southward. In the course of this expansion, Egypt of the New Kingdom became the largest empire so far in the Near East. It was surpassed in size however by its contemporary in the Far East, the Shang Dynasty, which unified the whole of the Chinese core civilization, later known as *Chung-kuo* (*Country in the Middle*).

The third and the most significant pre-modern surge of globalization occurred during the Axial Age. In the Bronze Age, the maximum empire size fluctuated between 0.3 and 1 million square miles, albeit embodying a gradual trend up. Around 500 BC, there was exhibited a rapid increase of maximum territory to 5.5 million square miles (the Persian Empire).⁶ The maximum size of the single largest polity prior to the Axial Age never surpassed 1.1 million square km, while the subsequent to the Axial epoch single largest polity never fell below 2.3 million square km.⁷

⁵ Liverani 2002.

⁶ Turchin 2009: 205, figure 2.

⁷ Taagepera 1997: 486.

The scale of the Axial Age globalization can be illustrated by a comparison between Assyria and Persia—two consecutive empires of the Axial Age. Sargon II (722-705 BC) of Assyria was proud of having subjugating Cyprus—a land he knew as "far away in the midst of the sea" and "so far off that none of my forefathers [had ever he]ard the names of their countries."⁸ His successor Sennacherib (705-681 BC) continued to refer to Cyprus as an island in the "midst of the sea."⁹ Eastward, the Assyrian Empire never penetrated the Zagros Mountains. Less than two centuries later the army of Persian King Darius I (521-486 BC) did invade Greece, succeeded to cross the Danube northward and in the east annexed the Indus Valley.

The reign of Darius I thus marks the formation of an enormous Indo-Mediterranean political system. Henceforth, "all these civilizations from India to Greece stood in very direct contact with one or several imperial states of the Near East."¹⁰ Two Greek major works on the Asian geography which preceded Alexander were written by Greeks at the service of the Persian Empire, Scylax and Ctesias. Alexander the Great conquered the Persian Empire and reached India. Beginning with Alexander, nearly all Greek major accounts of India came from agents of Greek invaders. The regions of India beyond the Hyphasis, where Alexander had ground to a halt, remained for centuries hence "a source of literary exotica."¹¹

⁸ *Ancient Near Eastern Texts*, 284.

⁹ *Ibid*, 288.

¹⁰ Kulke 1985: 390-391.

¹¹ Romm 1992: 83-84, 121.

The Mauryan Emperor Asoka (273-231 BC), having completed the conquest of India, aspired to conquer the entire Hellenistic world and later the Roman Triumvirs and Emperors dreamed of a universal conquest culminating in India.¹² Crassus was captured and killed by the Parthians on his way eastwards. According to tradition, Alexander wept that he has no more world to conquer; Julius Caesar, having reached the age of 33 (at which Alexander died), wept that he had performed less impressive conquests.¹³

The massive Indo-Mediterranean system embraced the bulk of the world's population representing the clustering of all contemporary civilizations except the Chinese. The Chinese world was expanding synchronously with that of the Indo-Mediterranean to its West and the original, core Chinese civilization metamorphosed into *Country in the Middle* (*Chung-kuo*) of a wider political system. Nevertheless, Tibet continued to isolate it from the Indo-Mediterranean world. In this aspect, the Axial Age formed two major political systems separated by Tibet. While an Augustan propaganda strongly inspired the Romans march to the Ganges,¹⁴ nowhere in Hellenistic tradition does the notion appear of a march to the Huang Ho or Yangtze.

Initially highly multipolar, the Chinese system in the course of wars and conquests consolidated. The Chinese classic Mozi (468-393 BC) observed: "In ancient times the Emperor commissioned feudal lords numbering more than 10,000. On account of absorption of one state by another, all of the more than 10,000 states have disappeared with only the

¹² Ostrovsky 2006: 42-43.

¹³ Dio Cassius, 37:52.

¹⁴ Ostrovsky 2006: 42-43.

four remaining.”¹⁵ Within two centuries after Mozi’s death, only one state remained in his world. One of the Warring States—Qin—performed a sweeping universal conquest of the six remaining in 230-221 BC.

For their own part, the Chinese discovered the world west of Tibet in 138 BC, when the royal official Chang Chian, dispatched by the Han Emperor Wu, reached the countries of Central Asia and was amazed to discover that those "people cultivated the land and made their living in much the same way as the Chinese."¹⁶ Two centuries later the Han army followed in his footsteps and for the first time two major systems of the Old World—the Indo-Mediterranean and the Chinese—came into political-military contact.

While the Bronze Age civilizations created first Empires of size visible on the world map, the Empires that came to the fore in the Axial Age occupied considerable portions of the world map. Some even reached 20% of the world’s dry land area.¹⁷ When the Han army penetrated into Central Asia (during the Second century AD) the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans were spanned by only three Empires—China, Parthia and Rome—stretching along the famed *Silk Road*.

The macrohistoric process of imperial expansion is conventionally outlined from the beginning of history until the Roman Empire: following the entities inhabiting the Nile valley and in Mesopotamia, “the aging world of antiquity produced entities of ever-growing extent, and finally the mightiest of all, which was to spread its own: the Greco-

¹⁵ Mozi 5:7:3

¹⁶ Sima Qian, vol II, p 236.

¹⁷ Taagepera 1997: 480.

Roman civilization.”¹⁸ The fall of Rome is regarded as a reversal of the process and the achievements of Rome as being unsurpassed. In our days, “it seems as if every major book or article on American grand strategy contains the observation that the United States is more powerful than any international actor since the Roman Empire was at its zenith.”¹⁹ Michael Ignatieff opens his article with this comparison: “We live in a world that has no precedents since the age of the later Roman emperors.”²⁰ “Given the extent of US primacy, it has become a commonplace to compare today’s United States to the Roman Empire.”²¹

This observation however present a precariously myopic, Eurocentric view of world history. To contradict this view, the process of military globalization saw neither reversal nor cessation with the fall of Rome and the advent of what in the European history is commonly called the *Middle Ages*. Although at a much slower rate, the maximum imperial size continued to increase.²² In the Eighth century AD, the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans were spanned by only two Empires—the Caliphate and Tang China. These two clashed in the battle at Talas in 751. That battle could involve soldiers from both the Atlantic and the Pacific shores.

Eastward, the Tang China extended its military reach to the Korean peninsula. Concurrently, Japan intervened in Korea, engaging in its only military campaign in mainland Asia during the pre-modern period and, at the same time, suffering its greatest defeat in pre-modern history. In the battle

¹⁸ Dehio 1945: 22.

¹⁹ Layne 2006a: 41.

²⁰ Ignatieff 2003: 53.

²¹ Rapley 2006: 103.

²² Turchin 2009: 205, figure 2.

of Hakusukinoe in 663, the Japanese Army was routed by the combined armies of Tang China and the Korean state of Silla. Consequently, the Yamato court erected a huge network of shore fortifications in Japan against what they anticipated to be an imminent invasion by both Tang and Silla. Transiently, the Far Eastern political system integrated China, the three Korean kingdoms and Japan.

In the Thirteenth century, the Mongol conquests turned Eurasia into the Mongolian realm and the peninsular remnants. During this period, one family ruled the entire land mass from the Pacific to the Adriatic and Baltic Seas. For a brief period, this saw the world's largest contiguous land mass turned into a single political system, evidenced by the description of Transoxanian Sultan by Ibn Battuta (1304-1377): "His territories lie between four of the great kings of the earth, namely the king of China, the king of India, the king of al-Iraq, and the king Uzbek."²³ The most telling element of this description is the consideration of China not as isolated but as an integral part of the Eurasian political system.

The Mongols attempted an invasion of Japan, but failed as a result of their inadequate seafaring know how. Two centuries later however, the Naval Revolution on the opposite, seaboard edge of Eurasia elevated the seafaring to the level necessary to unleash the most expansive and truly global phase of military globalization.

²³ Ibn Battuta, vol 4/31, p 556.

THE COLUMBIAN EPOCH

The Hellenistic tradition animated Ocean in military terms as the most stubborn and implacable of foes attacking the fleet.²⁴ Prior to the First century BC, the most human individual capable of crossing the encircling Ocean was Heracles. Between 100 BC and AD 100, tradition enabled human conquerors to cross Ocean. A series of texts depict such archetypal conquerors as Scipio Africanus, Messalla, and, as always, Alexander contemplating whether the southern *oicoumene* might be bridged to the northern as part of a globe-spanning extension of empire.²⁵ The anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herrenium*²⁶ composed in the early First century BC assured: “If Alexander had lived longer, he would have brought the Macedonian armies across Ocean.” Messalla’s eulogy, composed shortly after 31 BC, predicts that Consul Messalla will surpass the voyages of Odysseus in the scope of his conquests²⁷ and shall cap his career by conquering the Antipodes:

Wherever Ocean rings the world with seas
No land will bring against you hostile arms.
The Briton, as yet unbeaten by Rome’s wars,
awaits you,
And the other parts of the world, beyond the
sun’s pass...
So, when your deeds have at last gained
glorious triumphs,

²⁴ Romm 1992: 144, 147.

²⁵ Ibid, 133-134, 137-138.

²⁶ *Rhetorica ad Herrenium*, 4:31.

²⁷ Tibullus, 3:7:49-51, 148-150, 175-176.

You alone shall be equally called great in
either world.

Quintilian (the First century AD) inquired “whether Alexander is going to find lands beyond Ocean.”²⁸ This became a stock theme amongst contemporary rhetoricians.²⁹ Seneca the Elder extended Alexander’s potential for conquest: “Alexander will fly beyond Bactria and India, will seek what is beyond the great sea, and will think it unworthy that there is something he cannot pass beyond.”³⁰ A younger Seneca wrote: Alexander is “exploring unknown seas, sending new fleets onto Ocean, and breaking through ... the very bounds of the world.”³¹ His contemporary, Lucan, assured:

[Alexander] was preparing to bring his fleet
into Ocean,
There by the outer sea, neither fiery heat nor
sea-swell
Nor desert Libya, nor Ammon with its Syrtes,
could stop him.
He would have gone into the West, following
earth’s declination,
Rounded the poles, and drank from the Nile at
its source,
But his dying day prevented it.³²

“That the theme of Alexander’s designs on the Antipodes became popular during the Roman Empire’s greatest period of expansion can hardly be coincidence.” The

²⁸ *Institutio Oratoria*, 3:8:16; also 7:2:5, 7:4:2.

²⁹ Seneca the Elder, *Suasoriae* and *Controversia* 7:7:19.

³⁰ Cited in Romm 1992: 166.

³¹ Seneca the Younger, *Epistles*, 119:7.

³² Lucan, *Bellum Civile*, 10:36-41.

message being “that imperial Rome was carrying forward the goals left unfulfilled by the dying Alexander.”³³ Nevertheless several classics—Cicero, Pliny the Elder and Horace—were pessimistic regarding globe-spanning imperial extensions. For Cicero,³⁴ the Antipodes were “an exemplary case of lands that can never be conquered, a visible symbol of the limits to Roman expansion.” Pliny the Elder did not believe that the world ocean would ever be overcome: “Thus seas poured everywhere around us, by dividing the globe, have robbed us of a portion of the world; there is no region that permits passage from here to there or from there to here.” This thinking is akin to “dispelling the vanity of human existence.”³⁵

Seneca the Younger hypothesized the overseas expansion in distant future and saw it as being beneficial provided said naval adventures are not used “for the transport of legions and cavalry or the ferrying over of weapons of human destruction.”³⁶ He and Horace interpreted the eternal oceanic separation as an instance of divine wisdom, ordained to prevent impious war ships for overseas conquest:

For no purpose did a wise god divide the lands
with estranging Ocean, if our impious ships
nevertheless race across waters that should be
left untouched, recklessly braving all, the
human race rushes through forbidden sin.³⁷

³³ Romm 1992: 139.

³⁴ Cicero, *Republic*, 6:20.

³⁵ Pliny the Elder, 2:67:170.

³⁶ Seneca the Younger, *Natural Questions*, 5:18:14.

³⁷ Horace, *Odes*, 1:3:21-26.

Providence and that god who orders the cosmos ... did not intend this: That we should fill ships with armed legions and send them to conquer a portion of the deep...”³⁸

The *Pillars* or *Columns of Hercules* connecting the familiar Mediterranean and the alien Ocean were a vivid symbol of the barrier between inner and outer worlds. For Pindar, the Pillars stand for the boundary of the human condition itself. To pass beyond them is the prerogative of god alone, or of mythic heroes like Heracles who manage to bridge the human and the divine.³⁹

Columbus repeated the legendary achievement of Heracles. By Pliny’s lights, human existence could be said to have acquired meaning in 1492. What Seneca referred to as the “providence and that god who orders the cosmos,” overturned in their minds. Ships “with armed legions” began conquering “a portion of the deep.” In the words of Horace, the wisdom of a god had been overcome; “recklessly braving all, the human race rushed through forbidden sin,” leaving no waters of the world “untouched.”

In fact the Pillars of Hercules had revealed their “mobile” potential already in the classic tradition. As the Roman Empire advanced toward the North Sea, the Pillars were removed to the mouth of the Reinus.⁴⁰ In the wake of 1492, the Pillars began their figurative rush across the encircling Ocean. *Non plus ultra* (*nothing further beyond*) is said to have been inscribed as a warning on the Pillars of Hercules. Following the exploits of Columbus, the Holy

³⁸ Seneca the Younger, *Natural Questions*, 5:18:5.

³⁹ Romm 1992: 17-18.

⁴⁰ Tacitus, *Germania*, 34.

Roman Emperor Karl V adopted as a motto *plus ultra*. Today the motto still features on both the flag and arms of Spain. The Columbian epoch initiated the "global" and most expansive stage of military globalization.

Tiberianus' "Letter from the Antipodes" begins: "Those above greet those below."⁴¹ Fifteen centuries later, this utopian vision came true. A representative of the Antipodes, Garcilasco de la Vega of Inca descent, at last replied those classics who had doubted his existence:

And those who say that of the five parts of the world called zones only the two temperate are habitable and the midmost is excessively hot and the two outermost too cold to be habitable, and that it is impossible to pass from one habitable zone to the other because of the great heat of the intervening zone, may be assured that I myself was born in the torrid zone, in Cuzco ... and that I have been in the temperate zone to the south beyond the Tropic of Capricorn ... and to reach this other temperate zone, where I am writing these words, I passed through the torrid zone from one side... so that I can assert that the torrid zone is habitable...⁴²

Four centuries before Wendell Willkie published his epochal "One World," Garcilasco had expressed a very similar global concept:

But trusting in God's infinite mercy, I will say at the outset that there is only one world, and

⁴¹ Cited in Romm 1992: 138.

⁴² Garcilasco de la Vega, *Royal Commentaries*, vol I, 9-10.

although we speak of the Old World and the New, this is because the latter was lately discovered by us, and not because there are two. And for those who still imagine there are many, there is no answer except that they may remain in their heretical imaginings till they are undeceived in hell.⁴³

Imperial expansion poured overseas on unprecedented scale. Garcilasco's Inca Empire—the largest overseas—was conquered by the Spaniards within scarcely four hours. Meanwhile, Magellan circumnavigated the globe and the conquistadors followed in his wake.

In 1494, the Spaniards and the Portuguese signed the Treaty of Tordesillas fixing their frontier along 46° West of Greenwich. Having fixed their frontier along the Atlantic meridian, they found the world to be round and perforce requiring another demarcation along a Pacific meridian to complete their spheres. To complete this task, Columbus negotiated the Treaty of Zaragoza with the Pope and King Joao II of Portugal. The other agreed upon boundary crossed the other side of the globe, approximately along 132° East of Greenwich. The two Iberian powers faced each other on the opposite side of the globe. The Spanish and Portuguese hemispheres were formed,⁴⁴ with “a demarcation line cutting the globe into two halves...”⁴⁵

Following the Treaty of Tordesillas, the Portuguese declared the Indian Ocean as a *mare clausum*, a closed space in which they could charge tolls and duties. The Romans had

⁴³ Ibid, vol I, 9-10.

⁴⁴ James & Martin 1981: 74; Watson 1992: 218.

⁴⁵ Dehio 1945: 52.

been proud to turn the Mediterranean into their *mare nostrum*. In the Columbian era, world oceans became *mares nostrums* divided between several European empires. During the Nineteenth century, the shores of the Indian Ocean became almost continuously colored in British red: "Red is the dominant color in Africa; red territories and bases surround the Indian Ocean and make it an inland sea of the Empire for all practical purposes."⁴⁶

The kings of ancient Egypt had dreamed of ruling "all what the sun encircles," and likewise their contemporaries in Mesopotamia of extending their rule "from sunrise to sunset."⁴⁷ The European colonial powers established empires on which literally "the sun never sets," as Homer Lea poetically invoked for Britain:

The Saxon has marked around this Earth, as has no other race before him, the scarlet circle of his power ... There has been ... no race it has not fought... This Saxon line ... has given down ... an empire over which the Sun and stars shine together; where night never falls nor dawn begins.⁴⁸

Soon afterwards, the above-exalted Empire covered in its characteristic pale red "a fourth of the Earth's surface" and included "500 million souls, a fourth of the world's population."⁴⁹

In the Seven Year War (1756-1763), the battle lines were drawn in Europe, North America, South Asia and across

⁴⁶ Dierk Walter 2002: 62.

⁴⁷ Liverani 2002: 30.

⁴⁸ Lea 1912: 4-5.

⁴⁹ Walter 2002: 62.

the oceans. Hence, the European internal struggles were repeatedly fought on a global scale, across several continents. The intra-European warfare was globalized well before the Twentieth century. For this, some scholars define those European wars as already “world wars,” eventually leading to the World Wars of the Twentieth century.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Deudney & Ikenberry 2015: 10.

GLOBAL CLOSURE

Tacitus tells of a frustrated Roman naval expedition: The sailors did not “lack daring,” but the North Sea blocked them from exploring further. “Soon . . . we stopped trying, and it was deemed more reverent and more pious to believe in the works of the gods than to know about them.”⁵¹ By the end of the Columbian epoch, c. 1900, all geographic beliefs had been tested through explorations and all the works of the gods on the earth’s surface had been mapped and appropriated, leaving no room on the world map for divine “reverence” and “pity.”

Military globalization filled every void bereft of sovereignty on the globe, thereby creating a world-system. “With the allotment of Africa and the exploration of polar ice caps (both since 1900), no new lands remain.”⁵² “The 1880s ‘scramble for Africa’ represented a final territorial and economic aggrandizement in absolute geographical space.”⁵³ The waves of European expansion had circumnavigated the globe and coincided in the Far East—a fact symbolized by the US’ annexation of Philippines (1898), its *Open Door* policy in China (1900) and the Russian-Japanese War (1904-1905).

Herbert G. Wells’ famous *War of the Worlds* (1897) reflects the completion of military globalization. With military history gone planetary, the human imagination leapt to the inter-planetary. The geopolitical system, having become global, left no room for “the barbarians beyond frontier” and thus caused the imagination to push the invaders’ homeland

⁵¹ Tacitus, *Germania*, 34.

⁵² Whittlesey 1942: 189-190.

⁵³ Neil Smith 1999: 6.

to... Mars. Henceforth, the genre of aliens invading Earth has been popular.

Lenin argued that “for the first time the world is completely divided up.” Colonial powers had “completed the seizure of the unoccupied territories on our planet” and “in the future only re-division is possible.”⁵⁴ Two famous contemporary observers, Halford Mackinder and Frederick Turner, outlined this global closure in their seminal works:

But the end of the Nineteenth century is appropriate as the end of a great historical epoch ... The missionary, the conqueror, the farmer ... have followed so closely in the traveler’s footsteps that the world, in its remotest borders, has hardly been revealed before we must chronicle its virtually complete political appropriation. In Europe, North America, South America, Asia and Australia there is scarcely a region left for the pegging out of a claim of ownership... From the present time forth, in the post-Columbian age, we shall again, as in the pre-Columbian age] have to deal with a closed political system and nonetheless it will be one of worldwide scope.⁵⁵

And now, four centuries from the discovery of America... the frontier has gone... He would be a rash prophet who should assert that the expansive character of the American life has

⁵⁴ Cited in Ibid, 7.

⁵⁵ Mackinder 1904; 30-31.

now entirely ceased. Movement has been its dominant fact, and ... the American energy will continuously demand a wider field for its exercise. But never again will such gifts of free land offer themselves.⁵⁶

Regarding Turner's view, Neil Smith comments:

It was not simply the western frontier but the global frontier that was drawing to a close. The outlines of *globalism* were achieved, in most respects, by the beginning not the end of the Twentieth century.⁵⁷

Out of these circumstances the terms *lebensraum* and *geopolitics* were coined, respectively by Friedrich Ratzel in 1897 and Rudolf Kjellen in 1899 respectively. Geoffrey Parker notes that the science of geopolitics "began at just that moment of history when the coloring of polychromatic world political map was reaching its completion." Similarly, Neil Smith concludes:

Intellectually, this was a period of intense, state-centered geographic angst associated with the rise of distinct national schools of geography, and perhaps best represented by Friedrich Ratzel's geopolitics in Germany ... The period after 1898 was one of intense geographical interest, even as the loss of the new worlds to conquer weighted heavily. It corresponded with a more general spatial turn, not restricted to the global scale, as political

⁵⁶ Turner 1920: 1.

⁵⁷ Emphasis added, Neil Smith 1999: 6.

dilemmas and discourses became densely geographical.⁵⁸

By employing the evocative gerunds, such as *re-echoing* and *shattering*, Mackinder's vocabulary "only deepens the sense that Mackinder caught something more cogent than the now dated Heartland theory of geopolitics," something "geographically complex."⁵⁹ That "something" is first and foremost the condition of *global closure*:

Studies of conditions and resources make it clear that human society now inhabits a globe which is a closed circuit. Ever since the Fifteenth century discoveries which disclosed the remaining continents to Europeans, there has been space in which the expansive force of European peoples could dissipate itself—new lands to conquer, as well as new resources to utilize. That period has come to an end in the present century. As the geopoliticians have seen, the remaining unoccupied lands of the Earth offer little or no opportunity for settlement.⁶⁰

As with all political sciences, writes Geoffrey Parker,⁶¹ geopolitics underwent many changes but with one constant, underlying theme surviving—that the world has been seen as a closed and finite entity. Smaller units cannot be understood independently of a whole. Thus it is the world itself which is considered the most meaningful unit of study.

⁵⁸ Neil Smith 1999: 6, 10.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 10.

⁶⁰ Whittlesey 1942: 189-190.

⁶¹ Parker 1985: 1, 173.

“Global closure” is a geopolitical reality that will remain until the end of history. In past political systems geopolitical closure exerted a heavy centripetal pressure.⁶² Expanding systems (like Europe since the fall of Rome) were more successful in establishing balance of power, while closed systems (such as China) evolved into permanent hierarchic organizations. In the modern case, the advent of global closure coincided with the technological and industrial revolutions. As a result, the centripetal pressure of the closure yet multiplied, warfare explosively increased (manifesting in two World Wars) and the world-system inexorably moved towards unipolarity. From the time the centripetal factor of global closure became enacted, around 1900, military affairs undergo a dual process of globalization and centralization.⁶³

⁶² Ostrovsky 2006.

⁶³ By “centralization,” I mean the described below unipolar power projection and unipolar configuration of alliances.

GLOBAL WARFARE

In 1813, Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to the German Geographer Alexander von Humboldt:

The European nations constitute a separate division of the globe; their localities make them a distinct system; they have a set of interests of their own in which it is our business never to engage ourselves. America has a Hemisphere to itself. It must have its separate system of interests, which must not be subordinated to those of Europe.⁶⁴

"The greatest advantage of the United States, wrote Tocqueville thirty years later in his famous *Democracy in America*, consists in a geographical position which renders ... wars extremely improbable."⁶⁵ In Europe, a reciprocal perspective prevailed. Describing the perspective of Europe towards the United States between 1848 and 1917, Alan John P. Tylor noted: "The United States seemed ... not merely in another continent, but on another planet."⁶⁶

Nevertheless some thinkers of the late La Belle Époque anticipated military globalization involving both Hemispheres. In 1866, French Economist Michel Chevalier, was impressed by the "political colossus who is being created at the other side of the Atlantic" who will overshadow Europe by the end of the Nineteenth century. Unless Europe united, he warned, it would be "weak and exposed to disastrous defeats" in confrontations with the New World.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Cited in O'Tauthail & Agnew 1992: 197-198.

⁶⁵ Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol I, p 178.

⁶⁶ Tylor 1957: XXXIII.

⁶⁷ Chevalier 1866: 784-785.

Emphasizing the impact of technology on international frontiers and military alliances, Argentine writer Juan Bautista Alberdi, in a book published in 1870, predicted the advance of mankind through regional or continental organization to a final stage, the global:

In proportion as space is annihilated by the marvelous power of steam and electricity... the nations of the world find themselves brought closer and closer together, so that they seem to form a single country... Every railway is worth a dozen of alliances, every foreign loan is a frontier wiped out. The three Atlantic cables have destroyed and buried the Monroe Doctrine without the least formality.⁶⁸

Other thinkers of the period anticipated worldwide wars.⁶⁹ In 1885, Kang Yu-wei in his *One World Philosophy*⁷⁰ envisaged a final contest between Washington and Berlin that will hasten the world along the road to “One World” (Wendell Willkie would write a book under similar title, while, against the background of a broader global war, these two parties were engaged in that very contest). George Vacher de Lapouge, in a fatalistic chapter “L’Avenir des Aryens” (The Future of the Aryans) of his 1899 book,⁷¹ estimated that the final contest will be between America and Russia, with America likely to triumph. In 1900, Herbert Wells in his *Anticipations*⁷² foresaw a global organization of English-speaking peoples (“the New Republic”) which “will already be consciously and pretty

⁶⁸ Cited in Whitaker 1954: 65.

⁶⁹ Clarke 1966.

⁷⁰ Kang Yu-wei 1885: 79-85.

⁷¹ Vacher de Lapouge 1899: XXXI-XXXII.

⁷² Wells 1900: 107.

freely controlling the general affairs of humanity before this century closes...” In another fatalistic book, *The Day of the Saxon* (1912), Homer Lea stated that mechanical invention reduced distance and diminished once formidable geographic barriers:

Nations cannot in this age still hide themselves behind their mountain walls or their moats of space and sea... Science, unlike God, has no chosen people. These by the sunrise and those by its going down are one and the same. It has in its impartial and relentless manner crushed this once vast world into a little ball around which go each day the whisperings of a hundred tongues. It is now a hundred cubits less in size than the Tower of Babel. So small has this once immeasurable world become that man sees all its sides at once. He hears simultaneously all its noises... where, simultaneously, man boycotts time and God and space.⁷³

To reduce distance is to increase the convergence of interests. To diminish space, geographical and political, is to merge small nations into greater units. This passage is war; this unification is conflict. Mankind, like metals, is welded together by fire and by blows... When communicable means are increased in number, capacity, and speed, the world undergoes a corresponding shrinkage. In

⁷³ Lea 1912: 100-101.

the process of this contraction, there results a greater intensity of political expansion, a corresponding development of military capacity to wage war...⁷⁴

The “old world in its vastness is gone. Oceans have become rivers, and kingdoms the environs of a single city. The solitudes of the Earth have vanished, and the whole of the human race now struggles within a space no greater than was once allotted to a single empire.” Races are not converged from or toward widely separated spheres, but “jammed together.” The “world in a military sense is no larger than Western Europe a hundred years ago” and “is now a single theater of war...”⁷⁵

Owing to the “elimination of space and time,” Homer Lea warned, German “troops can now be moved to the end of the strategic world in less time a hundred years ago they could go from Berlin to Paris.”⁷⁶ His perspicacious insight might have been premature for World War I but spot on for World War II. Following World I, Jack Slessor of the British Air Force believed that trench stalemate was over. Similarly, the advent of the tank and airplane meant that the static warfare of the western front had become an aberration.⁷⁷ His American colleague, Billy Mitchell, echoed Slessor’s thoughts after first viewing the deadlock of trench warfare from the air:

A very significant thing to me was that we could cross the lines of these contending

⁷⁴ Ibid, 178.

⁷⁵ Ibid. 150-152.

⁷⁶ Ibid. 134-135.

⁷⁷ Meilinger 1997: 62.

armies in a few minutes in our airplane, whereas the armies had been locked in the struggle, immovable, powerless to advance, for three years. To even stick one's head over the top of a trench invited death. This whole area over which the Germans and French battled was not more than sixty miles across. It was as though they kept knocking their heads against a stone wall, until their brains were dashed out. They got nowhere, as far as ending the war was concerned.⁷⁸

In World War II, motorized warfare, combined with effective air support, introduced the phenomenon of *Blitzkrieg*:

The speed, mobility, and striking power of the armored division with tactical air support had a great advantage over field defenses and minor fortifications. The new warfare was characterized by fluidity and speed, deep penetrations, and broad encirclements. The stalemate of World War I had been transformed into the blitzkrieg of World War II.⁷⁹

Churchill, following the collapse of Poland, wondered: Neither in France nor in Britain had there been any effective comprehension that armored vehicles, withstanding artillery fire, could advance a hundred miles a day.⁸⁰ After Poland, France followed suit. The most formidable artificial

⁷⁸ Cited in Clodfelter 1997: 84.

⁷⁹ Jack Levy 1984: 233.

⁸⁰ Hart 1970: 20.

defensive line of the day—the Maginot Line—proved to be nearly useless: It "took only one direct hit from out 88-millimetre artillery to smash each of the French concrete blockhouses visible on the opposite side of the River."⁸¹ And it took them only six weeks to overrun France. As Heinz Soffner put it during the War, in today's world "time (in war) was dramatically speeding up."⁸² Stunned by this acceleration, some contemporary observers concluded that the world domination had now become possible:

The swift march of conquest stunned or dazzled the onlookers, many of whom conclude that it has been fortuitous ... The grandiose concept of the world domination became possible as a practical objective only with the rise of science and its application to mechanical invention. By these means, the Earth's scattered land units and territories became accessible and complementary to each other, and for the first time the world state, so long a futile medieval ideal, became a goal that might conceivably be reached.⁸³

During the interwar period, Hitler used allusion to threaten the English with on military-technological progress: "There are no islands today."⁸⁴ Soon it was to be proven beyond a doubt that neither Britain nor even Hawaii were islands for as far as modern military technology was concerned:

⁸¹ Keitel, *Memoirs*, 75.

⁸² Cited in Barney 2011: 90-91.

⁸³ Whittlesey 1942: 13.

⁸⁴ *Hitler: Speeches & Proclamations*, 1848.

While it took the average Englishman from [the First] World War times to 1940 to comprehend that the airplane had changed his country's strategic, and therewith political, position, actual bombardment, coupled with the threat of immediate invasion, caused him to learn in a few days what he failed to learn in twenty years. Similarly, Pearl Harbor and what may ensue will have open the eyes of many an American...⁸⁵

The formation of the global political system coincided with the technological revolution of warfare and communication. The coincidence resulted in explosive surge of military globalization, expressed by two *World Wars*. The maximum acceleration had been reached by December 1941:

- December 7: the Japanese attacked the United States and Britain and proclaimed war on them and Canada;
- December 8: the United States and Canada proclaimed war on Japan;
- December 9: China declared war on Germany;
- December 10: Germany and Italy declared war on the US;
- December 12: the United States proclaimed war on the Axis; Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa on Japan;
- December 11–18: declarations of war by the great powers were followed by reciprocal salvos of declarations by their allies; four European states proclaimed

⁸⁵ Herz 1942: 1049.

war on the United States and nine Latin American nations and the Philippines proclaimed war on the Axis.

The War had become globalized, as both contemporary observers and later historians expressed. Reich Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels recorded in his diary after the Pearl Harbor attack: “The War turned into World War in full sense of the word. After first steps, small in the beginning of the path, it now sends waves, which cover the whole world.”⁸⁶ American magazines shared this view: “The Terrible sweep of a World War ... really girdles the globe...”⁸⁷ A contemporary observer stated: “The battle area is planetary in dimension.”⁸⁸ World War II was, “in an unprecedentedly literal sense, a global war.”⁸⁹ The battles of the war were synchronously fought amidst snow and ice and in the tropics half a globe apart.⁹⁰

Fronts of global dimension were formed. The German-Soviet front stretched for 3000 miles; the Pacific front from the Aleutians through the Solomon Islands to Burma. These two fronts represented the lengthiest in history land-front and sea-front respectively. British and Japanese soldiers, representing eastern and western islands of Eurasia, collided on the Indian-Burmese frontier thousands of miles from their homes. In the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski “Europe and Asia had become a single battlefield.”⁹¹

⁸⁶ Cited in Kershaw 2009: 434.

⁸⁷ *Life*, December 29, 1941, p 32.

⁸⁸ Byas 1942: 29.

⁸⁹ Henrikson 1980: 83.

⁹⁰ Lukacs 1993: 107.

⁹¹ Brzezinski 1997: 5.

The Pearl Harbor attack was another signal indication of accomplished military globalization—two non-European powers clashed on the opposite to Europe side of the globe. Because of the theatre's contraposition to Greenwich, time zones convergence complicated timetable: "Sunday, December 7 in Hawaii would be Monday, December 8 in Malaya."⁹²

Equally symbolical was the end of the war with the American and Soviet troops meeting on the Elbe River: "Nothing could have symbolized the demise of the ancient system more drastically than the meeting of Soviet and American troops on the Elbe River at the close of the World War II."⁹³ Some of the participants in that historic rendezvous were from the Pacific western and eastern shores.

The subsequent Cold War was a global confrontation. Henry Kissinger opens his chapter on US foreign policy: "For the first time, foreign policy has become global. In the past, various continents conducted their foreign policy in isolation." Present confrontations and uncertainties however are "being played on for the first time on the global scale... The postwar period was the first in which *all* the continents interacted."⁹⁴ Mackinder had predicted the impact of the global closure in 1904:

Every explosion of social forces, instead of being dissipated into surrounding circuit of unknown space... will be sharply re-echoed from the far side of the globe... There is a vast difference in effect in the fall of a shell into an

⁹² Hart 1970: 210.

⁹³ Joffe 1984: 66.

⁹⁴ Kissinger 1979: 53, 68.

earthwork and its fall amid the closed spaces and rigid structures of a great building or ship.⁹⁵

In 1979, Kissinger stated: "Modern communications transmitted news and ideas instantaneously. Events that used to be local—wars, rivalries, scandals, domestic upheavals, natural tragedies—suddenly began to assume global significance."⁹⁶

In a nuclear field, Mackinder's "re-echo" came true in a decidedly more literal sense. The Soviet hydrogen device—*Tsar Bomba*—detonated over Novaya Zemlia island in the Arctic Ocean broke windows in Finland and Norway and the "an echo of the explosion" circumnavigated the globe three times.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Mackinder 1904: 30-31.

⁹⁶ Kissinger 1979: 68.

⁹⁷ Sergo Khrushchev 2000: 467.

Part II
UNIPOLAR GLOBALIZATION

US STRATEGIC GLOBALIZATION

From Continentalism to Globalism

The Eighth century British scribe, Alcuin, was amazed by the unprecedented Viking invasion from beyond the North Sea because it was not "thought that such an inroad from the sea could be made."⁹⁸ In the past century, the Americans were similarly surprised by the Japanese inroad, but this time the sea was the Pacific Ocean. At this point, the history of surprise inroads from beyond the sea ended for no sea was large enough to make an inroad surprising.

After the Pearl Harbor attack, the American policymakers became convinced that, once and for all, political isolationism would no longer be a viable foreign policy on this planet. "Pearl Harbor convinced the remaining skeptics."⁹⁹ President Franklin Roosevelt acknowledged that the hostilities in Europe, Africa, and Asia were part and parcel of a singular global war and added: "Our strategy and self-defense [therefore] must be global strategy."¹⁰⁰ As Joseph E. Davies wrote in the "Epilogue" to his 1943 book:

The year that has passed since Pearl Harbor has brought home to all Americans the fact that we are now engaged in a global war. President Roosevelt has referred again and again in his speeches to the global strategy we are pursuing; he has called attention to the

⁹⁸ Loyn 1977: 55.

⁹⁹ Gaddis 1972: 353.

¹⁰⁰ Sloan 1988: 114-115.

interconnection between all the fighting fronts.¹⁰¹

Forming a global strategy would require unprecedented levels of knowledge of world geography. Scarcely two weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack, the National Geographic Society presented President Roosevelt with a specially designed map cabinet, accommodating 24 maps on 19 rollers with 15 or more map gazetteers. For Christmas 1943, the Society gifted Churchill a duplicate set of Roosevelt's Map Cabinet.¹⁰² In a 15 January 1945 editorial, the *New York Times* lauded the National Geographic's wartime map-making effort calling it “probably the most ambitious cartographical undertaking on record”¹⁰³

Isaiah Bowman, the acclaimed American Geographer and known as “Roosevelt’s Geographer,”¹⁰⁴ stated in 1942: “We are going to walk in gardens and enjoy culture only in snatches after we have toiled and bled on distant geographic frontiers. Our way of life is now planetary.”¹⁰⁵ The same year, two of Bowman’s colleagues, Derwent Whittlesey and Robert Strausz-Hupé, wrote: “Isolation, for the United States or any other nation, is impossible on an Earth integrated by science and invention.”¹⁰⁶

Global war has shown the continents and oceans to be parts of one closely meshed world political design. Far-off places, which only a

¹⁰¹ Davies 1943: 465.

¹⁰² Garver 1997: 153, 155.

¹⁰³ Cited in Ibid, 156.

¹⁰⁴ Neil Smith 2003.

¹⁰⁵ Bowman 1942a: 352.

¹⁰⁶ Whittlesey 1942: 192-193.

short while ago seemed to Americans to have no relation to their everyday needs and life—places like Iceland, Tripoli, Dakar, Bataan, Moulmein, and Lashio—have become for Americans the stepping stones of destiny.¹⁰⁷

Two contemporary Journalists, Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley, wondered how “Americans found themselves fighting at the end of 1941 on all the continents and all the seas.”¹⁰⁸ In his Inaugural Address on January 20, 1961, President Kennedy would confirm the fact of strategy having become global in nature: “The graves of young Americans who answered the call to service surround the globe.”

Roosevelt’s rival in the 1940 elections, Wendell L. Willkie, claimed in a radio address on October 26, 1942: The “world has become small and completely interdependent... The myriad millions of human beings in the Far East are as close to us as Los Angeles is to New York... Our thinking and our planning in the future must be global.”¹⁰⁹

That same year, Willkie made a round-the-world trip and the next year published his impressions in the momentous bestseller *One World*. It revealed: "There are no distant points in the world any longer" and that what concerns the "myriad millions of human beings" abroad, also concerns the Americans. "Our thinking in the future must be world-wide." To win the peace, "we must now plan for peace on a world basis" and "play an active, constructive part in freeing and

¹⁰⁷ Strausz-Hupé 1942: 3.

¹⁰⁸ Davis & Lindley 1943: 9.

¹⁰⁹ Willkie 1942: 340-341.

keeping" this peace.¹¹⁰ To repeat the mistake of Isolationism would be "a sheer disaster":

If our withdrawal from world affairs after the last war was a contributing factor to the present war and to the economic instability of the past 20 years—and it seems plain that it was—a withdrawal from the problems and responsibilities of the world after this war would be a sheer disaster. Even our relative geographic isolation no longer exists.¹¹¹

The only possible peace is global peace:

When I say that peace must be planned on a world basis, I mean quite literally that it must embrace the Earth. Continents and oceans are plainly only parts of a whole, seen, as I have seen them, from the air . . . And it is inescapable that there can be no peace for any part of the world unless the foundations of peace are made secure throughout all parts of the world.¹¹²

To repeat the already cited above Alberdi's words in chapter titled "Pueblo-Mundo" (Global Village), written in Argentina as far back as 1870, the "three Atlantic cables have destroyed and buried the Monroe Doctrine without the least formality."¹¹³ Echoing Alberdi's reference to Monroe Doctrine seventy years later, Clarence Streit in his famous *Union Now* confirmed: "Men fly round the globe today in one-tenth the time once needed to send news of the Monroe

¹¹⁰ Willkie 1943: 4, 166.

¹¹¹ Ibid, 165.

¹¹² Ibid, 166.

¹¹³ Cited in Whitaker 1954: 65-66.

Doctrine from the White House to Buenos Ayres."¹¹⁴ Another prominent contemporary cosmopolitan, the founder of the Pan-European movement, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, joined the challenge against the hemispheric isolation:

The Atlantic had become the Mediterranean of our days, uniting and not separating the two main branches of the white race and Western civilization... I understood that the period of continental isolation was definitely over and that the Atlantic Clipper had opened a new page of history: the chapter of a united Atlantic world, including Pan-America, the British Commonwealth of Nations and the future European federation.¹¹⁵

As World War II erupted, the American concept of Continentalism was challenged as being anachronistic and the focus of discussion in America shifted to the question which alternative strategy would replace it after the War. Together with Continentalism, the concept that the world is divided into hemispheres was altered too. Yet before America's entrance into the War, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson began extending the Monroe Doctrine across the Atlantic, even though Roosevelt was still "wary of offending the myriad devotees of the hemisphere tradition."¹¹⁶ By early 1941, Stimson had become "deeply disappointed by the President's failure to provide the country with energetic leadership in pursuing the line" of the "arsenal of democracy" and

¹¹⁴ Streit 1940: 32.

¹¹⁵ Coudenhove-Kalergi 1943: 219.

¹¹⁶ Whitaker 1954: 159.

“breaking the last shackles of neutrality and the Hemispheric traditions.”¹¹⁷

In 1941, Geographer Vilhjalmur Stefansson challenged the prominence of longitudinal metrics in determining areas of influence by noting that the 11th Meridian borders Greenland and cuts across West Africa.¹¹⁸ That same year, *Foreign Affairs* published Eugene Staley’s “Myths of the Continents” (in 1947, *The Foreign Affairs Reader* selected this piece for its 25th anniversary volume which contained articles “selected because what their authors had to say seems a permanent part of the record”). Its opening question asked:

One general theme runs like a red thread through most of these discussions, by continentalists and non-continentalists alike. That is the conviction that the day of the small, completely independent nations is past. There will be in the future—and ought to be—*larger* political-economic units of some kind. This, in the view of the present writer, has to be accepted as unquestionably sound. But is the natural progression from small, sovereign states to continental groupings?¹¹⁹

Staley’s answer was that the natural progression is neither to continental nor even hemispheric groupings, but right to the end—the global grouping. Modern transportation, Staley wrote, makes continental unities myths. Ocean does not separate. Colonization was easier overseas than westward.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Ibid. 160.

¹¹⁸ Stefansson 1941: 244.

¹¹⁹ Staley 1941: 482.

¹²⁰ Staley 1941: 484-485, 486.

The “solidarity” with South America is “maritime” rather than “overland,” and if there should be any maritime solidarity today it is rather with Great Britain:

It should be noted ... that our relations with the Western Hemisphere countries to the south of us are not really ‘continental’ in any significant practical sense. A land connection is afforded by the Isthmus of Panama, but no one ever travels, or sends messages, or transport good between North and South America *overland*... If the Western Hemisphere is to be considered as one unit for defense purposes, it provides an instance not of continental but of *maritime* solidarity. The practical issue today, in reality, is between two kinds of maritime solidarity. Some would make our area of maritime solidarity quasi-continental—that is, confined to North and South America and their immediate vicinities—while others would team up with Britain in a world-girdling maritime defense group.¹²¹

A Western Hemisphere defense would be inferior to the Anglo-Saxon defense: “*We* would be the blockaded party.” The Axis would have the economic advantage.¹²² The bottom line of this article stated:

It is less risky to stand now for all-out defense, together with Britain, of the seas and the strong-points commanding the seas of the

¹²¹ Ibid. 487.

¹²² Ibid. 492.

whole world—Singapore, Hawaii, Panama, Gibraltar, Suez, and Britain itself—than to let Britain go down and then to try to defend the Western Hemisphere practically alone.¹²³

“Myths of the Continents” was the only article in that *Foreign Affairs* volume dealing with Latin America or Pan-America. “At any time before 1941 such a proportion would have been unthinkable; since 1941, it has been about right.”¹²⁴

In 1942, “[a]nother heavy blow to the traditional Western Hemisphere faith was delivered . . . by a work of hard-boiled realism”—Nicholas Spykman’s *America’s Strategy in World Politics*. In it, the Western Hemisphere concept was associated with Isolationism and against which Spykman revolted.¹²⁵ He argued: “Hemisphere defense is no defense at all.”¹²⁶

Two years later, the noted Geographer Walter Ristow emphatically confirmed this appraisal having the benefit of fresh perspectives gleaned from global aerial photography: “The world is not divided into hemispheres,” confirmed from air-global perspective.¹²⁷ In chapter titled, “From Continentalism to Globalism,” Alan K. Henrikson wrote: “To pure Air-Age Globalists the world had no ‘parts’ at all. They pictured it as a smooth, seamless ball, a monosphere, no longer divided into continents and oceans or into Eastern and Western “Hemispheres.”¹²⁸

¹²³ Ibid. 494.

¹²⁴ Whitaker 1954: 164.

¹²⁵ Whitaker 1954: 164.

¹²⁶ Spykman 1942: 157.

¹²⁷ Ristow 1944: 334-335.

¹²⁸ Henrikson 1974: 448.

Continentalism and even the idea of Hemisphere now seemed claustrophobic. Referring to "this hemisphere" in 1823, the Geographer Samuel Whittmore Boggs explained to the State Department in 1945, Monroe meant a narrower than hemispheric stretch of territory. "Surely, a saner and more realistic understanding of geography than that is needed!"¹²⁹ Western "hemispheric" frontiers would be the meridians 20° West and 160° East of Greenwich. These meridians cross lands and islands of the Eastern Hemisphere. "Like an ostrich with its head in the sand, we avoid seeing the other half of the world, much of it surprisingly near."¹³⁰

Subsequently, a new strategy, deemed more workable, was established. It was neither continental, nor even hemispheric, but rather global. Only on the global basis, wrote Willkie in 1943, can we win and keep peace.¹³¹ No smaller scale was found practicable. The "Western" Hemisphere of yore appeared to be just another Eurocentric concept,¹³² together with the Near/Middle/Far East.¹³³ Writing in 1942, George T. Renner suggested:

American political geographers—
Hartshorne... Bowman... and some of the rest
of us began studying *Geopolitik* seriously as
long ago as the Germans did. Obviously, if a
German Geopolitiker can draw a map for an
Axis-dominated Europe we should at once set
our geographers to work designing a new

¹²⁹ Boggs 1945: 847.

¹³⁰ Ibid, 847.

¹³¹ Willkie 1943: 166.

¹³² Boggs 1945: 846.

¹³³ Barney 2011: 181.

world map to meet democratic specifications.¹³⁴

Renner's response to the Geopolitiker's "European map" was a US "world map." One of the mentioned by Renner geographers, Isaiah Bowman, was cautious to avoid such disproportion. Writing that same year, he defined Hitler's design as "world domination" and concluded that the US commitments must likewise be "planetary" in scope:

When successive treacherous blows fell within the Western Hemisphere, we could not fight back in Europe only or in Japan only. We had to fight wherever there was fighting: our commitments suddenly became planetary. We began to sail great-circles courses of thought and action. The whole 'wide improbable atlas' was opened daily as our military situation tied every neighborhood, large and small, to the rim of the world. Hitler's design was world domination. We finally saw that our resistance must be as bold and far-flung as his design ... Thus all of us began to think geographically and to regard the map in terms that include all the lands and seas, the peoples and resources, the governments and ideologies that lie between. Suddenly we realized that even the remotest solitudes will not have their solitude restored after the war, and that victory this time

¹³⁴ Renner 1942: 14.

means for America no resumption of something called ‘normal...’¹³⁵

Intervention and withdrawal, Bowman continued, had marked the traditional policy of England and America. This intervention however was not to be followed by withdrawal:

This time we say that our emergence is permanent, that we must now make sure of our future, that we are only as imperishable as our resolution... The tremulous balance of international forces will vex us at the end of the war.¹³⁶

The same year another prominent US geopolitical thinker observed:

Global war has shown the continents and oceans to be parts of one closely meshed world political design. Far-off places, which only a short while ago seemed to Americans to have no relation to their everyday needs and life—places like Iceland, Tripoli, Dakar, Bataan, Moulmein, and Lashio—have become for Americans the stepping stones of destiny.¹³⁷

At the end of World War II, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall stated:

It no longer appears practical to continue what we once conceived as hemispheric defense as a satisfactory basis for our security. We are

¹³⁵ Ibid, 651.

¹³⁶ Bowman 1942: 658.

¹³⁷ Strausz-Hupé 1942: 3.

now concerned with the peace of the entire world.¹³⁸

Many later historians interpret the US grand strategy during World War II as transformation from hemispheric to global scale:

Before Pearl Harbor, the major military doctrine of the United States was 'hemispheric defense.' After Pearl Harbor, it became 'global defense.'¹³⁹

From journalists to academics to Government technicians, there was a rising consensus that the hemispheric world of traditional boundaries and power relationships was no longer viable.¹⁴⁰

James Kurth characterized the history of America's Grand Strategy as three cycles of expansion, two being continental in scope and a third global, beginning at the end of World War II.¹⁴¹ Peter Gowan concludes, "from the time of its entry into the Second World War, the United States has pursued not regional, but global hegemony – which it has now finally achieved."¹⁴² Since the dawn of the Twentieth century, Christopher Layne maintains, the United States relentlessly attempted to expand its hemispheric hegemony into a global one and succeeded in doing so after World War II.¹⁴³

¹³⁸ Cited in Layne 2006: 41-42.

¹³⁹ Henrikson 1980: 83.

¹⁴⁰ Barney 2011: 83.

¹⁴¹ Kurth 1996.

¹⁴² Gowan 2002: 7.

¹⁴³ Layne 2006: 3.

During lectures, Alexander de Seversky, the author of *Victory through Air Power* (1942), would move back and forth between giant wall maps displaying his war strategies, and a massive globe in the middle of the room, which he could spin in all the directions. The maps were colorful, dynamic and unconventional—in some he used the metaphoric power of arrows and icons of flags, others centered on the North Pole, in order to explicate new proximities.¹⁴⁴

Walt Disney animated *Victory through Air Power* the year after the book's publication. The animated sequences continually drew upon maps to demonstrate Axis encirclements across the globe. In the film's conclusion, the United States (represented as an eagle) defeats Japan (represented as a black octopus), flies off to land nobly on top of the globe. The globe gradually bronzes into a top of a flagpole, which holds an American flag flapping in the wind. The animation so impressed Winston Churchill that he insisted President Roosevelt watch it with him during their summit meeting in Quebec in August 1943.¹⁴⁵

The Western Hemisphere idea owed its origins partly to a particular view of the map—the view suggested by the conventional Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-century Mercator Map which divided the globe neatly and definitively into flat hemispheres, Eastern and Western, and gave the Americas an appearance of continental unity¹⁴⁶ and continental isolation. On that conventional map, Hawaii appeared on the left, in the extreme "West," and Japan on the right, the "Far East." The

¹⁴⁴ Barney 2011: 3-4.

¹⁴⁵ Meilinger 1997: 258.

¹⁴⁶ Whitaker 1954: 160-161.

Pearl Harbor attack connected the two points. The East met West.¹⁴⁷

After 1941, Americans learned to see the world map in a new way. Media undertook massive efforts to emancipate the public from the concept of Isolationism. Just three weeks after the American entry into the war, *Life* published a two-page map of the globe that outlined recent developments on all fronts of the war. It was titled, "Whole Globe a Battlefield." This map placed the United States at the center, in the space between the two facing pages, with the rest of the world unfolding on either side. A similar map appeared in *Los Angeles Times* on June 27, 1942 and carried the headline "America, in Center of World at War..."¹⁴⁸

A week before President's Fireside radio chat, which was set to air on February 23, 1942, his Press Secretary Stephen T. Early sent out a press releases to national newspapers a week, calling on Americans to bring their maps and globes with them when they sit and listen to their President's upcoming war update, so that they might clearly and better understand him as he delivers his crucial message.

In their preparation for the broadcast, *Los Angeles Times* published a map of the world for audiences to visualize the content of the President's address.¹⁴⁹ On February 20, 1942, the *New York Times* noted: "Map dealers reported yesterday a heavy demand for maps following President Roosevelt's suggestion that those who listen to his Monday night broadcast have a globe or map of the world available for

¹⁴⁷ Henrikson 1979: 172.

¹⁴⁸ Cited in Zhurauliova 2014: esnp.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

handy reference.” In that landmark radio address, Roosevelt explained:

This war is a new kind of war. It is different from all other wars of the past, not only in its methods and weapons but also in its geography. It is warfare in terms of every continent, every island, every sea, every air-lane in the world ... That is the reason why I have asked you to take out and spread before you a map of the whole Earth, and to follow with me in the references which I shall make to the world-encircling battle lines of this war ... The broad oceans which have been heralded in the past as our protection from attack have become endless battlefields on which we are constantly being challenged by our enemies ... We must all understand and face the hard fact that our job now is to fight at distances which extend all the way around the globe.¹⁵⁰

The global “handy reference” turned this fireside chat into one of Roosevelt’s most effective. Asking Americans to study their maps as he talked, he vividly illustrated for them the truly global nature of the war and the vital logistic links binding the United States to its new allies in Britain, Australia, China, and the Soviet Union. Pearl Harbor, he proclaimed, had discredited Isolationism:

Those Americans who believed that we could live under the illusion of Isolationism wanted the American eagle to imitate the tactics of the

¹⁵⁰ Roosevelt 1942.

ostrich. Now, many of those same people, afraid that we may be sticking our necks out, want our national bird to be turned into a turtle. But we prefer to retain the eagle as it is – flying high and striking hard.¹⁵¹

Appealing to armchair cartographers, Roosevelt demanded: "Look at your maps ... This war is a new kind of war. It is different from all other wars in the past, not only in its methods and weapons but also in its geography."¹⁵² The US Government's already sizeable cartographic apparatus rapidly grew. Novel types of maps and globes covered the walls and desks of academic and defense bureaucrats, as well as found their way into American homes. In 1943, cartographer Helmuth Bay commented on the growing interest in world geography among ordinary Americans:

[W]ith a global war in progress and American fighting men stationed in more than fifty countries or colonies,... all about us people are tossing about such names as Guadalcanal, Attu, Pantelleria, and other tiny places with the greatest of ease and familiarity, while in restaurants we find armchair strategists capable of sketching very credible maps of the Soviet Union on napkins and even spelling such names as Dnepropetrovsk and Simferopol correctly...¹⁵³

Sociologist (and later propagandist for the State Department), Hans Speier, wrote of the ubiquity of maps

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Cited in Barney 2011: 81-82 and 2012: 397.

¹⁵³ Cited in Zhurauliova 2014: esnp.

around the outbreak of America's involvement in World War II in *Social Research*: "today, maps are distributed on posters and slides, in books as propaganda atlases, on post cards, in magazines, newspapers and leaflets, in moving pictures and on postage stamps."¹⁵⁴

American weekly and monthly magazines made the "greatest assault on tradition" and "have borne the burden of making the public conscious of global geography." To switch from Isolationism to globalism, America applied an "image-based" internationalism.¹⁵⁵

Henry Luce, the author of the "American Century" (1941), and "his cartographers-for-hire" were making clear attempts to break through the isolationist hold on US geopolitics.¹⁵⁶ Pronouncing that our world is one world, fundamentally indivisible, Luce saw America as the responsible steward for maintaining such a rolling, unified space.¹⁵⁷ The most famous of Luce's "cartographers-for-hire" was Richard Edes Harrison. In 1940, *Fortune* published his *Atlas for the US Citizen*. The "Preface" to the *Atlas* by *Fortune* editors opens with these words:

At last however the great awakening may be upon us, and we may be prepared to demand that the realism we love so well in lesser spheres now rules our thought in the larger spheres where our fate will be determined ... For the atlas, which these maps make up, is so designed that the citizen of the US may here,

¹⁵⁴ Speier 1941: 310-311, 316.

¹⁵⁵ Barney 2012: 405, 417.

¹⁵⁶ Barney 2011: 93.

¹⁵⁷ Barney 2012: 404.

with the whole world before him, begin to make manifest to himself the outlines of his nation's destiny.¹⁵⁸

In 1942, *Fortune* published another piece by Harrison, *Look at the World: The Fortune Atlas for World Strategy*. It included the map "Eight Views of the World." On the map, the reader contends with eight globes, all centering and highlighting different areas of the world. In the first globe, we see a centered United States, with the tag line "The US: its geographical isolation is more seeming than real." All continents can be seen in relation to America. The United States is highlighted on each of the eight globes, amplifying its connection to the other continents of the world. Europe's orthographic projection shows the tiny peninsula dwarfed by Asia and has a caption stating the visually obvious, "Europe: more close neighbors than any other continent."¹⁵⁹ Harrison's mapping innovations mediate a geopolitical shift in American foreign policy toward a modern, image-based internationalism during the US rise to superpower status.¹⁶⁰

The 1942 article in *Life*, titled "Maps: Global War Teaches Global Cartography," opens:

Until the fifth decade of the Twentieth century, knowledge that the world is round was of little immediate importance to most of the inhabitants of this planet ... Today however the round world is the prize of global war. Mercator projection cannot tell this story. No one can read the map of this war until he has

¹⁵⁸ Cited in Barney 2011: 120-121 and 2012: 419.

¹⁵⁹ Barney 2011: 105-106 and 2012: 410.

¹⁶⁰ Barney 2012: 397.

comprehended the fact that the world is round and that no map can give an entirely truthful picture of its surface.¹⁶¹

Life's feature on the Dymaxion map from 1943 included a color version of Dymaxion globe, which readers were invited to cut out and assemble for their personal use. The process involved imagining the surface of the globe as a compilation of parts that exist in relation to each other, a kaleidoscope of colorful details that acquire meaning only when arranged into a whole. The Dymaxion map serves as a powerful metaphor for its contemporary moment, capturing a geographical discourse built on the idea to grasp the interconnectedness and unity of global space.¹⁶²

At that historical juncture, the globe prevailed over the world map: "For a picture of the world as a whole, a map is only a poor substitute for a globe."¹⁶³ The globe proved to be fitter for the purpose of emancipation from the concept of Isolationism: Like the desk globe at home, no matter which way one looks at it, the "one world" is entangled with relationships in all directions, with Isolationism easily disputed by the "spin" of the globe. "A new global outlook, which supplanted a focus on fixed borders and lines with fluidity and a synthetic gaze that captured the world as one, held important implications for American power and values."¹⁶⁴

As Frank A. Ninkovich concluded, "The perception of the globe's unity in space and time was crucial, for it

¹⁶¹ *Life* August 3, 1942: 57.

¹⁶² Zhurauliova 2014: esnp.

¹⁶³ *Life* August 3, 1942: 61.

¹⁶⁴ Barney 2011: 90 and 2012: 410.

obliterated the geographical, cultural, and temporal distinctions that gave life to the historical myth of old and new worlds.”¹⁶⁵ Thus a need arose to reconceive national interest from the standpoint of interwoven global processes, rather than from the isolationist paradigm.¹⁶⁶ America shifted to a globally minded perspective.

In 1924, Churchill had assured: Japan is situated at the end of the world. It cannot threaten our vital security in any way.¹⁶⁷ On the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack, Republican Senator Robert A. Taft felt confident in stating that no power “would be stupid enough” to attack the United States “from across thousands of miles of ocean.”¹⁶⁸ The day after the attack, Hitler’s interpreter, Paul Schmidt reflected:

At the time... I did not believe that war between the United States and Japan, separated as the two countries were by ... the Pacific Ocean, could be over as quickly as proved to be the case. My first reaction was: The war will now be endlessly protracted.¹⁶⁹

Similarly, Albrecht Haushofer wrote in late 1939: A new war may possibly last 30 or more years (Whittlesey 1942: 129). Technology however overcame space, precluding the possibility of protracted wars between Great Powers. Willkie reduced the Pacific to a “ribbon”:

At the end of the last war, not a single plane had flown across the Atlantic. Today that

¹⁶⁵ Cited in Barney 2011: 113.

¹⁶⁶ Barney 2012: 415.

¹⁶⁷ Kershaw 2009: 39.

¹⁶⁸ Cited in Kagan 2014: esnp.

¹⁶⁹ Schmidt 1950: 238.

ocean is a mere ribbon, with airplanes making regular scheduled flights. The Pacific is only a slightly wider ribbon in the ocean of the air, and Europe and Asia are at our very doorstep.¹⁷⁰

Twenty years after the Pearl Harbor attack, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson would state in a ‘Memorandum on Asia’ to President John F. Kennedy: without maintaining the island outposts of Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan, “the vast Pacific becomes a Red Sea.”¹⁷¹ The United States, compared a prominent expert on foreign policy in our days, “does not have the great advantage of Britain: the option of aloofness.”¹⁷² As this distinction implies, La Munch had protected more than the vastest Ocean following the recent technological progress.

The global war convinced the Americans that, as Mackinder had put it forty years earlier, the modern political system is “global” and at the same time “closed”:

Paradoxically, rather than confirming Americans' sense of the immensity of the Earth, these extended operations had in the last analysis a foreshortening effect: the world was made to seem smaller and more compact. What had formerly seemed to them an "open-space" system became, despite hopeful glimpses of a new unlimited global horizon, a "closed-space" system. This new awareness of the proximity of states had a profound impact, not

¹⁷⁰ Willkie 1943: 165.

¹⁷¹ Sloan 1988: 152.

¹⁷² Joffe 1995: 105.

only upon military strategy and diplomacy but upon the very conceptual context of statecraft.¹⁷³

The above-cited words of Historian Alan Henrikson are compounded upon by the chapter entitled, "The Unified World."¹⁷⁴ It opens: "As Americans extended their ken around the spherical Earth, they gradually came to a new awareness of the world's continuity and unity, a ... characteristic feature of Air-Age Globalism."

¹⁷³ Henrikson 1974: 445.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, 447.

Air-Age Globalism

Aircraft were used in war for the first time in 1911, during war between Italy and Turkey.¹⁷⁵ The innovation quickly accelerated military globalization. In 1919, Hugh Trenchard of the Royal Air Force (RAF) suggested to Churchill that the RAF be given the opportunity to subdue a festering uprising in Somaliland. Churchill agreed. The results were dramatic: the RAF chased the rebel ringleader, “the mad mullah,” out of the area and pacified Somaliland at a cost of £77,000 rather than the £6 million it would have cost for the two army divisions originally planned (Meilinger 1997: 49).

For Air Power pioneers, Giulio Douhet, Gianni Caproni and Nino Salvaneschi, “the bomber was an apocalyptic instrument of war qualitatively different from any weapon that had come before. It could rapidly destroy an entire nation from the inside out rather than slowly defeat it from the outside in.”¹⁷⁶ Their prescient voices however were not immediately heard by policymakers. During the interwar period, France and Britain, in line with conventional Nineteenth century thinking, neglected an air force and entrusted their security to the Maginot Line and the English Channel in “an attempt to immobilize warfare and to freeze the *status quo*.”¹⁷⁷ A French critic in 1928 remarked: “Everything is being done as though the Versailles Treaty ... permits us to go back to the military routine of 1914—and then fall asleep.”¹⁷⁸ The world woke up in World War II to realize the impact of Air Power on distance. France’s rapid

¹⁷⁵ Meilinger 1997: 3.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 184.

¹⁷⁷ Carr 1943: XII.

¹⁷⁸ Cited in Ibid, XII.

collapse shocked most of the world, but Air Power expert, Alexander de Seversky, simply remarked that the Maginot Line had become the tomb for a nation that had refused to look skyward.¹⁷⁹ Derwent Whittlesey suggested that while the Columbian naval revolution multiplied the size of the known world the air revolution shrank it back:

The discovery that the ocean was a unit brought all continents within the ken of European man and thereby multiplied many times the potential area of the world state. The invention of flying... shrank the Earth by reducing travel time, and so brought separated areas into intimate contact.¹⁸⁰

Air Power exposed the whole globe defenseless and, according to the thesis of John Herz, forced military globalization on territorial states:

Of all the new developments, air warfare up to the atomic age, has been the one that affected the territoriality of nations most radically. With its coming, the bottom dropped out—or, rather, the roof blew off—the relative security of the territorial state.¹⁸¹

Neither the Siegfried and Maginot Lines, nor the vastest ocean proved to be insurmountable barrier. In 1940, H. N. Brailsford concluded: “Air power has made inevitable the

¹⁷⁹ Meilinger 1997: 250.

¹⁸⁰ Whittlesey 1942: 13.

¹⁸¹ Herz 1957: 487.

unification of continents.”¹⁸² The next year, Hans Baldwin projected:

[The] limited security measures of today ... will not suffice tomorrow when technical improvements give the weapons of death a new and even more hideous efficiency, when the plane achieves a range almost unlimited and a speed and bomb capacity now undreamed of.

Tomorrow air bases may be the highroad to power and domination... Obviously, it is only by air bases ... that power exercised in the sovereign skies above a nation can be stretched far beyond its shores.

Perhaps... future acquisitions of air bases ... can carry the voice of America through the skies to the ends of the Earth ... [The] blueprint planes of tomorrow, the future patrol of the world, will help to make the peace and keep it.

¹⁸³

In April 1941, the Science Museum of the Saint Paul Institute displayed an exhibition headlined by the question "Can America Be Bombed?" This exhibition used as base maps a series of large spherical maps. The spherical maps together with globes displayed the ultimate condition of the Earth being spherical in shape. This fact had been recognized to be of paramount importance in dealing with world relationships. So graphic was this exhibition that replicas of its several displays appeared in the rotundas of the House and

¹⁸² Cited in Staley 1941: 482.

¹⁸³ Baldwin 1941: 84, 189, 222.

Senate office buildings in Washington DC. Later, the Museum constructed 50 additional globes at the request of the Navy.¹⁸⁴ In 1942, Spykman stressed the impact of the new, “third” dimension of warfare:

Only statesmen who can do their political and strategic thinking in terms of a round Earth and a three-dimensional warfare can save their countries from being outmaneuvered on distant flanks. With air power supplementing sea power and mobility again the essence of warfare, no region of the globe is too distant to be without strategic significance, too remote to be neglected in the calculations of power politics.¹⁸⁵

The same year, de Seversky in his bestseller book *Victory through Air Power* argued that no spot on Earth was immune from overhead attack and that the entire globe, including its skies, was a battlefield. Long-range bombing is the road to victory. The book opens projecting a threatening, if imaginary scenario: “From every point of the compass—across the two oceans and across the two Poles—giant bombers, each protected by its convoy of deadly fighter planes, converge upon the United States...”¹⁸⁶ In fact the War in Europe did end with that scenario—but in reverse—called the Combined Bomber Offensive. Already during the War, de Seversky pushed for the development of “interhemispheric” bombers that could strike the enemy from the United States. Anticipating deterrence, he stated that bombers with this king

¹⁸⁴ Powell 1945: 49, 53.

¹⁸⁵ Spykman 1942: 165.

¹⁸⁶ De Seversky 1942: 7.

of global reach would “change the whole picture of law enforcement.” The mere threat of American airpower would be enough to keep the peace.¹⁸⁷

In 1945, Whittlesey theorized in his presidential address to the Association of American Geographers that there was a “new horizon” in geography that required an acceptance of a new “vertical” (i.e. air age) dimension:

Every advance in the vertical plane ... multiplies his [man's] power, rather than adding to it. The simultaneous closure of the era of surface expansion and opening of unmeasured potentialities latent in a three-dimensional world are setting new values upon every part of the Earth.¹⁸⁸

Writing the previous year, Ristow formulated the main assumptions that would characterize the new geography. In the “Air Age,” there “are no longer any far corners of the Earth.” Transport by air discounts geographical barriers and political boundaries. With long-range aircraft and the multitude of state interests involved in the war, the traditional focus on regional geography had to be supplemented with world-minded surveys of the globe. “Air Age geography is global geography.”¹⁸⁹

In the same article, Ristow added: “All geography becomes home geography when the most distant point on Earth is less than sixty hours from your local airport.”¹⁹⁰ Already before the War, leading Geopoltiker, Karl Haushofer,

¹⁸⁷ Cited in Meilinger 1997: 254.

¹⁸⁸ Whittlesey 1945: 20.

¹⁸⁹ Ristow 1944: 333-334.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, 334.

in a chapter titled “Small States Have No Right to Exist,” had stated: “Small states were much better able to maintain themselves in previous times when means of communication had not yet compressed a distance of 400 miles into an hour’s plane flight.”¹⁹¹ An antagonist of Haushofer, Clarence Streit, expressed a similar thought: “In the world our machines have made us, distance is no more a thing of miles, but of minutes. New York is closer to England now than to Virginia in George Washington's time.”¹⁹² Louis H. Powell’s 1945 article, entitled “New Uses for Globes and Spherical Maps,” opens:

In those far-off days of 1940 and 1941 when America was rudely forced into awareness of its proximity to Europe and Asia, a new unit of measuring distance on the face of the Earth was born--the distance to which a bomber could fly with a paying load of bombs and, with reasonable certainty, return to its base.

The cartographic measurement became minutes, not miles. As Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce said in a speech to Congress in 1943: Grammar school boys can tell you today that an airway from Chicago to Bombay or Singapore is 40 flying hours. “Incidentally, they never think in land miles, they think in flying hours.”¹⁹³

Timothy Barney finds “a kind of idealism in the new air-age geography, as if one could somehow fly away from borders, nationalism, and war machines” to “globalism.” New maps lacked borders—all is connected. “The “act of seeing global space is... opening up the world to interdependences

¹⁹¹ *Weltpolitik von Heut*, 1935, cited in Dorpalen 1942: 208.

¹⁹² Streit 1940: 32.

¹⁹³ Cited in Barney 2011: 86.

that require constant, vigilant management” and challenges the old classical realist tradition that had established the nation-state as the key political unit. Not only nation-state but also the idea of Hemispheres were challenged by the air age:

Air-age geography makes hemispheres obsolete—America is now seen as closer in proximity to the “Eastern hemisphere” of Eurasia than to Latin America thus questioning conceptions central to US foreign policy since the Monroe Doctrine.¹⁹⁴

Moreover the "older land-sea dualism" was undermined too, evolving into the "newer air monism."¹⁹⁵ The globe became one integral whole:

To pure Air-Age Globalists the world had no "parts" at all. They pictured it as a smooth, seamless ball, a monosphere, no longer divided into continents and oceans or into Eastern and Western "Hemispheres."¹⁹⁶

This monosphere seemed to a famous contemporary observer destined to global unity under a single control through aviation:

A new page of history began on December 17, 1903, when Orville Wright rose from the Earth with his flying machine... Since that memorable December day, mankind has taken a new course toward a new destiny... We must realize that, for the first time in history, the

¹⁹⁴ Barney 2012: 402, 419.

¹⁹⁵ Henrikson 1974: 448.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, 448.

globe has become a real unit... Thus the progress of aviation urges world unity, while the political and psychological developments are still far from that goal... Aviation leads straight across the problem of huge regional groups to the problem of world organization and world control by a single power...¹⁹⁷

During the War, Aviation globalized the study of geography. High school textbook, *Our Air-Age World* (1944), emphasized: "In the proportion that travel time by airplane has been reduced, continental stretches have been compressed, ocean expanses have shrunk to the dimensions of straits, and islands dotting the ocean have become stepping stones."¹⁹⁸ Such textbooks advanced the notion of a miniaturized globe that students could synthesize as one whole. "Global geography" needed to be taught in America in ways that would capture the "airman's vision." To this end, "geography teachers required air-age maps, globes and atlases."¹⁹⁹

The globe was elevated in importance above map: "For a picture of the world as a whole, a map is only a poor substitute for a globe."²⁰⁰ In the course of the War, "globes rather than maps were increasingly regarded as the proper conceptual and physical base on which to trace the movements of the war and to delineate the contours of the peace."²⁰¹ On 19 September 1942, Eisenhower tells that the Prime Minister saw in Russia a globe of some sixty inches or more in diameter

¹⁹⁷ Coudenhove-Kalergi 1943: 251, 294-295.

¹⁹⁸ Henrikson 1974: 450.

¹⁹⁹ Cosgrove & Dora 2005: 375.

²⁰⁰ *Life* August 3, 1942: 61.

²⁰¹ Henrikson 1974: 447.

and wished to have a globe of the same size. His own was twice smaller.²⁰²

Consequently, the US Office of Strategic Services engaged in creating the “largest detailed military globe ever made.”²⁰³ They produced three 50-inch, 750-pound globes on special bases on which they could revolve. These globes were presented as 1942 Christmas gifts to Roosevelt, Stimson and Churchill. George Marshall wished the leaders “may accurately chart the progress of this global struggle.” Roosevelt thanked Marshall: “I can swing around and figure distances to my great satisfaction.”²⁰⁴

Walter W. Ristow reported in a 1951 publication of the Library of Congress that some 12 or 15 identical globes were made during the war.²⁰⁵ Today however their exact number and whereabouts of some of them are unknown. Peace decreases the importance of globes. Those globes are artifacts of World War II—the most explosive moment of military globalization.

Samuel Whittimore Boggs’ report to the State Department opens: “The world is round.”²⁰⁶ The geographic fact had been known since Antiquity, but now Air-Age strategists were forced to cope with the fact:

First and foremost, the Earth was recognized as being “round.” The word “recognized” is used here deliberately, for Air-Age Globalists sometimes implied that they were simply

²⁰² Robinson 1997: 147.

²⁰³ Henrikson 1974: 447.

²⁰⁴ Robinson 1997: 143.

²⁰⁵ Ibid, 151.

²⁰⁶ Boggs 1945.

acknowledging the full implications of a truth that had once been known but had been effectively forgotten.²⁰⁷

Beginning in 1942, many Air-Age maps stacked to the topography of rolling mountains and basins, leaving out political boundaries and highlighting the fluidity of continental land. Alternative world maps showed the globe in terms of relationships and aerial routes, rather than the traditional categories of separate continents and hemispheres, marking a turn to what Historian Alan Henrikson has termed “air-age globalism.”²⁰⁸ Emphasizing the importance of aerial travel for international relations and US wartime strategy, this mode of representation was closely “linked to the contemporaneous policy shift from isolationism to global engagement.”²⁰⁹ “Indeed the emphasis on the entire globe as a field of strategy helped form the basis ... of what came to be known as 'air-age globalism.'”²¹⁰ Maps had to be increased in quantity and adjusted in quality:

War has perennially driven interest in geography, but World War II was different. The urgency of the war, coupled with the advent of aviation, fueled the demand not just for *more* but *different* maps, particularly ones that could explain why President Roosevelt was stationing troops in Iceland, or sending fleets to the Indian Ocean.²¹¹

²⁰⁷ Henrikson 1974: 446.

²⁰⁸ Ibid, 28.

²⁰⁹ Zhurauliova 2014: esnp.

²¹⁰ Barney 2011: 80.

²¹¹ Schulten 2014: esnp.

The practitioners of air-age globalism were corporate executives, government representatives, popular critics, academic researchers, and educators. This discourse of the air was reflected in the move toward popular, journalistic cartography during World War II—“maps and globes came off the walls and desks of academics and defense bureaucrats and into American homes in unprecedented ways.”²¹²

As the War took to the air, geography and cartography followed suit. Mapmakers were devising a bird’s-eye view of the world, actively changing the ways we viewed the globe and our placement in it:

Air-age globalism was a discursive phenomenon throughout the development of World War II that accounted for the rapid “shrinking” of the world through air technologies and the internationalization of American interests. Cartography became air-age globalism’s primary popular expression...²¹³

A number of wartime geographers and cartographers challenged the dominance of the Equator-based Mercator projection:

The seafaring mind of the Mercator projection accentuated geographical imaginaries of east and west, but in the air, travel from a given place was possible in all directions on a spherical Earth.²¹⁴

²¹² Barney 2011: 87 and 2012: 398.

²¹³ Barney 2012: 397.

²¹⁴ Ristow 1944: 334-335.

The actual ‘global’ relations of the United States, which are remarkably different from the conceptions many people cherish, based on Mercator maps, have suddenly acquired heightened importance in these days of airplanes and radio.²¹⁵

Instead of the Mercator projection, the wartime geographers and cartographers argued in favor of "globe" maps, which focused on "Earth's sphericity, continuity, and unity."²¹⁶ They promoted air-age globalism, presenting new azimuthal projections centered on various parts of the world. The new projections demonstrated that “distance had indeed been revolutionized by aviation and encouraged the idea of a unified international community.”²¹⁷

The immense spatial changes faced American rhetoric in the mid-Twentieth century Air-Age. Popular Harrison's perspective maps highlight spatial relationships among continents made relevant by the war. These maps, resembling a photograph of a globe from distance, brought home the world's sphericity by moving the viewer out to a fixed point above the Earth.²¹⁸ His “maps mediate a historical shift in American foreign policy and spatial worldview from classic principles of political realism (with its emphasis on geopolitically defined states and concrete balances of power) toward a more fluid, abstract, and image-based internationalism.”²¹⁹

²¹⁵ Boggs 1945: 849.

²¹⁶ Zhurauliova 2014: esnp.

²¹⁷ Reynolds 2006: 302.

²¹⁸ Schulten 1998: 177.

²¹⁹ Barney 2012: 399.

Harrison's northern polar equidistant projection, published in 1941, so impressed the US Air Force officials that they asked for the original to hang in their headquarters.²²⁰ The Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation printed 350,000 pamphlets entitled *Maps, and How to Understand Them*, which were illustrated with Harrison's maps.²²¹ The pamphlet preached the "new conception of global geography," a vital one in if the peace is to endure:

For the countries of this sky-linked world are now bound together more closely, both geographically and physically, than our own states were at the turn of the century. Today, wherever you live, no spot of this once-wide globe is farther than 40 hours' flying time from your local airport. This means that once distant nations are now, and will henceforth be, close friends – or close enemies... Realization of how the airplane has shrank the world is vital to straight thinking about the kind of peace that will endure. With this new conception of global geography, we see the world as it really is—a clustering of nations whose nearness makes them all members of the same Family of Nations. Without this conception of global geography, we are looking at a world that used to be—a world where nations lived in the fancied safety of remoteness, protected by

²²⁰ *Life* February 28: 1944: 61.

²²¹ Schulten 1998: 186.

distances that no longer exist and seas that have been narrowed to millponds.²²²

The cartography²²³ and other media reflected America's emerging global strategy. "Americans became enamored with a new Air-Age global perspective. And from this vantage point, the world was now closer—an exciting and frightening prospect."²²⁴ In this Air-Age prospect, as FDR put it his radio address on February 23, 1942, Isolationism had to be substituted by "flying high and striking hard."

²²² Vultee Aircraft Corporation 1945: 3.

²²³ Barney 2012: 401.

²²⁴ *Idem*, 2011: 96 and 2012: 397-398.

The Eurasian Focus

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was globalist and opposed to regionalism, sharing the British attitude. But when circumstances forced Stimson to think in regional terms, the areas to which he gave preferential attention were Europe and the Far East, not Latin America. "His handling of relations with the latter gave impression of a busy man getting necessary but minor matters cleared off his desk so that he might concentrate on the really important matters."²²⁵

Already by 1941, the mainstream US strategy followed suit, focusing on Eurasia rather than the Western Hemisphere: "Public opinion and official policy in the United States are today influenced very decidedly by the realization that our own ability to defend ourselves depends in no small measure on what happens in Europe and Asia."²²⁶ The Eurasian land mass received prominence during World War II among both realist geopolitical thinkers and idealists: "The United States would presumably play in this future world of European and Asiatic power blocs the game of the balance of power as England played it in Europe."²²⁷ "Today the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans are ribbons, and Europe and Asia are at our very doorstep."²²⁸ Regarding the Atlantic ribbon, Coudenhove-Kalergi projected:

The Atlantic had become the Mediterranean of our days, uniting and not separating the two main branches of the white race and Western civilization... I understood that the period of

²²⁵ Whitaker 1954: 139.

²²⁶ Staley 1941: 482; also Baldwin 1941, 285-286.

²²⁷ Strausz-Hupé 1942: XI.

²²⁸ Willkie 1943: 165.

continental isolation was definitely over and that the Atlantic Clipper had opened a new page of history: the chapter of a united Atlantic world, including Pan-America, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the future European federation... And beyond and above Pan-Europe I conceived the vision of a New Atlantis, bringing peace and prosperity and liberty to all men and women and nations of good will throughout the globe.²²⁹

In the air-age, America was found “as closer in proximity to the ‘Eastern hemisphere’ of Eurasia than to Latin America.”²³⁰ New cartographic projections massively introduced during the War, such as Harrison’s maps,²³¹ made it difficult to dismiss the war as an “Asian” or “European” affair and merely impossible to maintain a sense of geographical isolation. Instead, they encouraged Americans to embrace an international destiny and prepared them for a total commitment to the Asian and European theaters.

In 1945, Samuel Whittemore Boggs of the State Department’s geographic branch submitted his “This Hemisphere” report to the Department. The report was republished in the *Journal of Geography* the same year.²³² Monroe, Boggs stressed, did not refer in 1823 to the “Western Hemisphere” but “this hemisphere.” Boggs’ exegesis fleshed out the bottom line: “When a person speaks of ‘this hemisphere’ as the one in which the United States of America

²²⁹ Coudenhove-Kalergi 1943: 219.

²³⁰ Ristow 1944: 334-335.

²³¹ Schulten 1998: 180.

²³² Boggs 1945.

is located, one may well inquire, ‘Which hemisphere?’” On the round globe, multiple hemispheres are possible:

If Americans were curious to ascertain how much of the world can be included in some hemisphere that includes all of the United States ... they would be greatly surprised ... A series of hemispheres, with the United States at the very edge of each, reveals relations of this country to the rest of the world that few people appreciate.²³³

Though multiple hemispheres are possible, Boggs’ primary alternative was the Northern Hemisphere.²³⁴ Foreshadowing "some of the postwar architecture of international relations," Boggs noted: "Dakar, Moscow and northern Manchuria are closer to the center of the United States than Buenos Aires."²³⁵

On December 30, 1951, Dean Acheson stressed that “the Western Hemisphere” is the “foundation of our position in the world,” but our position is “lying in both the Western and Northern Hemispheres,” connecting the United States to Europe and Asia.²³⁶ The *Northern Hemisphere* motif gained currency: “Another sign of the time was the displacement of the term *Western Hemisphere* by *Northern Hemisphere*.”²³⁷

In 1942, Spykman concluded: America must keep either Europe or Asia from falling under the domination of any one power, no matter how friendly this might be today.

²³³ Ibid, 849.

²³⁴ Ibid, 845-846.

²³⁵ Ibid, 847-848.

²³⁶ Cited in Whitaker 1954: 175.

²³⁷ Ibid, 175.

“This policy parallels, on a grander scale, the historic policy of Britain towards the continent of Europe.” Unless we follow this cold-blooded and brutal power politics, we would cease to influence international relations.²³⁸

In March 1945 several of the nation's most prominent civilian experts (Frederick S. Dunn, Edward M. Earle, William T. R. Fox, Grayson L. Kirk, David N. Rowe, Harold Sprout, and Arnold Wolfers) prepared a study, "A Security Policy for Postwar America," in which they argued that the United States had to prevent any one power or coalition of powers from gaining control of Eurasia. America could not, they insisted, withstand attack by any power that had first subdued the whole of Europe or of Eurasia.²³⁹ The postwar concept of Eurasia developed out of the revival of geopolitical thinking in the United States, stimulated by Axis aggression and strategic decision-making:

From the closing days of World War II, American defense officials believed that they could not allow any prospective adversary to control the Eurasian land mass. This was the lesson taught by two world wars. Strategic thinkers and military analysts insisted that any power or powers attempting to dominate Eurasia must be regarded as potentially hostile to the United States.²⁴⁰

Eurasia contained the only other superpower after the War. The acute awareness of the importance of Eurasia made George Marshall, Thomas Handy, George A. Lincoln, John

²³⁸ Cited in Thorndike 1942: 115.

²³⁹ Leffler 1984: 356.

²⁴⁰ Cited in Ibid, 356.

Deane and other officers wary of the expansion of Soviet influence there. “Shielding the Republic,” Lippmann had envisaged: “Russian-American relations will no longer be controlled by the historic fact that each is for the other a potential friend in the rear of its enemies. Russia will, on the contrary, be the greatest power in the rear of our indispensable friends.”²⁴¹ And Spykman had been more specific on the matter: The United States must organize the Eurasian *Rimland* in order to imprison the Eurasian *Heartland* within its bounds.²⁴²

Franklin Roosevelt boldly outlined the national alternative regarding Eurasia: either encircle or be encircled.²⁴³ Naturally, the former was preferred.

²⁴¹ Lippmann 1943: 145.

²⁴² William Parker 1982: 185.

²⁴³ Henrikson 1980: 83.

THE COLD WAR

Globalizing Monroe

Three months before his death, Roosevelt in his last State of the Union address (January 1945) had recalled “our disillusionment after the last war” and assured the American public: “We must not let that happen again, or we shall follow the same tragic road again—the road to a third world war.”²⁴⁴ No more “disillusionment” happened. On the eve of the Cold War, Hans Baldwin claimed that due to the progress of military technology, the postwar strategy must be global:

Strategically the world is, or soon will be, one world; the great ocean barriers and ice masses ... are no longer effective ramparts. The compartmentalized strategy of the past—national, continental, hemispheric—is superseded by the grand strategy of the world ... There are no longer remote continents. Seas and terrain barriers which for centuries have restricted the conquests of the past have little meaning in the age of the airplane and less in the age of the guided missile ... Maginot Lines, spiritual, mental, or physical, are dangerous and expensive; no defenses ever have been erected by man which have not been breached or by-passed...

Since ranges of weapons are now approaching transoceanic and intercontinental distances, American strategy must be global in concept. “Bases overseas ... will always be important... Equally important are ‘positions-in-

²⁴⁴ Cited in Kagan 2014: esnp.

readiness' or friends and 'allies'... The ... American frontier today lies in the Sudeten hills and along the rocky shores of the Adriatic."²⁴⁵

"The guiding principle" of strategy must entail "a clear understanding that the world is geographically one..."²⁴⁶ New weapons, Baldwin confirmed three years later, "have not brought us more security, but less! None of them, none of these weapons is a Maginot Line." First and most obvious effect of the new weapons is the "shrinkage of time-space factor. The map has become smaller... And the second is that the offensive has a definite advantage over the defensive today in modern war." How do you defend against missiles, submarines, and long range supersonic bombers? It means that the United States is no longer a continent in a strategic sense. Rather we are *insular*:

Our Atlantic and Pacific Oceans have shrunk in the modern terms of high-speed weapons to roughly the dimensions of the English Chanel and the North Sea in the 19th century ... For the first time in our history we have 'live' frontiers...²⁴⁷

Twenty years later, Baldwin extended:

The jet plane of globe-girdling range, the nuclear-powered, submarine-launched missiles, and, above all, intercontinental missiles and space vehicles with nuclear warheads have altered forever the dimensions

²⁴⁵ Baldwin 1947: 147-149, 287-288.

²⁴⁶ Ibid, 303-304.

²⁴⁷ Baldwin 1950: 66-69, 76, 78.

of the old geography; we are, today, in geographical terms, no longer an isolated continent, but a continental island in a very small world.²⁴⁸

The world shrank to become too small for two superpowers. Deterrence analogies expressed “two people on a single keg of dynamite—each with a button, two scorpions in a bottle, two heads on a single chopping block...”²⁴⁹ Hans Morgenthau associated that “two super-powers and their allies and satellites face each other like two fighters in a short and narrow lane...”²⁵⁰ The global spatiotemporal context was altered by the military technological progress:

The impact of technology on mankind's means of communication had brought these two surviving great powers within point-blank range of one another round the circumference of the globe by 'annihilating distance...' By the middle of the Twentieth century of the Christian era, the progress of technology had made a once wide world shrivel to dimensions so diminutive as to make it a henceforth impossible for two gladiators to take their stand in this arena without point-blank range of one another... [In] an act of enveloping the face of the globe, the *Ecumene* was contracting in scale, as measured by the speed of human communication, far faster than it was expanding in area, as measured by its

²⁴⁸ Baldwin 1970: 289.

²⁴⁹ Kahn 1960: 9.

²⁵⁰ Cited in Trachtenberg 2003: 177-178.

extension over the physical surface of the planet.²⁵¹

During the last years of the Cold War, Zbigniew Brzezinski confirmed: "The global scope of the current contest result ... also from developments in both weaponry and mass communication."²⁵²

In the summer 1945, Lieutenant Stanley Dunbar Embick opposed establishing US bases in Iceland. Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, criticized him for "thinking in narrow terms of the defense of the Western Hemisphere rather than of the world" and thus representing "a rather restricted concept of what is necessary for national defense."²⁵³ In 1946, James F. Byrnes maintained that military assistance program to Latin America would focus attention on a region where American interests were relatively unchallenged, and would undermine more important American initiatives elsewhere on the globe. "Greece and Turkey are our outposts," he declared.²⁵⁴

The strategy had become global strategy. Kissinger wrote on US foreign policy: "For the first time, foreign policy has become global. In the past, various continents conducted their foreign policy in isolation ... The postwar period was the first in which *all* the continents interacted."²⁵⁵ Acheson on the eve of the Truman Doctrine had observed: "The world had not witnessed such a polarization of power since the days of Rome

²⁵¹ Toynbee 1954: vol IX, p 473-474, 479, 484.

²⁵² Brzezinski 1986: 28.

²⁵³ Stoler 1982: 318.

²⁵⁴ Cited in Leffler 1984: 355.

²⁵⁵ Kissinger 1979: 53, 68.

and Carthage ... Control of three [Old World] continents was at stake."²⁵⁶

Of the “three continents,” Europe and Asia were of primary importance. Kennan wrote in 1947: "All in all, our policy must be directed toward restoring a balance of power in Europe and Asia."²⁵⁷ Hans Baldwin agreed: If the principal sea routes to Europe and the Far East “are cut we have indeed lost ‘the struggle for the world,’ for only across these sea frontiers can the full measure of American economic, cultural, and military strength be exerted, only across the seas can we maintain communication with Western Europe and Eastern Asia.” Only across these frontiers “can we extend all forms of American strength to the Eastern Hemisphere.”²⁵⁸

The great speed of modern weapons and missiles demands ‘out-post lines’ pushed out as far from our shores as possible. We must have ‘defense-in-depth’ and our own geography no longer suffices. Our frontier today, our strategic frontier, really is in Europe and Asia.²⁵⁹

The presence of the only other superpower in the Eurasian Heartland sharpened the strategic focus. On September 24, 1946, Truman's Special Counsel, Clark M. Clifford, "American Relations with the Soviet Union: A Report to the President..." stated:

Our policies must also be global in scope. By time-honored custom we regarded 'European Policy,' 'Near Eastern Policy,' 'Indian Policy,' and 'Chinese Policy' as separate problems to be

²⁵⁶ Schnabel 1996: vol I, p 60.

²⁵⁷ Cited in Gaddis & Etzold 1978: 27.

²⁵⁸ Baldwin 1947: 158.

²⁵⁹ Idem, 1950: 98.

handled by experts in each field. But the areas involved, far removed from each other by our conventional standards, all border on the Soviet Union and our actions with respect to each must be considered in the light of overall Soviet objectives.²⁶⁰

At 1:00 PM on March 12, 1947, Truman stepped to the rostrum in the hall of the House of Representatives to address a joint session of the Congress: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The statement was epochal:

The statement was all-encompassing. In a single sentence Truman had defined American policy for the next generation and beyond ... For the first time in its history, the United States had chosen to intervene during a period of general peace in the affairs of peoples outside North and South America. The symbolic act could not be more significant. The commitment had been made" and "there would be no turning back."²⁶¹

Writing in 1947, Henry Stimson stated the fact that the United States has become a wholly committed member of the world community and drew implications:

It is the first condition of effective foreign policy that this nation put away any thought that America can again be an island to herself

²⁶⁰ *Containment*, 70.

²⁶¹ Ambrose & Brinkley 1997: 82-83.

... The troubles of Europe and Asia are not 'other people's troubles;' they are ours.²⁶²

JCS 1769/1, "United States Assistance to Other Countries from the Standpoint of National Security," from April 29, 1947, explained:

The potential military strength of the Old World in terms of manpower and in terms of war-making capacity is enormously greater than that of our area of defense commitments, in which the United States is the only arsenal nation. It is obvious therefore that in case of an ideological war we must have the support of some of the countries of the Old World unless our military strength is to be overshadowed by that of our enemies...

[Almost] all potentially strong nations who can reasonably be expected to ally themselves with the United States are situated in Western Europe... That the defense of the United States and Canada in North America and of Great Britain and France in western Europe is inseparable from the combined defense of them all... is something that has been demonstrated by what we have had to do ... in actual warfare in the past... [The maintenance of Britain and France as friendly and strong countries] is still of first importance to the national security of the United States as well as

²⁶² Stimson 1947: 6-7.

to the security of the entire Western Hemisphere."²⁶³

Writing at the same time, Bernard Brodie emphasized that, "as the world is now organized, and as it now operates, American security is for all practical purposes synonymous with world security... [W]e have reached a stage where large-scale war without American participation borders on the inconceivable ... The atomic bomb has in military effect translated the United States into a European power"²⁶⁴

The global strategy required global geographic knowledge. The beginning of the Cold War triggered the "massive ... expansion in the scope and activities" of federal cartographic agencies. "World regions became part of geopolitical Cold War imperatives ... Fighting the Soviet Union required the power to construct spatial knowledge of the entire Earth with the utmost precision."²⁶⁵

The emerging US alliance system, George Kennan wrote in 1948, will encircle the globe: "There is no logical stopping point in the development of a system of anti-Russian alliances, until that system has encircled the globe and has embraced all the non-communist countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa,"²⁶⁶ with the emphasis on Europe and Asia. On November 6, 1947, Kennan drew "Resume of World Situation":

All in all, our policy must be directed toward restoring a balance of power in Europe and Asia... The world situation is still dominated

²⁶³ *Containment*, 72-73.

²⁶⁴ Brodie 1948: 377, 380.

²⁶⁵ Barney 2011: 156.

²⁶⁶ Cited in Gaddis & Etzold 1978: 34.

by the effort undertaken by the Russians in the post-hostilities period to extend their virtual domination over all, or as much as possible, of the Eurasian land mass.²⁶⁷

In 1947-48, priority shifted to Western Europe and the Near East—"the heart of Eurasia."²⁶⁸ Massive economic aid to Western Europe, military assistance to Greece and Turkey, and economic policy toward Japan "were aimed primarily at tackling the internal sources of unrest upon which communist parties capitalized and at rehabilitating the industrial heartlands of Eurasia." The United States would oversee the resuscitation of the industrial heartlands of Germany and Japan, establish a viable balance of power in Eurasia, and militarily dominate the Eurasian rimlands, thereby safeguarding American access to raw materials and control over all sea and air approaches to North America.²⁶⁹

The year Truman proclaimed his Doctrine, he established the *Unified Combatant Command*. It integrated functional and geographic strategic branches under a single command. The geographic branches spanned the globe, meeting on the opposite side.²⁷⁰ In 1951, Truman approved the *NSC-68*. It was "one of the key historical documents of the Cold War," the "first comprehensive statement of a national strategy." The program called on the United States to assume unilaterally the defense of the non-Communist world. It "represented the practical extension of the Truman

²⁶⁷ *Containment*, 91, also 92-93.

²⁶⁸ Leffler 1984: 355.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.* 370-371, 380.

²⁷⁰ See chapter "Unified Combatant Command" below.

Doctrine..." The United States could no longer "distinguish between national and global security."²⁷¹

The Truman Doctrine was accompanied by Marshall Plan, military assistance to West Europe and (following the North Korean attack on South Korea) southeast Asia, Atlantic and other alliances, stationing of troops permanently in Europe, Japan and Korea, and German and Japanese rehabilitation. The overall principle was to stabilize the positions in Eurasia:

Postulating a long-term Soviet intention to gain world domination, the American conception of national security, based on geopolitical and economic imperatives, could not allow for additional losses in Eurasia, could not risk a challenge to its nuclear supremacy, and could not permit any infringement on its ability to defend in depth or to project American force from areas in close proximity to the Soviet homeland.²⁷²

In 1941, Baldwin posed several questions:

Our influence at the peace table will probably be dominant, whether we fight or retain our non-belligerency. But are we prepared to guarantee the peace we make? Are we prepared, for instance, to set up international police force... in cooperation with... other powers to patrol the world? Will we make alliances, guarantee the safety of small nations

²⁷¹ Ambrose & Brinkley 1997: 111-112.

²⁷² Leffler 1984: 379-380.

in Europe and Asia; will we engage with Britain to keep the peace of the world?²⁷³

Six years later, Truman boldly and definitely answered all of those questions: yes, we are.

Truman's accomplishments were breathtaking. He had ... rearmed Germany. He pushed through a peace treaty with Japan ... that excluded the Russians and gave the Americans military bases, allowed for Japanese rearmament and unlimited industrialization... Truman extended American bases around the world, hemming in both Russia and China. He had learned, in November of 1950, not to push beyond the iron and bamboo curtains, but he had made sure that if any Communist showed his head on the free side of the line, someone—usually the American—would be there to shoot him.²⁷⁴

Writing in 1954, Whitaker concluded: The Western Hemisphere to all appearances “has gone never to return.”²⁷⁵ However the Truman Doctrine did not abolish the Monroe Doctrine. The American conception of national security that had emerged between 1945 and 1948 continued to include “a strategic sphere of influence within the Western Hemisphere.”²⁷⁶ The Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted that in practice non-American forces had to be kept out of the Western Hemisphere and the Monroe Doctrine had to be kept

²⁷³ Baldwin 1941: 285-286.

²⁷⁴ Ambrose & Brinkley 1997: 122-123.

²⁷⁵ Whitaker 1954: 155.

²⁷⁶ Leffler 1984: 379.

inviolable. The basic consideration has always been an overriding apprehension lest a base be established in this area by a potentially hostile foreign power. The United States, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson insisted, must have "a stable, secure, and friendly flank to the South, not confused by enemy penetration, political, economic, or military."²⁷⁷

The first Cold War collective alliance was the Rio Treaty concluded in 1947. It allied the United States with Latin American states. The year after, the Charter of the Organization of American States was concluded. Pan-American measures and agencies have indeed survived and even continued to grow but within "a conceptual framework of global proportions."²⁷⁸

Keeping the Monroe Doctrine inviolable, the Truman Doctrine extended it beyond the Western Hemisphere, or, regarding the scope, *globalized* it. In fact "the Truman Doctrine was described as globalizing the Monroe Doctrine."²⁷⁹ *The New York Times* noted the belief amongst Congressmen that Truman's 1947 speech represented a "new, world-wide Monroe Doctrine going into force."²⁸⁰

Many later commentators regard the Truman Doctrine as a worldwide equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine.²⁸¹ As John L. O'Sullivan put it, the "Truman Doctrine pushed the outer boundary from the Monroe definition across the Atlantic and the Pacific."²⁸² Walter Russell Mead sees Bush's

²⁷⁷ Cited in Ibid, 354-355.

²⁷⁸ Whitaker 1954: 175-176.

²⁷⁹ Ibid: 174.

²⁸⁰ Cited in Russell 2007: 12.

²⁸¹ Гаджиев 1997: 183.

²⁸² O'Sullivan 1986: 12.

“globalization of the Monroe Doctrine” as a process stretching back to World War II.²⁸³ Neil Smith interpreted Woodrow Wilson’s promise in 1919 of the “New World Order” as already “a global Monroe Doctrine” which abolished “the territorial system of nation-states” once and for all.²⁸⁴ Similarly co-editor of Woodrow Wilson’s papers, Arthur Link, described the League of Nations as an attempt “to apply the principles of the Monroe Doctrine to the World at large.”²⁸⁵

Writing in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War, British policy-analyst Anatol Lieven and UN official Samir Amin vividly criticized the globalization of the Monroe Doctrine. Lieven referred to Walter Russell Mead who sees Bush’s globalization of the Monroe Doctrine as a process stretching back to World War II and interpreted US National Security Strategy of 2002 (NSS 2002) as “basically an attempt to extend a tough, interventionist version of the Monroe Doctrine (the ‘Roosevelt Corollary’ to the Doctrine by President Theodore Roosevelt) to the entire world.”²⁸⁶ Amin subtitled his subchapter, “Extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the Rest of the World.” The chapter states: Devised after Potsdam and basing on the nuclear advantage, the Americans endeavor to extend the Monroe Doctrine “to the whole planet.” He offered a response: “A rapprochement between the large portions of Eurasia (Europe, Russia, China and India) involving the rest of the Old World ... is necessary and possible, and would put

²⁸³ Lieven 2004: 171-172.

²⁸⁴ Neil Smith 2003: 5, 9.

²⁸⁵ Link 1974: 142.

²⁸⁶ Lieven 2004: 172.

an end once and for all to Washington's plans to extend the Monroe Doctrine to the entire planet."²⁸⁷

The idea can be traced a century back. On the eve of the Open Door policy in China, Alfred Thayer Mahan suggested: A support of China against foreign domination or annexation or partition would be "a policy identical in principle with the Monroe Doctrine."²⁸⁸ The Monroe Doctrine, Mahan wrote later, is "indeterminate in scope because it has steadily grown, and of which therefore finality cannot be affirmed."²⁸⁹ Bowman was "flushed with simultaneously nationalist and internationalist excitement about the project of establishing a veritable global Monroe Doctrine."²⁹⁰

In July 1940, Stimson suggested extending the Monroe Doctrine across the Atlantic, though not explicitly until Britain. He stated to the Senate referring to the Lend Lease: Under modern conditions of warfare, the Monroe Doctrine could be enforced only by extending the American line of defense "far out into the Atlantic Ocean."²⁹¹ The Truman Doctrine took place in the context of extension or globalization of the Monroe Doctrine.

The globalized doctrine included domination of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, an extensive system of outlying bases to enlarge the strategic frontier and project American power, an even more extensive system of transit rights to facilitate the conversion of commercial air bases to military

²⁸⁷ Amin 2006: 17.

²⁸⁸ Mahan 1900: 188.

²⁸⁹ Mahan 1907: 83-84.

²⁹⁰ Neil Smith 2003: 12.

²⁹¹ Cited in Whitaker 1954: 159.

use, access to the resources and markets of most of Eurasia and denial of those resources to a prospective enemy backed by nuclear superiority.

On December 30, 1951, Dean Acheson stressed that “the Western Hemisphere” is the “foundation of our position in the world,” but our position is “lying in both the Western and Northern Hemispheres.”²⁹² American Historians and Geographers in the 1950s noted that “the fictitious boundaries of the Western Hemisphere have crumpled” and the concept of the “Western Hemisphere” was gradually replaced by that of the “Northern Hemisphere.” The latter more and more captured the American political and strategic imagination:

In the restless years following the end of World War II, the United States had slowly and reluctantly adopted a global strategy of defense, thus repudiating conflicting defense theories, which were either continental or Western-Hemispheric in character.²⁹³

The term *Northern Hemisphere* “displaced” the term *Western Hemisphere*, but, to “be sure, displacement did not mean abandonment” as “Government spokesmen went on repeating the Western Hemisphere shibboleth even when, by their own showing, it was only a shibboleth.”²⁹⁴ The Monroe Doctrine has remained intact, but overshadowed by new Eurasian alliances, most notably NATO: The Rio Treaty of 1947 “was promptly followed and completely overshadowed by the creation of NATO.”²⁹⁵

²⁹² Cited in Whitaker 1954: 175 and Weigert 1957: 242.

²⁹³ Weigert 1957: 242, 275, 279.

²⁹⁴ Whitaker 1954: 175.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid*, 174.

The transatlantic alliance was named the “headlong” strategic revolution: “After 1940, the substance of the Western Hemisphere idea was lost, and its place was taken ... by new twofold division of the globe, not into the traditional Eastern and Western Hemispheres, but into Northern and Southern Hemispheres, or, more frequently, into the Communist and non-Communist worlds.” Both new-style divisions grouped Western Europe with America, “and thus they were in headlong conflict with the classic Western Hemisphere idea, an essential component of which was the separation of America from Europe.”²⁹⁶

At the other edge of Eurasia, America was grouped with Japan and South Korea. It used to be said about the Monroe Doctrine: “The Monroe Doctrine may be taken as the point at which, in American and certain European eyes, the American system began to have parity with the European system. It seemed to be gaining gravitational equivalence.”²⁹⁷ Correspondingly, the Truman Doctrine may be taken as the point at which, in American, European and certain Asian eyes, the American system began to have preponderance over both European and Asian systems.

²⁹⁶ Ibid. 154-155.

²⁹⁷ Henrikson 1980: 78.

The British Succession

In 1947, no longer able to defend Greece and Turkey on its own, Britain passed the commitment to the United States. The Truman Doctrine thus made the United States the successor of the British Empire.²⁹⁸ Most far-reaching of Truman's political decisions regarding the direction of foreign policy "was his determination to pick up an exhausted Britain's mantle as a global, balancing power."²⁹⁹

The announcement of the Truman Doctrine was the culmination of half-a-century long process, began with the Venezuelan and the Alaskan boundary disputes at the end of the Nineteenth century. Hence, Britain recognized the paramouncy of the United States in the New World and began what Lionel Gilber called "retreat from world power status."³⁰⁰ By 1903, Britain had completely given in to American demands concerning control over the proposed isthmian canal. Shortly thereafter, Britain bowed to the reality of America's overwhelming regional power and withdrew its naval and military forces from North America. "Britain withdrew from the Western Hemisphere because London realized it lacked the resources to compete successfully against the United States and that the naval forces deployed in North American waters could better be used elsewhere." In the 1930s, "America's power ultimately rose to a point where it could displace Britain as hegemon."³⁰¹

Earlier, *Mein Kampf* (1926) had said that the United States would inherit the British Empire, which is doomed, and

²⁹⁸ Morgenthau 1951: 115-116.

²⁹⁹ Nitze 1999: 1.

³⁰⁰ Cited in Layne 1993: 28.

³⁰¹ Ibid, 32.

become the “new lord of the world.”³⁰² In the beginning of World War II, Hitler argued that the United States “was not fighting for England, but only trying to get the British Empire into its grasp. They were helping England, at best, in order to ... to reinforce their military power by acquiring bases.”³⁰³ At the same time, Karl Haushofer noted that Britain seeks for the preservation of her Empire the help of the United States. “But by accepting such help she mortgages her Empire to the very power that has the strongest geopolitical interest in liquidating it.”³⁰⁴

Both Haushofer and Hitler made good estimations. US Presidential candidate in 1940, Wendell Willkie, advocated a complete decolonization and self-determination for all nations worldwide. Churchill was upset: “I am not going to accept less favorable terms from that other German, Willkie, than I could get from Hitler.”³⁰⁵ In one his most famous wartime statements, on November 10, 1942, Churchill promised:

Let me ... make this clear. In case there should be any mistake about it in any quarter. We mean to hold our own. I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.³⁰⁶

The editors of *Life* magazine (October 12, 1942) however presented “Open Letter ... to the people of England”:

[One] thing we are sure we are *not* fighting for is to hold the British Empire together. We do

³⁰² *Mein Kampf*, 722-723.

³⁰³ Memorandum 1940.

³⁰⁴ Cited in William Parker 1982: 178.

³⁰⁵ Cited in William Louis 1977: 199.

³⁰⁶ Cited in William Louis 1977: 200.

not like to put the matter so bluntly, but we do not want you to have any illusion. If your strategists are planning a war to hold the British Empire together they will sooner or later find themselves strategizing alone.³⁰⁷

Americans might disagree among themselves on war aims, but they were unanimous on this point. "Clearly Americans believed that the British Empire should be liquidated."³⁰⁸ "It was crucial, in the American view, that Britain emerge from the war neither too weak nor too strong, but amenable to American direction on the larger issues."³⁰⁹ The United States wanted to ensure that Britain would be taken down a notch in the postwar world so that it would be an adjunct to American power rather than a rival to it.³¹⁰ The development of the Anglo-American "relationship since the beginning of the Second World War is part of a larger story of the decline of British power against that of America—with the United States sometimes giving the British Empire a push down the slippery slope."³¹¹

Following the Truman Doctrine, the US Pacific and Mediterranean Fleets met in the Indian Ocean to inherit the British strategic outposts in that Ocean.³¹² The "Great Game" between Russia and Britain, to which J. W. Kaye had called attention, has a century later become a great game between the Soviet Union and the United States.³¹³

³⁰⁷ Cited in *Ibid*, 198.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid*, 198-199.

³⁰⁹ Kolko 1968: 488.

³¹⁰ Layne 2002: 143.

³¹¹ Reynolds 2006: 312.

³¹² Harkavy 2005: 5.

³¹³ *Idem*, 1989: 44.

Staley's design from 1941 of the strong-points chain—Panama, Hawaii, Singapore, Suez and Gibraltar—came true. With the creation of this chain, the Panama Canal declined in strategic importance. In 1890, it had seemed to the famous expert on sea power in history, Mahan that the Panama Canal “will become a strategic center of the most vital importance.”³¹⁴ A decade later, he stated the recognized importance of the Canal among public men: To illustrate the words of public men stressing the political, commercial, and military importance of the Isthmus of Panama “would require an article—rather, perhaps, a volume—by itself.”³¹⁵ A dozen more years later, Mahan reemphasized:

The military, or strategic, significance of the Panama Canal... is that it will be the most vital chord in that system of transference by which the Navy of the United States can come promptly to the support of either coast of the local defenses ... With a competent Navy, and with the Panama Canal secured... invasion will not be attempted...³¹⁶

The Panama Canal, Mahan continued, is the only link between the US coasts, enabling the United States to concentrate the Fleet with the greatest rapidity upon any threatened or desired point. The Canal is militarily and geographically integral to the United States and Americas.³¹⁷

This remained the accepted view in America until the end of World War II. “Our navy is perfectly capable of

³¹⁴ Mahan 1890: esnp.

³¹⁵ Idem, 1900, 5.

³¹⁶ Idem, 174-175.

³¹⁷ Idem, 1912: 177, 1912a: 182.

efficient operation in both the Atlantic and Pacific at the same time, and will continue to be as long as the Panama Canal remains intact.”³¹⁸ The United States, military expert Hans Baldwin said in 1941, is able to shift its naval forces from sector to sector to meet any threatened point only as long as the Panama Canal is available for the use of the fleet.³¹⁹ Yet in 1947, Baldwin repeated:

Southward, the United States possesses no ‘live’ frontiers of comparable importance to those to north, east, and west. But the Panama Canal, our principal arterial sea gate between our sea frontiers, demands a new scope of protection...³²⁰

With the establishment of the globe-girding chain of naval strong-points including Malacca, Suez and Gibraltar, the Panama Canal ceased to be the exclusive and even the most important link of the US Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. Old World sea passages became more important in the age of US global strategy. In 1953, US Naval Station Rota was established on the Spanish shore of the Gibraltar Strait. In 1956, the United States forces Israel, France and Britain from the Suez Canal, as earlier it had forced Colombia from Panama.

In 1977, the two Torrijos–Carter Treaties signed abrogated the Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903, by which the United States had exercised the control of the Panama Canal, and guaranteed that Panama would gain control of the Panama Canal after 1999. The Canal Zone, as an entity,

³¹⁸ Gunther 1940: 600.

³¹⁹ Baldwin 1941: 94.

³²⁰ Baldwin 1947: 158.

ceased to exist on October 1, 1979. On December 31, 1999, the United States relinquished control of the Panama Canal and all areas in what had been the Panama Canal Zone. With the end of the Cold War, protecting sea-lanes between the Caribbean and Europe yet decreased in importance. In 1995, Southcom headquarters were relocated from Panama to Miami.³²¹

The emphasis shifted to the Old World straits. The year the Torrijos–Carter Treaties were signed, the US embassy was established in Djibouti, a country on the shores of Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. In 2001, US Naval Base Camp Lemonnier was established in this country, the only permanent US military base in Africa with around 4000 service members assigned there, four times more than elsewhere on the continent.³²² To dig deeper in the strategic location, US service members engage in humanitarian aid to the local population in the field of public health and disease prevention. Currently, US Navy engineers build there a medical clinic to serve the populace. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Patrice Young explained that the mission is to convince the local populace that America is “a force for good.”³²³ It is important that the populace living on the shore of the strategic highway believes so. Marine Corps General Joseph F. Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained: "But geography is destiny, and Djibouti occupies key terrain on the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb at the mouth of the Red Sea."³²⁴

³²¹ Drea et al 2013: 73.

³²² Garamone 2015: 1.

³²³ Allmond 2017: 1.

³²⁴ Cited in Garamone 2015b: 1.

Between 1979 and 2003, Egypt—the owner of Suez—was the second largest non-NATO recipient of US military aid after Israel. In 1989, Egypt became Major Non-NATO Ally. Morocco—the shore of the Gibraltar Strait—and Tunis—the shore of the Strait of Sicily—became Major Non-NATO Allies in 2004 and 2015 respectively. The designation “Major non-NATO Ally” is a testament to the significance for the United States. These allies represent critical regional access points for the US military presence—sometimes in a strictly geographical sense.³²⁵ Egypt, along with Israel, leads by wide margin in amount of US security fund. Djibouti is also high in the hierarchy of US foreign aid. Not accidentally, despite the opposition from the Arab street to the 2003 Iraq War, Egypt quietly allowed overflights, refueling, Suez Canal transit, and use of a major military hospital.³²⁶

In 2001, the US Navy would not need the Panama Canal to move the fleet from the Far Eastern outposts in Japan and South Korea to the far western in Afghanistan; they used the Malaccan Strait for this purpose. The US Kitty Hawk aircraft super-carrier left Yokosuka, Japan, in September 2001 and having passed only 6000 miles took forward staging base in support of the Marines and US Special Forces in Afghanistan.³²⁷ Similarly, during the 1996 Taiwan crisis, the United States had dispatched two carrier battle groups to the Strait, one from Okinawa and another from the Mediterranean.³²⁸

³²⁵ Campbell 2004: 159-160.

³²⁶ Harkavy 2005: 19.

³²⁷ Kennedy 2002: 10.

³²⁸ Wei-cheng Wang 2005: 22.

Singapore provides logistical support to US military aircraft and vessels sharing the belief that a strong US presence in the region is vital for peace, prosperity and stability.³²⁹ Singapore has hosted US Navy littoral combat ships and built a major US naval facility at the Changi Naval Base that can accommodate US Navy aircraft carriers,³³⁰ US former Defense Secretary Ash Carter in his 2016 visit to Singapore pointed out that more than 100 US Navy ships and more than 800 US aircraft transit through Singapore every year. He added that "there's no country... and no geography in the world that compares to Singapore for... the importance it has in the field of maritime security,"³³¹ placing thus the Straits of Malacca above the Panama Canal. Using the Old World straits, the US Atlantic and Pacific Fleets can alternatively be shifted between western and eastern sectors on the opposite side of the globe, in the Indian Ocean:

Basically, the Indian Ocean [US naval] force acts as a hinge, with reinforcements or surges ('swing' forces) of forces being provided during crises or potential conflicts from the Western Pacific or the Mediterranean...³³²

Criticizing the nascent idea of "Pax Americana" in 1943, Nathaniel Peffer stated: "No nation today can aspire to higher ascendancy than Great Britain had attained in the latter part of the Nineteenth century..."³³³ Peffer underestimated. Eventually, the United States inherited the British strategic outposts, numerous others and preserved its Western

³²⁹ Carter & Ng 2015: 1.

³³⁰ Harkavy 2005: 14.

³³¹ Cited in Ferdinando 2016: 1.

³³² Harkavy 1989: 44.

³³³ Peffer 1943: 16.

Hemispheric outposts. Peffer's compatriot, Strausz-Hupé, a year earlier had envisaged more correctly: "The United States would presumably play in this future world of European and Asiatic power blocs the game of the balance of power as England played it in Europe."³³⁴

Thomas Paine in his famous pamphlet *Common Sense* in support of the 1776 Revolution wrote: "Even the distance at which the Almighty hath placed England and America is a strong and natural proof that the authority of the one over the other was not the design of Heaven."³³⁵ Heaven proved to have such a design, but with reverse roles. Already in 1878, British politician William Gladstone could see:

While we have been advancing with portentous rapidity, America is passing us by as if a canter. There can hardly be a doubt, as between America and England, of the belief that the daughter at no very distant time will ... be unquestionably yet stronger than the mother ... She [America] will probably become what we are now—head servant in the great household of the world...³³⁶

³³⁴ Strausz-Hupé 1942: XI.

³³⁵ Cited in O'Tauthail & Agnew 1992: 196.

³³⁶ Cited in Kohn 1962: 17.

Containment

American General Tasker Bliss foresaw in 1904: "Here may come a time in the not too distant future when Americans might find ourselves fighting for our Monroe Doctrine on one side of the world and against somebody else's Monroe Doctrine on the other side of the world."³³⁷ The prophecy came true, with *Mittel Europa* and *Hako Ichiu* as rival Doctrines. The Monroe Doctrine won and incorporated the spheres of the rival Doctrines. In addition, as the previous chapter described, the United States incorporated the strategic positions of the British Empire. The only surviving rival Doctrine was what Mackinder had called the *Eurasian Heartland* and Haushofer and Eurasianists called *Eurasia* proper: "The widening American frontier, enfolding the German, Japanese, and British 'buffer zones,' collided with the widening Soviet perimeter."³³⁸ The new US controlled space was "global" rather than "hemispheric":

Because of the virtual elimination of other empires on this shrunken footing, the US and the USSR were in direct as well as close contact with one another ... The German, Japanese, and British "buffer zones" were to a large extent included within the orbit of the United States. Other intermediate areas became Soviet satellites. The American frontier widened until it met the widening frontier of Russia. There it stopped. The Air-Age Global horizon, which had given rise to such expansiveness even as the globe itself

³³⁷ Cited in Sloan 1988: 120.

³³⁸ Porter 2012: 333.

seemed to diminish, was blocked. Once again, as at earlier points in American history, space seemed "closed" for Americans. Only this time it was closed not on a continental or hemispheric scale but on a global scale. The chance of there being another frontier beyond seemed unlikely.³³⁹

The early Cold War was marked by the division of blocs and pacts, treaties and security alliances that were no longer partitioned according to traditional continental and hemispheric geopolitics, but by uncompromised global one:

Within living memoire, man's world, in the sense of the habitable and traversable surface of the planet of which man was a denizen, had at last become round in fact as well as in theory—or, if not yet fully round, at least already more than hemispherical.³⁴⁰

The world order became bipolar. "In AD 1947, the United States and the Soviet Union are alternative embodiments of contemporary man's tremendous material power; their line is gone out through all the Earth, and their words to the end of the World."³⁴¹ "Two super-states—America and Russia—cast their shadows across the Earth."³⁴² "The theater of conflict is very clearly the world. There is no area of the Earth which is immune from the Cold War."³⁴³ The

³³⁹ Henrikson 1974: 453.

³⁴⁰ Toynbee 1954: vol IX, p 479.

³⁴¹ Idem, 195.

³⁴² Baldwin 1947: 142.

³⁴³ Idem 1950: 13.

"battlefield for the planetary hegemony is the entire planet."³⁴⁴
The Cold War "involves—for the first time in history—a two-nation contest for nothing less than global predominance." This "global rivalry" is historically unprecedented. "Never before have two powers competed on such a broad front."³⁴⁵

William T. R. Fox, who coined the term *superpower* in 1944, initially applied it to the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Later, however he wrote: When "Hitler and Tojo had been run to earth and the smoke of battle had cleared away, it became obvious that only two powers were according each other first-ranking status. Light years separated those two from all the rest, Britain included."³⁴⁶ French President Charles de Gaulle acknowledged that no grandeur is left for the "old powers" including France: "Two empires, the American and the Soviet, now become giants in comparison with the old powers..."³⁴⁷

German Philosopher Karl Jaspers described the bipolarity of the world in these words: Small states still pursue the same ends by the same means but all their "ventures are undertaken with a glance at the two superpowers, with their help or permission." Both superpowers have interests in all wars. "They have a hand in everyone." In the age of world strategy

all military planning of small nations, while locally to the point, depends upon the actions of the great powers. Whether they take sides or attempt to stay neutral, the small nations get

³⁴⁴ Deudney 1983: 19.

³⁴⁵ Brzezinski 1986: 8, 27.

³⁴⁶ Fox 1979/80: 417.

³⁴⁷ De Gaulle 1970: 164.

their orientation from the great powers. They have some leeway left to them—in case of war only if their conquest or destruction would be too costly, measured by the total purpose—but they are part of the one global battlefield.³⁴⁸

In this view, the Cold War marked the culmination of the five-millennium long process of the globalization of conflict. Since the first known in history confrontation between two powers—Upper and Lower Egypt—the history of conflict between ever larger powers culminates with almost the whole world divided on two blocs. “American and Russian forces met, unexpectedly, along the Elbe River and on the Manchurian border, circling and dividing the Earth.”³⁴⁹ In 1946, Churchill in his famous speech announced that the Iron Curtain has descended from the Baltic to the Adriatic. Four years later, US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, defined the “iron curtain” on the opposite side of the globe—running from Alaska through the Aleutians, Japan and to the Philippines.³⁵⁰ The Berlin Wall and the 38th Parallel in Korea symbolized the fact that eventually two remaining superpowers faced themselves on the opposite sides of the globe.

To contain the Sino-Soviet bloc, the US had a daunting task to “build a 20,000 miles Maginot Line” around the Sino-Soviet perimeter.³⁵¹ “There was never a possibility that we could contain the Soviet Union at all points, or for that matter at any one of them, around the enormous perimeter that stretches from Finland through ... Europe and the whole

³⁴⁸ Jaspers 1958: 62-63.

³⁴⁹ Kohn 1957: 48.

³⁵⁰ Donald White 1996: 17.

³⁵¹ Kohn 1952: esnp.

length of Russia's Asiatic frontier to the Bering Straits."³⁵² The global dimension of the Cold War, claimed US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, overburdened the Containment:

If an enemy could pick his time and place and method of warfare—and if our policy was to remain the traditional one of meeting aggression by direct and local opposition—then we needed to be ready to fight in the Arctic and in the Tropics; in Asia, the Near East, and in Europe; by sea, by land, and by air...³⁵³

This was the background of Dulles' *massive retaliation* doctrine: "Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power." The strategy will be based "primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing."³⁵⁴

Nevertheless the world balance was not perfectly bipolar. It heavily tilted in favor of the United States. Cold War bipolarity was "decidedly lopsided from the start."³⁵⁵ On the economic side, the Soviet Union was never a true superpower. In terms of GNP, it was twice weaker than the United States and lagged behind Japan.³⁵⁶ Its military might, concentrated in ground forces, never approached the global reach of US power projection capabilities." As the Cold War proceeded, the United States amassed a strong and loyal set of allies while the USSR led an alliance of comparatively weak

³⁵² Morgenthau 1951: 182.

³⁵³ Dulles 1954: esnp.

³⁵⁴ Ibid, esnp.

³⁵⁵ Walt 2011: 7.

³⁵⁶ Lundestad 1992: 250-251.

and reluctant partners. In short, even before the Soviet Union collapsed, America's overall position was about as favorable as any great power's in modern history.³⁵⁷

US network of military alliances and bases surrounded the Soviet bloc. The United States deployed to Eurasia much of Air Force and thousands of tactical nuclear weapons.³⁵⁸ In a 1952 speech to the National War College, US Air Force General Curtis LeMay summarized the situation while showing a slide of SAC's medium bomber bases: "You will notice that they form a ring around the USSR. This base system will permit us flexibility in attacking from many different directions..."³⁵⁹ To substitute for Roosevelt's term "encirclement,"³⁶⁰ George Kennan coined the term *containment*,³⁶¹ though the Soviets regarded themselves as being "encircled" rather than "contained."

American admirals at Paris in 1919 had extended the responsibility of their Fleet "from the Philippines to the Virgin Islands."³⁶² In 1945, the responsibility was again extended "from the Philippines to the Virgin Islands," but this time across the Eastern Hemisphere. Bi-coastal North American state became bi-coastal Eurasian. Soon the southern³⁶³ and northern³⁶⁴ Eurasian coasts would be fortified too and the Atlantic coastal frontier advance, first to the Fulda Gap and eventually to the Russian border. During the Cold War, the

³⁵⁷ Walt 2011: 7-8.

³⁵⁸ Art 1991: 18.

³⁵⁹ Cited in Schake 1998: 94-95.

³⁶⁰ Henrikson 1980: 83.

³⁶¹ Gaddis & Etzold 1978: 25.

³⁶² Cited in Vagts 1941: 435.

³⁶³ See the continuation of this chapter.

³⁶⁴ See chapter "Arctic Frontier" below.

United States maintained a huge navy, far superior to anything that the Soviets ever deployed, stationed overseas.³⁶⁵ The US Mediterranean and Pacific Fleets met in the Indian Ocean, integrating the former British outposts— Singapore, Gibraltar, and Suez —into their maritime highway.

Aside from the network of alliances and bases and the naval route, the US Joint Chiefs in 1946 asked the State Department to negotiate for far-flung rights of military air transit and technical stop at key airfields in North Africa, the Middle East, India and Southeast Asia. They delineated route from Casablanca through Algiers, Tripoli, Cairo, Dhahran, Karachi, Delhi, Calcutta, Rangoon, Bangkok and Saigon to Manila. Such rights would permit the rapid augmentation of American bases in wartime as well as the rapid movement of American air units from the eastern to the western flank of the US base system.³⁶⁶

This "Eastern Hemisphere Route" would function along crossing Latin America "Western Hemisphere Routes,"³⁶⁷ but the former route proved to be more important. By early 1948, the Joint Chiefs were willing to forego base rights in such places as Surinam, Curacao-Aruba, Cayenne, Nounea and Vivi-Levu in favor of the Eurasian transcontinental transit highway.³⁶⁸ The latter would permit the rapid augmentation of American bases in wartime as well as the rapid movement of American air units from the eastern to the western flank of the US base system without passing through the Western Hemisphere,³⁶⁹ as the maritime route

³⁶⁵ Art 1991: 18.

³⁶⁶ Leffler 1992: 60, 353; Schnabel 1996: vol I, p 147.

³⁶⁷ Schnabel 1996: vol I, p 147.

³⁶⁸ Leffler 1984: 352.

³⁶⁹ Leffler 1984: 353; Schnabel 1996: vol I, p 146.

through the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean allowed the rapid augmentation of US Navy without passing through the Panama Canal.

In 1955, Dulles initiated Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) for the Middle East and Central Asia. As its name explicitly implied, the Organization covered the "central" area of the globe located between NATO and SEATO. In 1983, the Unified Combatant Command established a geographic branch for the same region—Central Command. Analogously, the Command covered the "central" area of the globe located between the US European and US Pacific Commands.³⁷⁰ Implicitly in this context, the name “Central” on both occasions implied the opposite to the United States area of the globe.

Five other current US commands by their names designate either geographic direction relatively to the unipole (*Northern Command* and *Southern Command*) or geographic region (*European Command*, *Pacific Command* and *Africa Command*). In 2006, before Africa Command was established, European Combatant Commander proposed renaming European Command to *Eastern Command* and Pacific Command to *Western Command*.³⁷¹ His idea was to have five commands with harmonious names—Northern, Southern, Western, Eastern and Central. The name *Central Command* remained unaltered—relatively to the unipole, it was in all directions.

Thus the view of the two remaining superpowers facing themselves at the opposite sides of the globe is not

³⁷⁰ See chapter “Unified Combatant Command” below.

³⁷¹ Drea et al 2013: 93.

proportional. One superpower became *contained* or *encircled* by the other. It was observed regarding the Western Hemisphere's borders: "Before and during World War II, the Hemisphere's borders in the minds of American strategists were extended ever farther as the technology of air transport brought more distant contiguous areas closer."³⁷² The process culminated at the beginning of the Cold War: the "ever farther" expanding US strategic frontiers coincided in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean. The United States faced itself on the opposite side of the globe.

³⁷² Deibel 1992: 91.

Alliances and Bases

The American eagle, in Roosevelt's words, could only "fly high and strike hard" if it had safe perches around the globe.³⁷³ After the War, these perches were found in the network of alliances and bases. An "underlying awareness of the suicidal consequences of retreat into 'Fortress America'" was one of the reasons for the expansion of the overseas bases which constitute "the cement in our system of alliances."³⁷⁴

In 1953, NSC-162/2 stated: "The military striking power necessary to retaliate depends for the foreseeable future on having bases in allied countries."³⁷⁵ The "bases were defined as the nation's strategic frontier."³⁷⁶ Beyond this frontier, the United States would be able to use force to counter any threats or frustrate any overt acts of aggression. Within the strategic frontier, American military predominance had to remain inviolate.³⁷⁷

Melvin Leffler distinguishes two main strategic considerations for overseas bases. The first was the need for defense in depth. Since attacks against the United States could only emanate from Europe and Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded as early as November 1943 that the United States must encircle the Western Hemisphere with a defensive ring of outlying bases. Although plans for an overseas base system went through many revisions, they always presupposed American hegemony over the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. In the Pacific, this ring had to include the Aleutians, the

³⁷³ Reynolds 2006: 304.

³⁷⁴ Hoopes 1958: 69, 71.

³⁷⁵ NSC 162/2 1953: 20.

³⁷⁶ Leffler 1984: 349.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.* 349.

Philippines, Okinawa, and the former Japanese mandate. In the Atlantic, strategic planners maintained that their minimum requirements included a West African zone, with primary bases in the Azores or Canary Islands. Admiral William Daniel Leahy went even further, insisting on primary bases in West Africa itself—for example, at Dakar or Casablanca. The object of these defensive bases was to enable the United States to possess complete control of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and keep hostile powers far from American territory.³⁷⁸

The second strategic consideration that influenced the plan for a comprehensive overseas base system was the need for forward defense, caused by the combination of the Pearl Harbor experience and the development of the atomic bomb and other technology:

The farther away from our own vital areas we can hold our enemy through the possession of advanced bases..., the greater are our chances of surviving successfully an attack by atomic weapons and of destroying the enemy which employs them against us ... Believing that the atomic weapons would increase the incentive to aggression by enhancing the advantage of surprise, military planners never ceased to extol the utility of forward bases from which American aircraft could seek to intercept attacks against the United States ... New weapons demanded that advance bases be established in areas well removed from the United States, so as to protect our operations,

³⁷⁸ Leffler 1984: 349-350.

with new weapons or otherwise, nearer the enemy.³⁷⁹

Hence, American power had to be projected quickly and effectively against any potential adversary. In conducting an overall examination of requirements for base rights in September 1945, the Joint War Plans Committee stressed that World War II demonstrated the futility of a strategy of static defense. The United States had to be able to take "timely" offensive action against the adversary's capacity and will to wage war. New weapons demanded that advance bases be established in "areas well removed from the United States, so as to project our operations, with new weapons or otherwise, nearer the enemy." Scientists, like Vannevar Bush, argued concerning atomic energy and guided missiles that, "regardless of the potentialities of these new weapons, they should not influence the number, location, or extent of strategic bases now considered essential." The basic strategic concept underlying all American war plans called for an air offensive against a prospective enemy from overseas bases. The first intercontinental bomber, B-36, was yet developing.³⁸⁰

After the War, the geopolitical situation radically changed, but one basic element persisted: attacks against the United States still could only emanate from Eurasia. The "fundamental geopolitical situation" as interpreted in the 1950s, was that the Sino-Soviet bloc "occupies the center of the world's principal land mass—the Eurasian Heartland" with most of the free countries being on the fringe of the Heartland. "Given these facts, the problem of defeating the aggressive

³⁷⁹ Ibid. 350-351.

³⁸⁰ Ibid, 351.

designs of the Sino-Soviet bloc necessarily involves the holding of strategic points all around the Eurasian perimeter. Because the independent countries of Europe and Asia are not strong enough to hold these positions alone, this central task has fallen primarily on the United States." Regarding the retaliation, "carefully selected base areas close in to the Sino-Soviet borders would permit approaches from virtually all points of the compass and this would greatly complicate the problem of Soviet defense."³⁸¹

An elaborate global network of bases evolved. Long-range bombers and missiles circled the Sino-Soviet bloc. Early on there were Strategic Air Command B-47 "Reflex Force" bases in Spain and Morocco; medium-range ballistic-missile bases in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey, as well as on Okinawa and Taiwan (for the Mace and Matador missiles).³⁸² The first version of War Plan Shakedown envisaged bombers flying from Maine, Labrador, the Azores and North Africa and Saudi Arabia would attack the European area of the USSR Concurrently, bombers from Guam would attack Vladivostok and Irkutsk.³⁸³ On Guam, a common joke has it that few people other than nuclear targeters in the Kremlin know where their island is.³⁸⁴ The unknown remote Pacific island, Guam became part of the "nuclear access" perimeter circling Eurasia:

On the US side, not surprisingly, the geopolitics of nuclear access point to the particular importance of a number of countries

³⁸¹ Hoopes 1958: 70, 77-78.

³⁸² Harkavy 2005: 6-7.

³⁸³ Kaku & Axelrod 1987: 74; Rearden 2012: 114.

³⁸⁴ Lutz 2006: esnp.

located around the Eurasian rimlands in proximity to the USSR and ... of several nations located astride the trans-arctic sea and air routes between the Soviet and US heartlands.³⁸⁵

Combined, the circle includes Alaska, Canada, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, UK, West Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Oman, Seychelles Islands, Diego Garcia, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Guam, Kwajalein (Marshall Islands), and Australia. In addition to these, Atlantic islands—Bermuda, Ascension, the Azores, and Barbados—provided additional access. The dispersal of the US nuclear posture “throughout all the major oceans is worth noting, as is their virtually irreplaceable nature.”³⁸⁶ Also worth noting is a pattern perfectly reflective of a rimland configuration around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc.³⁸⁷

Almost million US troops were deployed overseas during the Eisenhower administration—325,000 in combat in Korea and more than 600,000 stationed in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. In 1968, it had over one million troops on foreign soil—537,000 in Vietnam and another half million stationed elsewhere.³⁸⁸

Eisenhower wrote on West Europe: “We cannot be a modern Rome guarding the far frontiers with our legions if for no other reason than that these are not, politically, our frontiers.” When it was decided to deploy US divisions to

³⁸⁵ Harkavy 1989: 277.

³⁸⁶ Ibid. 277, 280.

³⁸⁷ Idem, 2005: 5-6.

³⁸⁸ Kagan 2012: esnp.

Europe, no one had “for an instant” thought that they would remain there for “several decades”—that the United States could “build a sort of Roman Wall with its own troops and so protect the world.”³⁸⁹ If not “politically,” overseas military bases and installations formed the US frontiers strategically: “These mini-territorial pieces of foreign real estate were literally extensions of the United States itself around the world.”³⁹⁰

Having revealed that the United States exists in multiple hemispheres, Samuel Whittmore Boggs mapped the “sum of all hemispheres containing all of the United States.”³⁹¹ The “sum” includes all the Earth surface with the exception of an area in the Indian Ocean. The limits of this excluded area comprise a series of great circles tangent to a mirror image of the United States in the South Indian Ocean. The excluded area has no land except uninhabited Kerguelen Island—one of the world's most desolate spots. Boggs concluded: “Thus there is no a human being anywhere on the Earth that does not live in some hemisphere that includes the whole of the United States.”³⁹² The implication is clear: there should not be a human being anywhere on the Earth beyond the American strategic perimeter. “In an emerging Cold War ... Boggs' placement of America into multi-directional relationships was a reminder of the full global reach of American responsibility.”³⁹³ Notably, very close to that mid-Indian Ocean portion there is small island Diego Garcia. It is uninhabited too but contains US military base. Moreover

³⁸⁹ Cited in Trachtenberg 1999: 147-148.

³⁹⁰ Brunn 1974: 53.

³⁹¹ Boggs 1945: figure 10, p 850.

³⁹² Boggs 1945: 850; also Boggs 1954.

³⁹³ Barney 2011: 184.

Boggs' rule of "no a human being anywhere on the Earth" beyond the US hemisphere would hold even if Diego Garcia fell into that portion (all local inhabitants had been departed to clear the ground for the base).

Roman classic Boethius argued that moral power is more important than the global reach:

For though the earth, as far as India's shore,
tremble before the laws you give, though Thule
bow to your service on earth's farthest bounds,
yet if thou canst not drive away black cares, if
thou canst not put to flight complaints, then is
no true power thine.³⁹⁴

It is debatable whether "black cares" and "complaints" are overcome, but at least the edges of the globe as defined—from India's shore until Thule—are integrated in a single network of bases, with one base in Diego Garcia and another in Thule (whence local inhabitants had been removed too). Without invoking Boethius, an expert on the Cold War geopolitics wondered: What two places on the globe could have less in common than the frozen Thule and tropical Guam half way around the world? Both happened to be "principal operating areas of the Strategic Air Command."³⁹⁵

A British Statesman of the Nineteenth century, recalled Hans Baldwin, mused that for the sake of security Generals would seek bases on the Moon to protect the Earth from the Mars. "But the sarcastic humor of a generation ago is the distressing truth of today." Intercontinental or "hemispheric warfare," Baldwin wrote in 1947, will be

³⁹⁴ Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy*, III: 203.

³⁹⁵ Hoopes 1958: 71.

technically feasible tomorrow. “Strategically the world is, or soon will be, one world; the great ocean barriers and ice masses ... are no longer effective ramparts. The compartmentalized strategy of the past—national, continental, hemispheric—is superseded by the grand strategy of the world.”³⁹⁶

Hand in hand with the globalization of the system of bases, a global network of alliances was established. "There is no logical stopping point in the development of a system of anti-Russian alliances," Kennan wrote late in 1948, "until that system has circled the globe and has embraced all the non-communist countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa."³⁹⁷ NSC-162/2 stated:

The United States needs to have aligned on its side in the world struggle, in peace and war, the armed forces and economic resources and materials of the major highly-industrialized non-communist states. Progressive loss to the Soviet bloc of these states would so isolate the United States and alter the world balance as to endanger the capacity of the United States to win in the event of general war or to maintain an adequate defense without undermining its fundamental institutions.³⁹⁸

Through bases and alliances, according to Paul Nitze, the West must realize its geographic potential:

³⁹⁶ Baldwin 1947: 147.

³⁹⁷ Cited in Gaddis 1977: 882.

³⁹⁸ NSC 162/2 1953: 8.

We should develop an air defense system which makes of the West's geographic advantages. We should develop widely dispersed base system which the West's geographic situation makes possible. But, above all, we must maintain in full working order the system of alliances and those working relations with our allies without which the West will have no geographic advantage at all.³⁹⁹

“George Washington’s dictum of avoiding entangling alliances was discarded as the United States contracted 44 formal alliances and many other forms of commitment” with nearly hundred countries.⁴⁰⁰ During the Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, the United States, mainly through the efforts of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, so intensively formed alliances with other states that observers described the phenomenon as *pactomania*.⁴⁰¹

NSC-162/2 outlined the main principle: Attack on the NATO countries, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand or the American republics "would involve the United States in war" with the USSR or China.⁴⁰² This was not the full list of “entangling” countries:

Other certain countries, such as Indo-China or Formosa, are of such strategic importance to the United States that an attack on them would probably compel the United States to react

³⁹⁹ Nitze 1956: 195-196.

⁴⁰⁰ Pierre 1972: 696.

⁴⁰¹ Clemens 2000: 134.

⁴⁰² NSC 162/2 1953: 9.

with military force either locally... or generally... Moreover, the principle of collective security through the United Nations ... should be upheld even in areas not of vital strategic importance.⁴⁰³

A global security architecture emerged, intact until today. Two of the Dulles' alliances—NATO and the US-Japan alliance—are commonly called the “cornerstones of peace” in respective regions. Less commonly, the term “cornerstone” is applied to other allies, sometimes quite small. For the Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, “Israel is a cornerstone of our strategy in the Middle East,”⁴⁰⁴ and the alliance with the Philippines is called “the cornerstone of stability” in the Asia-Pacific region.⁴⁰⁵ It remains undefined how many “corners” the edifice has.

The Head Architect of the edifice, Dulles, summarized his achievements: The first Cold War treaty—the Rio Pact—was followed by NATO. “In the West Pacific and the Far East, the SEATO and ANZUS pacts and four bilateral treaties establish the principle that a threat to one is the concern of all. In the Middle East, the Baghdad Pact [CENTO] and the Eisenhower Doctrine assure collective response to Communist aggression.” Since 1945 “we have entered into collective security treaties with 42 other nations and we have less formal arrangements with several more.”⁴⁰⁶ Dulles was modest on the occasion: treaty relations were established with nearly 100 other countries,⁴⁰⁷ virtually half of the world’s

⁴⁰³ Ibid. 9.

⁴⁰⁴ Ferdinando 2015: 1.

⁴⁰⁵ Peak 2017: 1.

⁴⁰⁶ Dulles 1957: 30.

⁴⁰⁷ Garamone 2016: 1.

countries, “and pledged to defend nearly 50 treaty allies in the event of an attack...”⁴⁰⁸ This became the defining international feature:

The traditional US alliance system, comprised of nearly 100 formal treaty arrangements and security commitments that the United States negotiated and maintained during the last half century, has been one of the defining features of post–World War II US foreign and national security strategy.⁴⁰⁹

The SEATO and CENTO soon dissolved but only to be continued by bilateral treaties and partnerships. Most US alliances have been bilateral arrangements between the United States and countries in all regions throughout the globe.⁴¹⁰ In 1985, ANZUS underwent crisis too. New Zealand barred nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships from using New Zealand ports or entering New Zealand waters and the United States in response suspended its treaty obligations to New Zealand until United States Navy ships were re-admitted to New Zealand ports. Nevertheless, ANZUS has remained intact as well as the US - New Zealand partnership. New Zealand actively assisted US efforts in Afghanistan in 2001 and, to a lesser extent, in Iraq in 2003.⁴¹¹

Leaving the Rio Pact in the “strategic rear,” as the Soviets called it,⁴¹² all the later alliances concentrated around the Eurasian Heartland. The network of alliances and

⁴⁰⁸ Campbell 2004: 153.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid, 151.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid, 153.

⁴¹¹ Ibid, 154.

⁴¹² NSSUS 1988: 25.

hundreds of US military bases and installations⁴¹³ spanned the globe. In his New Frontier Speech in 1960, President Kennedy stressed: “Our frontiers today are on every continent.”

Kurt Campbell distinguishes within US alliances during the Cold War three broad categories: the nuclear family (or the inner circle), the extended family, and friends and acquaintances. Throughout most of the Cold War, those US allies that comprised what can be called the nuclear family included NATO members, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia. These states or multilateral groupings were typically on the front lines in the face of the Soviet threat and represented the strongest US alliances, sharing several common features. First, these nuclear-family states were included, formally or informally, under the US nuclear umbrella; in several cases, by treaty arrangement, extended US deterrence protected them from nuclear-armed aggression. Second, these states served as hosts to large numbers of US military forces, and both partners demonstrated a high degree of military cooperation, joint planning, joint training, and interoperability. In addition, Washington provided major military equipment to these states.⁴¹⁴ Thus the international anarchy was replaced by bold hierarchy, with the United States at the top, followed by several layers of allies and the contained party at the bottom. This international hierarchy would strengthen after the Cold War.

Initially the ground Army and the Navy disagreed and discounted the whole Roosevelt’s idea that American eagle could only “fly high and strike hard” if it had safe perches

⁴¹³ Cottrell 1963: 80.

⁴¹⁴ Campbell 2004: 156.

around the globe.⁴¹⁵ But, stated the leading expert on flying high and striking hard, Curtis LeMay,⁴¹⁶ history has proved that our theory was right: “We needed to establish bases within reasonable range; then we could bomb and burn them until they quit.” The main pacto-designer, Dulles, expressed his satisfaction too: “This nearly world-wide system of regional collective security has served all the participants well.”⁴¹⁷ At the same time, Townsend Hoopes confirmed that the US strategic conception and the base system built to support it have served their intended purpose for the last decade, proving an effective deterrent to general war.⁴¹⁸ The pattern persisted until the end of the Cold War:

Our global forward deployed forces ... are essential to the creation of regional power balances which deter Soviet aggression and promote overall regional stability; they support the political independence of nations on the Soviet periphery and hence are key to the fundamental US strategic objective of avoiding Soviet domination of the Eurasian land mass...⁴¹⁹

The global network of alliances and bases forged in, and by, the Cold War would outlive the Cold War and, surprisingly for many, expand afterwards. In 1995, Josef Joffe would label it “the hub-and-spokes system,” with the United States the “hub.”⁴²⁰ Despite the disappearance of the Soviet

⁴¹⁵ Cited in Reynolds 2006: 304.

⁴¹⁶ LeMay 1965: 381.

⁴¹⁷ Dulles 1957: 30.

⁴¹⁸ Hoopes 1958: 70.

⁴¹⁹ NSSUS 1987: 27.

⁴²⁰ Joffe 1995.

threat, regarded by many as the generator of the US Cold War alliances, the trend of strategic consolidation would continue and gain a new momentum.⁴²¹

⁴²¹ See “The Post-Cold War Period” below.

The Arctic Frontier

In 1922, Vilhjalmur Stefansson coined the term “Arctic Mediterranean.” when he prophetically described a map of the Arctic arena as follows:

A map giving one view of the northern half of the northern world shows that the so-called Arctic Ocean is really a Mediterranean sea like those which separate Europe from Africa or North America from South America. Because of its smallness, we would do well to go back to an Elizabethan custom and call it not the Arctic Ocean but the Polar Sea or Polar Mediterranean. The map shows that most of the land in the world is in the Northern Hemisphere, that the Polar Sea is like a hub from which the continents radiate like the spokes of a wheel. The white patch shows that the part of the Polar Sea never yet navigated by ships is small when compared to the surrounding landmasses. In the coming air-age, the ... Arctic will be like an open park in the center of the uninhabited city of the world, and the air voyagers will cross it like taxi riders crossing a park...⁴²²

The prophecy began to come true during World War II. Hitler envisaged in November 1941: “Tomorrow the North Pole will be a crossroads...”⁴²³ In fact the North Pole had become a crossroads yesterday: On June 30, 1941,

⁴²² Cited in Weigert 1944: esnp.

⁴²³ Hitler, *Table Talks*, 111.

Roosevelt's emissary Harry Lloyd Hopkins arrived to Moscow via the North Pole.⁴²⁴

In a sort of “Copernican revolution” in cartography, the traditional Mercator projection was challenged by the azimuthal projection centered on the North Pole. The series of influential geopolitical works from 1942 by Hans Weigert, Robert Strausz-Hupé and Nicholas Spykman revealed that Mercator projection had distorted distances and encouraged the idea of self-contained “hemispheres.” A common depiction of the United States in pre-war atlases centered on a ‘Western Hemisphere’ with apparently limitless ocean disappearing on either side was discredited once and for all.

In his lecture segments, Air Power expert Alexander de Seversky (his name meaning “of north”) moved back and forth between giant wall maps displaying his war strategies, and a massive globe in the middle of the room, which he could spin in all the directions. Some maps were centered on the North Pole “in order to show new proximities.”⁴²⁵ Air-age transportation routes, wrote de Seversky's colleague Walter Ristow,⁴²⁶ are no longer restricted to east-west lines—the seafaring mind of the Mercator projection accentuated geographical imaginaries of east and west, but in the air, travel from a given place was possible in all directions on a spherical Earth. The same year, Hans Weigert expressed it more poetically:

The northern scene is still clouded. Over the islands and coastlines of the Arctic, the fog hangs densely. And above all, there is the

⁴²⁴ Kershaw 2009: 325.

⁴²⁵ Barney 2011: 3-4.

⁴²⁶ Ristow 1944: 334-335.

spiritual fog, the cloud of suspense, and the quiet before the storm that since Pearl Harbor has weighed heavily upon our minds. Whenever imagination turns to this war theater, which has not yet seen decisive battles, we become aware of the North as the scene of fateful events in the making ... The North is coming into focus.⁴²⁷

Proceeding to more factual observation, Weigert detailed:

One of the elementary and vital realities of the Second World War concerns the fact that it is being fought on the northern half of the temperate zone that lies in a circle around the Arctic. The main Powers in our day are northerly, with the land masses of Europe, Asia, and North America grouped around a sea which can truly be called the "Arctic Mediterranean."⁴²⁸

The Mercator projection was replaced by North "polar centrisim":

Under the influence of Columbian thought patterns, geography was defined as Old World and New World, and consequently as Eastern and Western hemispheres. America as a name was applied at first only to part but later to the whole of the Western Hemisphere, and more recently, the Monroe Doctrine, Pan

⁴²⁷ Weigert 1944: esnp.

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

Americanism, Hemisphere Solidarity, etc, have become the political expressions of the same idea. The air age introduces a geographical reorientation in terms of Northern and Southern hemispheres. The Earth's great land masses, situated in the temperate zones and capable of supporting large populations at the highest peak of efficiency, lie mostly in the Northern Hemisphere, and the resulting community of great states should constitute a circumpolar system. The lines of communication, which must necessarily be important determinants of power, are great circle routes traversing arctic and subarctic areas. In the long run North America's orientation should be north, not south, or west or east.⁴²⁹

The Northern Hemisphere, the convex arena encompassing most of the globe-sweeping spectacle that was the Second World War, could best be viewed not from low along the line of the Equator but from the lofty vantage of the North Pole. Thus it became increasingly the fashion in the years after Pearl Harbor to center world maps at that point. In no other way could the war so readily be seen as a unified whole.⁴³⁰

Gone were the worlds of Mercator and Mahan, as mainstream American Magazines joined the assault on the

⁴²⁹ Malin 1944: 109-110.

⁴³⁰ Henrikson 1974: 450.

traditional cartography. A 1942 article in *Life*, titled "Maps: Global War Teaches Global Cartography," notes:

Mercator projection cannot tell this story. No one can read the map of this war until he has comprehended the fact that the world is round and that no map can give an entirely truthful picture of its surface ... In the world airpower communications lie in great circles across land, sea and ice cap without distinction. The polar azimuthal projection ... shows that many important great circles lie far to the north, some of them across the polar region.⁴³¹

An attached "Air Power World" map on the same page shows some of these routes. The article continues:

For the Mercator mind... a global war holds grim surprises. In all azimuthal projections centered on world's warring capitals, the [Northern] Pole lies close to center. The projection directly on the Pole may therefore be safely used as a general map of the modern world... Viewed from the Pole, the two major landmasses, Eurasia and North America, are almost one.⁴³²

In a *Fortune* issue devoted to the possibility of American entrance into the war four months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Richard Eden Harrison drew a famous map, entitled "One World, One War." The map uses the polar azimuthal equidistant projection, which he referred to as "the

⁴³¹ *Life* August 3, 1942: 57, 61.

⁴³² *Life* August 3, 1942: 64.

darling of the proponents of the ‘air-age.’⁴³³ Harrison commented on the map:

It is a map of the problems and opportunities of fighting all over the world at once. While it includes obvious distortions, which increase toward the south, it... is a continuous map that shows the world in one unbroken piece.⁴³⁴

The map was centered on North America and inscribed that the “entire conflict pivots around the United States.” The map used the north polar azimuthal equidistant projection which Harrison referred to as “the darling of the proponents of the *air-age*.” This projection brings “the world into a tightly wound collection of landmasses” and maps “the problems and the opportunities of fighting all over the world at once.” The world “appears much closer than imagined.”⁴³⁵ More specifically, it charts uninterrupted directional relationships between the belligerents within the Northern Hemisphere, bringing this Hemisphere into a tightly wound collection of landmasses: “The polar projection made the world a group of tightly wedged continents, bringing a sense of proximity and immediacy to the forefront which the Mercator projection could not hope to match.”

“One World, One War” was reprinted by *Fortune* in March 1942 and became the opening world map in the *Atlas Look at the World: The Fortune Atlas for World Strategy* (1942). It became a standard wall map in American homes.⁴³⁶ Another polar-centered map in the Atlas is “The World

⁴³³ Cited in Barney 2012: 415.

⁴³⁴ Cited in Zhurauliova 2014: esnp.

⁴³⁵ Barney 2012: 415-416.

⁴³⁶ Henrikson 1980: 83; Schulten 1998: 176-177.

Divided” on which the large expanse of the USSR is actually colored in pitch-black as an Axis country, uniting it with Germany, Japan, and Italy. Over the blacked-in country is a small caption, suggesting that the reader count this black if Nazis win a quick and complete victory. The projection connotes a sense of dangerous closeness that changes perceptions of strategy. Black color is used as a bold tool.

A third polar-centered map in the Atlas *Look at the World*, “Arctic Arena,” uses the full-globe orthographic projection, distorting the familiar shapes of continents and placing the USSR and Europe north of the United States to illustrate the new proximities that air routes over the North Pole bring to life: “An important consequence of viewing these wartime North-Pole-centered maps was a new awareness of the proximity of North America to Eurasia, and vice versa.”⁴³⁷ As Stefansson had anticipated, the Arctic Ocean became an inland sea, a circumpolar Mediterranean. Russia, previously thought of as being on the opposite side of the Earth, suddenly appeared overhead and Canada appeared in the forefront:

[Harrison’s] most famous maps revived long-forgotten modes of projection that, instead of establishing Europe as the center of the world, anchored maps around the Arctic, changing our entire spatial perception of proximity ... The polar azimuthal projection places Canada in the forefront of American interests, as a kind of gateway to other parts of the world, and hence, the conception of manifest destiny

⁴³⁷ Henrikson 1980: 86.

becomes much more global in scope on the page.⁴³⁸

The US Army ordered 18,000 copies of Harrison's north polar map. Later, they requested 1000 maps from Harrison's 1944 *Atlas for the US Citizen* to help new members of the Air Corps develop an aerial sense of geography. Many Harrison's and other journalists' maps were distributed to American soldiers.⁴³⁹ The year Harrison's *Atlas* was published, Hans Weigert wrote on the "Arctic Mediterranean":

If we transpose this vision to a map, it would appear clearly on a north-polar version of a great circle chart. With its great circle projections, this is the kind of map the aviator needs. To him the idea of our Polar Mediterranean is familiar. To many navigators and to those who have grown up in the shadow of the Mercator projection (with the poles at infinity), this vision has appeared strange and almost inconceivable not so long ago... today we begin to rid ourselves of old-fashioned (yet yesterday's) west-east relationships. They have dominated our geographical and political imagination until we now begin to appreciate the importance of the course northward. We can speak without exaggeration of an Arctic Revolution in our day.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁸ Barney 2012: 398-399, 413-414, 418.

⁴³⁹ Schulten 1998: 180-181.

⁴⁴⁰ Weigert 1944: esnp.

Military and civilians, adults and children, became conscious of the round Earth and the Arctic connection. As Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce said in a speech to Congress in 1943: "Grammar school boys can tell you today that the best way to get to [Bombay and Singapore] is to fly north from Chicago, across the polar ice cap—in 40 flying hours."⁴⁴¹

Synchronously with the emergence of the polar concept, the United Nations was established. The UN famous logo features a polar-centered globe surrounded by branches symbolizing peace. The famous *Union Now*⁴⁴² opens with an image of the globe centered on North Pole.

The *Air-Age Globalism* found a direct way from World War II into the Cold War: "A revolution occurred during the 1940s in the way Americans visually imagined and graphically represented the world. Their new outlook, *Air-Age Globalism*, fundamentally affected subsequent American-Soviet relations."⁴⁴³ The icy wasteland skyrocketed to strategic significance in these relations. The "Arctic became a key piece of cold war psychosis" since the beginning of the confrontation.⁴⁴⁴ "The polar azimuthal projection places Canada in the forefront of American interests, as a kind of gateway to other parts of the world..."⁴⁴⁵

The American policy-makers became convinced that not only the Pacific and Atlantic but even the Northern Ocean does not protect. Already in October 1945 with the Cold War

⁴⁴¹ Cited in Barney 2011: 86.

⁴⁴² Streit 1940.

⁴⁴³ Henrikson 1974: 445.

⁴⁴⁴ Barney 2011: 118 and 2012: 418.

⁴⁴⁵ Barney 2012: 418.

only in sight, the Joint Chief of Staff projected strategy on three integral frontiers: Pacific, Atlantic and Arctic: The air strategy demanded "that our defensive frontiers be well advanced in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and the shores of the Arctic."⁴⁴⁶

The same perimeter made the offensive frontiers. Since all main industrial regions of the world are situated in the Northern Hemisphere around the Arctic Ocean, the polar region became pivotal for the offensive strategy. In a *New York Times* article published on July 19, 1946, Air Force Commander, General Curtis LeMay, noted that, "the long-range bomber, flying over the polar region, made the industrial heart of any country in the world vulnerable to complete surprise and destruction."⁴⁴⁷

The first postwar base system approved by both the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the civilian secretaries in October 1945 included Iceland as a primary base area. In June 1946, Greenland was on the JCS's short list of six "essential" bases, three of which (Greenland, Iceland, and the Azores) were declared to be of "outstanding importance."⁴⁴⁸

In 1946-47, the Joint War Plans Committee explained that American bases must control the air in the Arctic, prevent the establishment of enemy military facilities there, and support the America's own striking forces. Once Soviet-American relations began to deteriorate, Greenland was designated as a primary base for American heavy bombers and fighters because of its close proximity to the industrial heartland of the potential enemy. As the United States sought

⁴⁴⁶ Cited in Stoler 1982: 320.

⁴⁴⁷ Cited in Albertson 2015: 32.

⁴⁴⁸ Cited in Petersen 2011: 92.

rights for bases along the Polar route, American defense officials also hoped to thwart Soviet efforts to acquire similar rights at Spitsbergen and Bear Island.⁴⁴⁹

The Northern Ocean, now commonly labeled “the Arctic Mediterranean,”⁴⁵⁰ became the third frontier between the superpowers: The fresh triumph of western technology—air power capable of striking across Arctic Circle—put the United States and the Soviet Union in jeopardy from one another on three fronts. The “two surviving great powers” are “both at the same plight of simultaneously encircling and being encircled by one another.”⁴⁵¹

An influential US strategist who appreciated the Arctic military air radii was General Henry H. Arnold, the head of the Army Air Forces. In a February 1946 article in *National Geographic*, he emphasized the polar air route's implications for air-base maintenance and national defense. Raising the specter of an Air-Age atomic Pearl Harbor, he warned:

A surprise attack could readily come from across the roof of the world unless we were in possession of adequate airbases outflanking such a route of approach. The geographical relationship of the United States to those countries from which such an attack could emanate—identified only as lying “north of the 30th parallel”—could be seen ... on the National Geographic Society's new north polar map.⁴⁵²

⁴⁴⁹ Leffler 1984: 352.

⁴⁵⁰ Jones 1955: 498.

⁴⁵¹ Toynbee 1954: vol IX, p 484.

⁴⁵² Cited in Henrikson 1974: 451-452.

*The Right to Fly*⁴⁵³ included 12 polar azimuthal maps to supplement text arguing for the “indivisibility of air space” and indicting postwar complacency in strategic planning. *The Price of Power*⁴⁵⁴ opens with the azimuthal map projection depicting the Arctic frontier between North America and Eurasia adapted from the official chart used by the US Air Force. Underneath, it is inscribed: “Strategists term the area between the 30th and 65th parallels the key zone since all modern wars have started there.” The book confirms that “the age of the Mercator projection has ended”⁴⁵⁵ and suggests that if “intercontinental or hemispheric war comes to the world,” missiles and bombers will probably come from the Arctic frontier—the closest frontier to the rival superpower:

The Arctic frontier is the one which abuts most closely upon Russia, the other ‘super-state’ in this bipolar world, and it is one most directly threatened (potentially, not today) by a sudden *debouchment* from its empty cold of the modern ‘cavalry of the skies’—the robot rocket, the supersonic plane, and air-borne soldier ... Our new strategy must be global; it must be conscious of the three-dimensional nature of modern war and of the newfound importance of the polar regions.⁴⁵⁶

Three years later, Baldwin re-emphasized: There are no longer geographical barriers; they are no longer sure ramparts. Oceans, including the Arctic, and skies have

⁴⁵³ Cooper 1947.

⁴⁵⁴ Baldwin 1947.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 32.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 156-157, 173.

become our frontiers vulnerable to assault, as internal European frontiers had been.⁴⁵⁷

Already experienced in World War II, mainstream Magazines presented the polar projection for the new confrontation with such maps as *Life's* "Arctic Strategy" and *Newsweek's* "The Coldest Cold War."⁴⁵⁸ *Newsweek* map "Turning the Tables: How Far the Russians Must Fly to Hit US Cities"⁴⁵⁹ looks to the future with a polar projection of a black Soviet Union hovering over the United States with a series of red arrows thrusting towards cities like New York, Chicago and Seattle and quantifying the miles it would take to reach and destroy them. Unambiguously, North America borders Eurasia across the Arctic:

Through using their polar azimuthal equidistant maps, people became newly and acutely aware of the proximity of North America to northern Eurasia, the vital "Heartland"... Control of this region, it was understood, gave command of the "World Island," which in turn assured rule of the entire world.⁴⁶⁰

Starting in 1951, the polar strategy gradually became dominant. The technical precondition for this was the introduction of heavy bombers, namely the B-36, which possessed near intercontinental range, and the B-52 Stratofortress, which possessed true intercontinental reach. Air-refueling techniques were also perfected that enabled the

⁴⁵⁷ *Idem*, 69.

⁴⁵⁸ Barney 2011: 318, note 49.

⁴⁵⁹ *Newsweek*, October 3, 1949: 26, 20–22.

⁴⁶⁰ Henrikson 1974: 450.

B-47 Stratojet medium bomber to perform intercontinental missions.⁴⁶¹

With the Soviet nuclear detonation in 1949, Canada and the United States agreed to establish the Pinetree Line of radar stations approximately along the 50th parallel for early detection of Soviet bombers coming from the north. US Air Force (USAF) permanent warning line moved northward across Canada to the Pinetree Line which became operational in 1954 and eventually consisted of 44 long-range radar stations and six USAF-run smaller “gap filler” radar stations.⁴⁶²

With the advent of inter-continental bombers and ballistic missiles, the polar frontier became more sophisticated. The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) was announced on August 1, 1957. The next year the United States and Canada started the Continental Air Defense Integration North (CADIN). By 1960, ten SAC bases were in Canada, and all were for tankers, to enable B-52s to reach wartime targets by traversing the North Pole region.⁴⁶³

For defense, radar Distant Early Warning (DEW) network for detecting missiles and bombers stretched through the Aleutians, Alaska, across Canada, Greenland, Newfoundland Iceland, and Britain.⁴⁶⁴ Three huge radar installations located at Clear, Alaska; Thule, Greenland; and Flyingdales Moor, England composed the Ballistic Missiles Early Warning System (BMEWS).⁴⁶⁵ Between 1954 and 1957

⁴⁶¹ Petersen 2011: 91.

⁴⁶² Herd 2011: 6.

⁴⁶³ Schake 1998: 233.

⁴⁶⁴ Baldwin 1970: 104.

⁴⁶⁵ Power 1964: 153-154.

alone, 63 DEW stations designed to warn of Soviet bombers extended from Alaska to Baffin Island, making north Canada a "highly sophisticated armed camp."⁴⁶⁶ "The long-sought polar strategy was finally realized."⁴⁶⁷

The continental radar network did not extend to the East or west Coast. The geographic distribution suggests that the attack was most expected from missiles hurled over the North Pole region and across Alaska and Canada,⁴⁶⁸ a strategy called "polar-centered."⁴⁶⁹ Dean Acheson contemplated the new Arctic frontier: "Here there are daily contacts on a thousand radarscopes, and doubtless the same is true on the other side of the screen."⁴⁷⁰

In the 1950s, U-2 reconnaissance aircraft took off from the Persian Gulf region, crossed the Asian continent northward and kept the northward course across the Pole to return home. In 1956, Project *Homerun* performed 156 almost daily sorties by RB-47, mostly from Thule in northern Greenland, flying across the North Pole to photograph and gather information of the Soviet Union. When USSR government filed an angry complaint with the US government, the US government attributed the overflights to "navigational difficulties."

Hellenistic classics believed in a legendary *Ultima Thule* in the northern end of the world. From its first appearance in writing, about 300 BC, the island of Thule is presented as a place which can be perceived but not

⁴⁶⁶ Bocking 2009: 271-272.

⁴⁶⁷ Schake 1998: 233.

⁴⁶⁸ Brunn 1974: 125.

⁴⁶⁹ Henrikson 1974: 452.

⁴⁷⁰ Acheson 1958: 375.

approached.⁴⁷¹ Today, in Greenland, amidst permafrost and where four active glaciers converge, there is a place named Thule. Since the early Cold War, it hosts the US strategic base.

Until the B-52 was introduced in sufficient numbers to bear the brunt of deterrence, the Thule AFB held a pivotal role in the polar strategy as forward staging and refueling facility for B-36s and B-47s. At Thule, a B-36 could reach 85 percent of all Soviet targets and a B-47 could reach 50 percent with one inflight refueling.⁴⁷² "The construction of the Thule base in 1951–1952 signaled the beginning of the polar strategy." Subsequently, the Thule base became the emblem of the polar strategy.⁴⁷³

Edgar Allan Poe's poem "Dream-Land" (1844) begins with the following stanza:

By a route obscure and lonely,
Haunted by ill angels only,
Where an Eidolon, named Night,
On a black throne reigns upright.
I have reached these lands but newly
From an ultimate dim Thule –
From a wild weird clime, that lieth, sublime,
Out of Space – out of Time.

Disregarding its "wild weird clime," the SAC integrated the "out of Space—out of Time" one. Two millennia earlier, Vergil had imagined Augustus becoming a god after death and then "Ultima Thule obeys you."⁴⁷⁴ The

⁴⁷¹ Romm 1992: 157.

⁴⁷² Petersen 2011: 93.

⁴⁷³ Ibid, 91-92.

⁴⁷⁴ Vergil, *Georgics*, 1:25-31.

imagination came true, albeit under a living, mortal and democratically elected Commander-in-Chief.

The Scandinavian Peninsula and the Barents Sea, known during the Cold War as the “High North,” rose in importance. From the Cold War’s earliest years, the American nuclear-armed strategic bomber fleet had had its transit route over the northern parts of Scandinavia towards the central areas of the Soviet Union. In parallel, the Anglo-American carrier fleets operated in the Norwegian Sea for force projection, as well as for air protection for the strategic bombers. “Throughout the 1950s, the position of the High North had been that of an Anglo-American maritime and an American strategic bombing concern.”⁴⁷⁵

In the 1960s, through the development of nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles (abbreviated as SSBN), the ‘tactical northern flank’ evolved into an independent strategic theatre of operations in NATO central perception and strategy. The Northern Flank had become a strategic theatre in its own right. From the late 1970s and until the end of the Cold War, the ‘High North’ constituted a central theatre in NATO strategy and operations. Extensive NATO preparations were made, a solid infrastructure developed in northern Norway where NATO stockpiled great amounts of equipment, and frequent and large-scale land-, air- and sea-forces exercised were carried out on a regular basis.⁴⁷⁶

Roman classic Tacitus described the Roman expedition to the North Sea: the sailors did not “lack daring,” but the Sea blocked them from investigating. “Soon ... we

⁴⁷⁵ Dyndal 2011: 581.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid, 557-558, 563, 583.

stopped trying, and it was deemed more reverent and more pious to believe in the works of the gods than to know about them.”⁴⁷⁷ Tacitus’ contemporary compatriot, Poet Pedo Albonivanus, epically described a Roman expedition in the North Sea:

Now they see daylight and sunshine
abandoned behind them
So quickly; while they, exiled from the world’s
known bounds,
Dare to pass through the shadows whose realm
is denied them
Toward the end-points of things, the final
shores of the world.⁴⁷⁸

Eventually Polaris submarines, with their crews preferring to know rather than believe, sailed underneath the polar ice. Daring submarines passed beneath the polar ices of the northern “end-point of things,” with no possibility to be “exiled from the world’s known bounds” and no “final shores of the world” left beyond their SLBMs’ range. Albonivanus wondered whether the Romans are seeking “a race dwelling beneath another pole, another world untouched by freemen.”⁴⁷⁹ The Polaris’ Captains by contrast were well aware of “a race dwelling beneath another pole, another world untouched by freemen.”

Leaving the classics aside, submarines exceeded even Herbert Wells’ future insight. In his *Anticipations*⁴⁸⁰ written in the days of Fridtjof Nansen, Wells put it: “I must confess

⁴⁷⁷ Tacitus, *Germania*, 34.

⁴⁷⁸ Cited in Romm 1992: 143.

⁴⁷⁹ Cited in Ibid, 143.

⁴⁸⁰ Wells 1900: 78-79.

that my imagination, in spite even of spurring, refuses to see any sort of submarine doing anything but suffocate its crew and founder at sea... No, the naval warfare of the future is for light, swift ships..." Seven decades later, the compatriot of Nansen, Finn Sollie, wondered: "Where Fridtjof Nansen's *Fram* drifted with the ice in the Arctic Ocean for three years (1893-96), submarines now navigate under the ice..."⁴⁸¹ A full *nuclear triad*—submarines, bombers and missiles—were positioned across the arctic frontier:

The Arctic Ocean and its bordering landmasses represent to the United States a new strategic frontier. The Arctic's frozen surfaces no longer bar navigation; nuclear-powered missile submarines can now cruise beneath the ice, surface in a *polynya*—a 'lake' or rift or hole in the ice—and launch their missiles. Long-range bombers can leap above the Pole. The most direct air-missile routes to the United States approach the nation across the North Atlantic, Arctic, Alaska and Greenland.⁴⁸²

⁴⁸¹ Sollie 1974: 75.

⁴⁸² Baldwin 1970: 103-104.

The Nuclear Triad

“A new page of history began on December 17, 1903, when Orville Wright rose from the earth with his flying machine, wrote Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi.⁴⁸³ Since that memorable December day mankind has taken a new course toward a new destiny.” In 1907, Giulio Douhet predicted that “the skies are about to become a battlefield as important as the land or the sea ... Only by gaining the command of the air shall we be able to derive the fullest benefit from the advantage which can only be fully exploited when the enemy is compelled to be earth bound.”⁴⁸⁴ The same year, Herbert Wells in his *The War in the Air*, envisaged: “There were no battlefronts; the men in airships could peer down and hurl fire into the heart of cities without having to penetrate their massive walls or well-guarded perimeters.”⁴⁸⁵ In his earlier *Anticipations* (1900),⁴⁸⁶ written before the flight of brothers Wright, Wells had already anticipated the application of airplane: The “new invention will be most assuredly applied to war.” However on that occasion Wells made what Gerry Kearns⁴⁸⁷ calls Wells’ worst prediction:

I do not think it at all probable that aeronautics will ever come into play as a serious modification of transport and communication ... Few people ... will be inclined to believe that long before the year 2000, and very probably before 1950, a successful aeroplane

⁴⁸³ Coudenhove-Kalergi 1943: 251, 294.

⁴⁸⁴ Cited in Meilinger 1997: 2.

⁴⁸⁵ Cited in Kearns 1983: 242-243.

⁴⁸⁶ Wells 1900: 74-75.

⁴⁸⁷ Kearns 1983: 242-243.

will have soared and come home safe and sound.⁴⁸⁸

As in the case of submarines, the pace of Air Power globalization exceeded Wells' future insight. Introduced in 1949, B-36 Peacemaker, armed with atomic weapons, came "home safe and sound" having exceeded the speed of sound. B-52 Hustler, delivered to SAC in 1960, exceeded the speed of sound twice (1300 miles per hour) to become a supersonic bomber capable "to reach any target on Earth in a few hours."⁴⁸⁹ The SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft exceeded the speed of sound four times.⁴⁹⁰ The *supersonic* went *hypersonic*. Inter-continental ballistic missiles reentered the atmosphere at perhaps 20 times the speed of sound.

Yet in 1950, Hans Baldwin⁴⁹¹ wondered about V-2 which crashed down faster than the speed of sound. "It would kill you before you knew what hit you ... You actually would hear the explosion and then later you would get the swishing sound of its passage through the atmosphere." The military expert probably was not aware that just when he wrote it supersonic bombers were being produced.

This air-strategic leap strongly favored strategic integration over sovereignty. The proposal of French President Charles de Gaulle regarding NATO to substitute cooperation for integration "in the control of aircraft travelling at twice the speed of sound has posed an almost insoluble military problem."⁴⁹²

⁴⁸⁸ Wells 1900: 74-75.

⁴⁸⁹ Power 1964: 143.

⁴⁹⁰ Deudney 1983: 25.

⁴⁹¹ Baldwin 1950: 61.

⁴⁹² Goodman 1966: 718.

Since the mid-1950s, bombers advanced in payload, range, and speed, especially with the arrival of jet engines and aerial refueling. The world's first intercontinental bomber, B-36 Peacemaker, had a range of 8800 miles, capable of transoceanic flight and return without refueling.⁴⁹³ B-52 Hustler's unrefueled range was 12,000 miles—twice the combat radius of the wartime B-29.⁴⁹⁴ US Strategic Air Command (SAC) had one wing of B-52s in 1957; two years later this number had increased ten-fold (over three hundred), all on bases in North America. Without refueling, this aircraft could leave the United States and reach all but a small section of southern Russia; with only one refueling, every target in the Soviet Union could be reached. The same is true for the later B-2 Spirit.

Synchronously with the evolution of inter-continental bombers, a fleet of jet aerial tankers entered the Air Force inventory, greatly aiding the SAC bomber force. The number of air-refueling tankers increased ten-fold between 1950 and 1955. By 1959, US Air Force had over two hundred combat ready KC-135 Stratotankers, and unlike its predecessors, this aircraft did not require bases across the ocean. In 1960, ten SAC bases were in Canada, and all were for tankers, to enable B-52s to reach wartime targets by traversing the North Pole region.⁴⁹⁵ Now, wrote John Herz in 1957,⁴⁹⁶ everything is different. A single center can radiate power globally.

Another innovation of B-52 Hustler was its hydrogen device. Proved in the thermonuclear tests during 1952-1954,

⁴⁹³ Kaku & Axelrod 1987: 97.

⁴⁹⁴ Schake 1998: 194.

⁴⁹⁵ Schake 1998: 233.

⁴⁹⁶ Herz 1957: 489.

fusion weapons increased the destructive power. This power of a single weapon could now be measured in equivalent megatons of TNT. The effective size of these new weapons could be significantly reduced. Prior to this, SAC bombers were the exclusive means of strategic attack, for only these aircraft offered an effective means of delivering a load over thousands of miles. But the miniaturization of fusion weapons reduced the size of a typical strategic weapon from ten thousand pounds to only fifteen hundred pounds, and this smaller weight could be carried by a ballistic missile.

The proliferation of thermonuclear technology among American strategic weapons would greatly reduce reliance on bombers and overseas bomber bases.⁴⁹⁷ Hydrogen bombs produce explosions one thousand times more powerful than those from similar-sized atomic bombs, or a million times more powerful than conventional explosives. But the tremendous strategic value of the hydrogen bomb did not stem from its destructive power alone. It was more compact and fitter for carrying by ballistic missiles: “Of equal importance is the fact that there are now in existence delivery systems which can take the bomb at ever increasing speeds to any target on Earth.”⁴⁹⁸ With the arrival of thermonuclear warheads, the locus of nuclear development shifted to the systems used to deliver weapons to their targets.

Within the next decade, the inter-continental bombers were combined with two other components of the *nuclear triad*—the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs). The first American ICBM arrived in 1958 and the same year the first SSBN,

⁴⁹⁷ Schake 1998: 248.

⁴⁹⁸ Power 1964: 29.

George Washington, went on its first war patrol. The Navy's Fleet Ballistic Missile program combined an elongated nuclear-powered submarine with the Polaris Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). Both ICBM and SSBN during the next decade underwent exponential growth⁴⁹⁹ and sophistication. Introduction of solid fuel shortened the necessary warning time from hours to minutes. The accuracy of ICBM and SLBM (Trident D-5) equaled that of bombers in the 1980s.

The ICBM and its sister, the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), completely transformed the nature of strategic warfare, effectively and ultimately realizing Giulio Douhet's theories of indefensible aerial bombardment. ICBMs could visit megatons of destruction on any point on the globe with little or no chance of being intercepted.⁵⁰⁰

Half a century after the world land surface had been completely mapped, the turn came for the ocean floor. The initiative for the new endeavor was military. Advances in submarine design made antisubmarine warfare a critical defense concern in the early Cold War years. Naval planners sought improved maps of the seafloor to better understand where submarines could travel undetected, where seamounts posed heightened risk of collision, and where enemy submarines could hide. Civilian scientists in the Pentagon's Research and Development Board intended to identify key unsolved scientific problems crucial to national defense, declared the entire field of oceanography crucial because of undersea warfare. Creating a comprehensive map of the ocean floor was a critical component of this task. Pentagon funding

⁴⁹⁹ Schake 1998: 251-252.

⁵⁰⁰ Shaw 1999: esnp.

for oceanographic research in the late 1940s and 1950s allowed creating first detailed floor map of World Ocean.⁵⁰¹

With ballistic missiles, military globalization advanced to a new level. ICBMs and other ballistic missiles differed in several important respects from the bombers they first supplemented and soon began to supplant. They were far faster and could not be intercepted. Land-based missiles proved more economical to maintain than bombers and their crews and proved more suitable to tight centralized control.

ICBM arguably was the single most influential weapon of the Twentieth century.⁵⁰² They were able to travel from one superpower's territory to the other's in something on the order of 30 minutes. During the Cuban Missile Crisis President Kennedy expressed: "You may say it doesn't make any difference if you get blown up by an ICBM flying from the Soviet Union or one that was ninety miles away. Geography doesn't mean that much."⁵⁰³ Air Force General Thomas Power summarized the impact of science on warfare culminating with the ballistic missile:

The most significant contribution of science... is, undoubtedly, the dramatic reduction in time required to accomplish a military objective... Offensive forces of the past needed weeks and even months to carry their firepower close enough to their targets to apply it effectively... The time it took to do all this was reduced to a

⁵⁰¹ Levin & Marker 2006: 606, 608.

⁵⁰² Shaw 1999: esnp.

⁵⁰³ Cited in Trachtenberg 1985: 150.

few hours by the modern jet bomber. The ballistic missile has reduced it to minutes.⁵⁰⁴

Long-range bombers, aerial tankers, ICBMs, and SLBMs undermined the necessity for the strategic overseas bases. The two forms of ballistic missiles—ICBM and SLBM—offered a direct substitute to overseas bomber bases. Both the *Atlas* and *Titan* ICBM missiles were assigned to bases in the continental United States. By the 1960s, “the long sought ideal of freeing American strategic forces from other powers had finally materialized.”⁵⁰⁵ From 1960, the United States “no longer relied on overseas bases for retaliation.” They remained primarily as “symbols of the American commitment” to the allies, “not the first line of defense for the United States.”⁵⁰⁶

Along overseas bomber bases, long-range bombers themselves, despite all their progress, declined in importance due to the advent of the ballistic missiles. Consequently, many projects, such as B-70 (the forerunner of the later B-1), were cancelled as anachronistic.⁵⁰⁷ Eisenhower told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the proposed B-70 bomber “left him cold in terms of making military sense.”⁵⁰⁸ Meanwhile, Khrushchev in his 1960 speech announced that his regular air force was being phased out, that bombers were obsolete, and that they would be entirely replaced by rockets. The first test flight of a Polaris missile took place on July 20, 1960 and of Minuteman missile on 1 February 1961. These missiles made obsolete not only

⁵⁰⁴ Power 1964: 30.

⁵⁰⁵ Schake 1998: 200, 216, 223, 251-252, 254.

⁵⁰⁶ Art 1991: 22.

⁵⁰⁷ Trachtenberg 1986: 756.

⁵⁰⁸ Cited in Idem, 1985: 150

bombers but even the first generation missiles (Atlas, Jupiter, Titan, Thor).⁵⁰⁹

Stratcom Commander, General James E. Cartwright, would explain the capabilities of the Air Force in 2005: The conventional and nuclear type capabilities are delivered by missiles at very high speeds and at very long ranges. “Our bombers have very long ranges, [but] not quite the speeds.”⁵¹⁰ Hypersonic speed thus is already “not quite” fast.

The further military technology progressed, the more unthinkable became political isolationism. In the article entitled “Illusions of Distance” Albert Wohlstetter wrote: “In the case of nuclear relations, the defects of the old geopolitical treatment of distance are striking.” Technology changes the world in the direction “that makes the new isolationism pure nostalgia.”⁵¹¹ Already a decade earlier, Acheson had described the idea of disengagement as another “illusion” and “the same futile—and lethal—attempt to crawl back into the cocoon of history.” The process of military globalization proved to be irreversible. “For us, Acheson wrote, there is only one disengagement possible—the final one, the disengagement from life, which is death.”⁵¹²

In the beginning of the Cold War, the US Air Force compiled *The Bombarding Encyclopedia of the World*. “The database soon became global,” counting 80,000 entries by 1960.⁵¹³ This *Encyclopedia* served as a basis for the early Cold War target lists to be struck in a single spasm-attack. Dulles

⁵⁰⁹ Jameson 2013: 47-48.

⁵¹⁰ Cited in Kristensen 2006: 33.

⁵¹¹ Wohlstetter 1968: 244, 247.

⁵¹² Acheson 1958: 371.

⁵¹³ Gregory 2012: esnp.

in 1954 labeled it “massive retaliation” and *Fortune* magazine mapped his design.⁵¹⁴

By 1960, 3729 installations across Eurasia from East Europe to China were determined to be essential for attack; these 3729 targets composed the National Strategic Targeting List (NSTL) for the first Single Integrated Operational Plan.⁵¹⁵ SIOP-62 planned to hit them all in a single massive attack, involving 3423 nuclear warheads of total 7847 megatons. In essence, the strategy was “an extension” of the American strategic bombing campaign against Germany in World War II, although “greatly compressed in time, magnified in effect, and reduced in cost.”⁵¹⁶ As one observer noted, “even in sophisticated strategic literature the SIOP is spoken of with reverential, almost Delphic awe.”⁵¹⁷ Technologically, SIOP-62 was a triumph in military globalization:

SIOP-62 represented a technical triumph in the history of war planning. In less than fifteen years, the United States had mastered a variety of complex technologies and acquired the ability to destroy most of an enemy’s military capability and much of the human habitation of a continent in a single day.⁵¹⁸

To coordinate SIOP-62 among themselves, the commanders held “World-Wide Coordination Conferences,” and “Joint Coordination Centers—one in England and one in Hawaii—were established to assist in the elimination of

⁵¹⁴ Max Gschwind 1954.

⁵¹⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff 1961: 44.

⁵¹⁶ Mearsheimer 2001: 64.

⁵¹⁷ Cited in McKenzie et al 2001: 9.

⁵¹⁸ Rosenberg 1994: 175.

interference among striking forces.”⁵¹⁹ The two centers on the opposite points of the globe—England and Hawaii—cared that the strikes of the western and eastern fronts do not overlap. Responsible for the execution of the SIOP, the SAC was described as “a self-sufficient strategic combat system that has the complexity and precision of a fine watch and the span of the globe itself.”⁵²⁰

Just two decades before SIOP-62, with the world stunned by the achievements of the Luftwaffe and motorized blitzkrieg, Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, General Alfred Jodl, expressed his frustration: “But the Russian space is a space that is impossible even for aircraft, as illustrated by the industrial region in the Urals. You can't get there.”⁵²¹ William T. R. Fox in his 1944 article, which introduced the term “Super-Power,” estimated that war between the United States and the Soviet Union would result in a stalemate. “Not only are the point of direct contact few and inaccessible but the centers are widely separated. The armed power of each can be effectively carried only part of the way to the other.”⁵²²

These technological limitations of World War II were completely overcome. A pupil of Halford Mackinder recalled his epochal thesis of 1904 describing the Eurasian Heartland as “the greatest natural fortress on Earth...” Half a century later, the thesis became outdated: “But that was before the use of the atom and jet aircraft” and missiles which can reach any part of the Heartland. “Clearly, then, the physical security of the Heartland no longer exists. Indeed, there is much in Soviet

⁵¹⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff 1961: 41.

⁵²⁰ Power 1964: 142.

⁵²¹ *Military Conferences*, 93.

⁵²² Fox 1944: 102.

literature to suggest that the Russian feel the fortress has become a trap. They have produced maps showing an almost complete ring of air bases around the Soviet Union and perhaps obvious conclusions have been drawn.”⁵²³

In Bernard Brodie’s words, the potential destruction relatively to World War II was “telescoped in time and multiplied in magnitude.”⁵²⁴ The SIOP-62 attack would kill a quarter of the population and destroy half of industry of world’s largest land mass including China.⁵²⁵ Later, despite the advent of flexible response, deterrence and detent, the magnitude of potential destruction kept increasing. In the late 1960s, multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) were introduced. By replacing the single warhead on a missile with a postboost vehicle or “bus” carrying multiple—and now very accurate—warheads (or reentry vehicles [RV]), each of which could strike a different target, a single missile conceivably could destroy a larger number of the enemy’s dispersed targets. Multiple warheads were also potentially useful for penetrating antimissile defenses since they would increase the number of objects the defender had to intercept. By the late 1970s, more than half of the US ICBM force and all of its SLBMs were MIRVed.

Submarines did not “suffocate its crew at sea” as Herbert Wells had expected.⁵²⁶ Instead, they would keep its crew relatively safe in case of attack. Being based on platforms difficult or impossible to detect and attack prior to missile launch, SLBMs offered the tremendous advantage as

⁵²³ Mills 1956: 147-148, 152.

⁵²⁴ Cited in Steiner 1984: 388.

⁵²⁵ Fred Kaplan 1991: 269-279; McKenzie et al. 2001: 6.

⁵²⁶ Wells 1900: 78-79.

weapon of deterrence. No matter how one planned an attack, it could not destroy the enemy's patrolling missile submarines, which would therefore provide a robust second-strike capability against area targets such as cities and thus holding hostage to the retaliation the whole rival population on land:

A single Trident II submarine can inflict more deaths than all prior wars in history. 24 missiles, launched while submerged, each with 17 independently targeted maneuverable nuclear warheads five times more powerful than the atom bomb that destroyed Nagasaki, can travel 5000 or more nautical miles to strike within 300 feet of 408 predetermined targets... Other first strike weapons have been created with even greater range, bigger payloads, and an accuracy to within 100 feet of a pinpoint.⁵²⁷

The US intelligence's list of targets also kept growing, peaking at some 150,000–160,000 military targets worldwide.⁵²⁸ The Soviet strategic build-up was crashing too. Together, the two superpowers combined for fire-power exceeding the total World War II output multiple times: "Today the United States and the Soviet Union have enough power to wreck World War II level of destruction every minute for two weeks—some 4.5 tons of TNT equivalent for every person on the planet."⁵²⁹

There was no longer a locally circumscribed field of battle, as in the First World War; "from the start of the Third,

⁵²⁷ Clarck 1987: VII; also Kaku & Axelrod 1987: 202.

⁵²⁸ McKenzie et al. 2001: 9.

⁵²⁹ Deudney 1983: 14.

the battlefield would be the entire global land area ... About 1900, 'thinking in continents' was the new world-political fashion..." That concept was imperialist rather than strategic. "Now, in consequence of the new armament techniques, world strategy has turned to 'global thinking,' in which all of Earth becomes one battlefield."⁵³⁰

The above words by a Philosopher were in complete agreement with international relations (IR) and military experts and policy-makers. Expert on geopolitics, William Parker, described Cold War and the Containment as the first in history instance of "global strategy."⁵³¹ A war between the two superpowers would be the first truly World War. World War I and World War II were fought on many continents but they did not differ in it from the Napoleonic War and Seven Year War. World War III is supposed to be fought along global rather than continental strategy.

Several IR experts correlated the progress in weapons with military globalization. If no really effective defense can be perfected against nuclear missile attacks, it can be concluded that "the combination of thermonuclear explosives, long-range bombers and ballistic missiles made the territorial nation-state as unviable as the medieval castle became after the development of artillery."⁵³² "Just as gunpowder made the medieval castle indefensible, so the nuclear missile has destroyed the unconditional viability of the nation state."⁵³³ Gunpowder enlarged the realm of defensible power units from

⁵³⁰ Jaspers 1958: 53, 61-62.

⁵³¹ William Parker 1968: 372-373.

⁵³² Sprout & Sprout 1960: 159-160.

⁵³³ Boulding 1980: 1; also Herz 1957: 476-477.

city-state to territorial state or even large-area empire. The air power and atomic power age accelerated the trend:

If we contrast our present system of bases and similar outposts surrounding entire world regions with what today are small-scale nation-states, perhaps we can visualize what the hard shell of frontier fortifications consolidating the then large-scale territorial states meant by way of extending power units in the age of absolutism. They became, in the words of Frederick the Great, ‘mighty nails which hold a ruler’s provinces together ... Today, when not even two halves of the globe remain impermeable, it can no longer be a question of enlarging an area of protection and of substituting one unit of security for another. Since we are inhabitants of a planet of limited (and, as it now seems, insufficient) size, we have reached the limit within which the effect of the means of destruction has become absolute. Whatever remained of the impermeability of states seems to have gone for good.’⁵³⁴

Already in 1939, Carl Schmitt announced the deep crisis of the European state, a crisis due to many factors, including the new technologies of warfare and communication that were undermining conventional understandings of

⁵³⁴ Herz 1957: 476-477, 489.

national territories and their borders.⁵³⁵ Thomas Power similarly said that

modern weapons have ushered in the era of 'long distance wars,' wars that can be carried on from the home basis half a world apart ... The attack on Pearl Harbor proved the futility of a purely defensive policy in a world which had become one vast battleground for global power politics.⁵³⁶

Dulles contemplated: "We now see that the world has become so much a unit that wherever the body politic is afflicted the whole is endangered."⁵³⁷ Security pursued only on national scale is obsolete, confirmed Daniel Deudney. We live in the age of planetary geopolitics.⁵³⁸ And Henry Kissinger called it "one of the great revolutions in history":

We are living in a period which, in retrospect, will undoubtedly appear to be one of the great revolutions in history. The self-sufficient nation-state is breaking down. No nation—not even the largest—can survive in isolation or realize its potentialities, material, political, or spiritual, on its own.⁵³⁹

Thomas Power used to refer to "our global strike forces."⁵⁴⁰ In 2009, adjusting to its global range, the direct descendant of Strategic Air Command was called *Global*

⁵³⁵ Barnes & Minca 2013: 676.

⁵³⁶ Power 1964: 38, 92.

⁵³⁷ Dulles 1957: 35.

⁵³⁸ Deudney 1983: 19.

⁵³⁹ Kissinger 1961: 165.

⁵⁴⁰ Power 1964: 245.

Strike Command (AFGSC). Its mission is to hold at risk strategic and tactical centers of gravity worldwide.⁵⁴¹ “Global” in *Global Strike Command* refers to the targets anywhere on the globe. The President charged the Stratcom Commander to “be ready to strike at any moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world.”⁵⁴² US Air Force Commander Stephen W. Wilson explained:

...Airmen see things globally – without boundaries. That is especially true of AFGSC Airmen, whose focus is inherently global and strategic ... We provide... when called upon, rapid global strike.⁵⁴³

Synchronously, a conventional global offensive system was initiated, called *Prompt Global Strike*. A decade earlier a reconnaissance aircraft had been introduced, called *Global Hawks*. The tradition to integrate *globe* into the name of aircraft symbolize the scope is traced to World War II, when military transport aircraft was labeled *Globemaster* for its ability to circumnavigate the globe with only two stops.

Globe-girding connotation is also found in the names of US ICBMs. The first operational ICBM was named *Atlas*—a Titan who held the heaven and is associated with the globe. The next family of ICBMs was called *Titan*.⁵⁴⁴ Along the compression of space, the compression of time was expressed by *Minuteman*—the first solid fuel ICBM. Having the same

⁵⁴¹ Green et al. 2016: 119.

⁵⁴² Cited in Kristensen 2006: 53.

⁵⁴³ AFGSC 2014: II.

⁵⁴⁴ The pioneers of the inter-continental bombers and rockets, Germans, were pragmatic rather than mythological and global-minded, simply calling their programs for bombers and rockets respectively *Amerika Bomber* and *Projekt Amerika*.

global range, it could be launched on a “minute” notice. As Bernard Brodie put it, the potential destruction was “telescoped in time.”⁵⁴⁵

⁵⁴⁵ Cited in Steiner 1984: 388.

Space

The Hellenistic tradition animated Ocean in military terms as the most stubborn and implacable of foes attacking the fleet.⁵⁴⁶ This “most stubborn of foes” was totally overcome; much more stubborn foes—submarine and air—followed suit. None held against modern fleets. Eventually, the space yielded too.

On the eve of the American entrance into World War II, Hans Baldwin claimed that if the majority of the Americans wholeheartedly and enthusiastically enter the war, “then our defense blueprint is simple—the sky is the limit.”⁵⁴⁷ Baldwin took it too low—the orbit proved to be the limit. The same limit synchronously reached the other superpower.

Space became another dimension introduced into strategy during the Cold War, with orbit becoming a new frontier. At this stage, military globalization actually proceeded beyond the globe. Expert on the Cold War, Historian John Lewis Gaddis, wrote about his subject: “And it was a rivalry that even extended, at one point, beyond the bounds of Earth itself, as human beings for the first time left this planet.”⁵⁴⁸

The ICBM, designed to travel into and through space, was in fact the very first military space system.⁵⁴⁹ Sputnik was launched in 1957. In 1960, SAINT (Satellite interceptor) was introduced to blast Sputnik out of the sky. On June 1964, first

⁵⁴⁶ Romm 1992: 144, 147.

⁵⁴⁷ Baldwin 1941: 48-49.

⁵⁴⁸ Gaddis 1992: 235.

⁵⁴⁹ Shaw 1999: esnp.

operational ASAT system (anti-satellite) was deployed.⁵⁵⁰ In 1947, Hans Baldwin had foreseen:

The range of weapons, soon to be measured in transoceanic and intercontinental terms, is now approaching the limits of our world and may, in real truth, almost achieve the infinite in globe-girdling, satellite missiles capable of circling the Earth endlessly.⁵⁵¹

The vision came true. In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union deployed the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). A nuclear warhead, placed in low orbit, had no range limit and could hit any location on the globe within a “few minutes.”⁵⁵² It approached North America from the South Pole and would hit North American targets from the south, which is the opposite direction from which NORAD early warning systems are oriented. With FOBS in project, Khrushchev envisaged: “You wait for it at the door, but it climbs through the window.”⁵⁵³ The Soviet FOBS opened a fourth frontier between the superpowers—over the South Pole. At this point, the two remaining superpowers faced each other on four fronts, across all four oceans.

Baldwin had stated: Defense requires a “girdle of radar warning systems and communication networks around our coasts from the Canadian Arctic to Latin American jungles.”⁵⁵⁴ And Thomas Power of the Air Force warned: Ballistic Missiles Early Warning System (BMEWS) consists

⁵⁵⁰ Kaku & Axelrod 1987: 148, 150.

⁵⁵¹ Baldwin 1947: 57.

⁵⁵² Kane 1971: 924.

⁵⁵³ Cited in Chester Ward 1964: 279-280.

⁵⁵⁴ Baldwin 1947: 151.

of three huge radar installations located at Clear, Alaska; Thule, Greenland; and Flyingdales Moor, England. Such warning is presently limited to missiles coming in from the north. "Should the Soviets succeed in developing missiles which, without degradation of accuracy, can be fired the long way across the South Pole, we would have no warning against them." Hence, the United States needs *omnidirectional* warning system.⁵⁵⁵

Both superpowers launched intelligence-collecting spacecraft for the duration of the Cold War to track each other's nuclear capabilities and fleet movements. The missile warning satellites represented the "first line of defense" by giving ample warning time for preemptive strike by the nuclear Triad.⁵⁵⁶ Consequently the globe became transparent. World's strategic inventory, size, and location were revealed in detail. Hence until today, intelligence-collecting spacecraft continues their ceaseless vigil.

In 1983, President Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Nicknamed *Star Wars*, the SDI designed a global shield in space against ballistic missiles. The British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, described the idea as a Maginot line in space.⁵⁵⁷ By 1985, military space activities had grown to such a scale that DoD created a new unified command, Space Command. To enhance command and control under a single combatant commander, Space Command in 2002 was merged with Strategic Command responsible also for Air Command. "Technological advances were outpacing doctrine,

⁵⁵⁵ Power 1964: 153-154, 243.

⁵⁵⁶ Shaw 1999: esnp.

⁵⁵⁷ Heinrik 1986: 3.

particularly in global information operations, and a new Strategic Command could direct integrated global planning and execution to link strategic capabilities and the space domain.”⁵⁵⁸

In the 1991 Gulf War, for the first time Commanders relied upon satellite communications to keep in touch within theater and between the Middle East and the United States and the GPS made possible precise ground maneuvers in a featureless desert. Data from missile warning satellites, combined with stations in Australia, alerted Israel and Saudi Arabia of incoming Scud missiles.⁵⁵⁹

Funded by the Pentagon, the ancient science of *geodesy* rose to a sophisticated modern-level science. The German - American rocket pioneer, Werner von Braun, raised the geodetic issue in 1951: "One of the gravest handicaps in improving missile accuracy is the poor accuracy of the geodetic survey of a great portion of the globe. For example, the Eurasian landmass relative to the continent of the Americas is not known to more accuracy than 300 to 400 yards."⁵⁶⁰ For this stage of military globalization, several-hundred-yards difference in measuring intercontinental distance made "one of the gravest handicaps." *Life* magazine stated in 1958: "Almost exactly" was not good enough.

The mission of the "global mapping," began by stratospheric balloons and continued by U-2, passed to satellites. The first geodetic satellite (launched in 1962) was initiated by the military establishment. The project was named ANNA—an abbreviation of Army, Navy, NASA and Air

⁵⁵⁸ Drea et al 2013: 85.

⁵⁵⁹ Shaw 1999: esnp.

⁵⁶⁰ Cited in Warner 2000: 393.

Force. US geodesists engaged in a project vital in modern war—finding the exact size and shape of the world, the positioning within the temporally varying Earth’s gravitational field, measuring of this field, flattening of the Earth (compression of Earth along the diameter), Earth’s orientation in space and irregularities in the Earth’s rotation.⁵⁶¹ This global datum was critical to the successful deployment of satellites and targeting of ICBMs. "The eventual goal of these enterprises was to provide accurate geo-positioning of any point, anywhere on Earth."⁵⁶² *National Geographic* observed in 1956 that in "this age of guided missiles, the exact distance from, say, Tallahassee to Timbuktu may suddenly become crucially important."⁵⁶³

Geodetic measurements required radar links between stations arrayed around the world. The days of separate, isolated national surveys passed.⁵⁶⁴ The mission required global approach. In fact the approach exceeded this globe by light years. Other celestial objects, including stars beyond the Solar system, were used for this military globalization. Solar eclipses were used to correct the Earthly distances. "Eclipse will aid missile accuracy" was the title in the 1948 *New York Times*.⁵⁶⁵ "Astrogeodetic" techniques produced ever more accurate maps of ever-larger regions of the Earth.⁵⁶⁶

In the process, much of the general knowledge of our world was adjusted. The radius of the Earth at the equator was found 420 feet smaller than previously thought—an important

⁵⁶¹ Warner 2000: 394, 401, 404, 407.

⁵⁶² Cloud 2002: 266-267.

⁵⁶³ Cited in Warner 2000: 394.

⁵⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 397.

⁵⁶⁵ Cited in *Ibid*, 397-398, 400-401.

⁵⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 364.

difference for controlling artificial Earth satellites and for locating the targets of artillery and guided missiles. Some discrepancies in geodetic measurements were caused by the contemporary estimation of the speed of light and led to the correction by 16 km/s (299,792 instead of 299,776 km/s).⁵⁶⁷ The Laser Geodynamic Satellite (*Lageos*) launched in 1976 brought the accuracy of intercontinental distance measurements down to the centimeter range, allowing to measure continental drifts.⁵⁶⁸

Another by-product of this military globalization was the Global Positioning System (GPS).⁵⁶⁹ Initially intended solely for military use, the GPS has found a large market in the private sector and is now practically a household word. It has become what some have called the "last word in global navigation," and may well emerge as one of the most significant globally influential technologies of the Twentieth century.⁵⁷⁰

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid, 397.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid. 408, 412.

⁵⁶⁹ Cloud 2002: 268-270.

⁵⁷⁰ Shaw 1999: esnp; Warner 2000: 413-415.

THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

Engagement and Enlargement

At the end of the Cold War, Zbigniew Brzezinski described the unprecedented global nature of the confrontation and theorized on its outcome:

[The Cold War] involves—for the first time in history—a two-nation contest for nothing less than global predominance ... The collision between America and Russia is now global in scale ... The global rivalry between America and Russia is new. Never before have two powers competed on such a broad front. Moreover never before would the eclipse of one of the major rival powers have given to the other effective global preponderance.⁵⁷¹

The “eclipse of one” was just five years away and indeed resulted in “effective global preponderance” of the other. On the 500th anniversary of the discovery of the New World, the US Defense Planning Guidance (1992) aspired to prevent the rise of peer competitor in the Old World.

The “peace dividend” decreased the defense budget and number of overseas troops during the next decade. Overall however military globalization rather increased with the end of the Cold War. In the 1980s, the US military conducted 19 foreign operations to 14 different countries; in the 1990s, it conducted 108 such operations to 53 different countries.⁵⁷² “After 1989, American military interventions abroad became

⁵⁷¹ Brzezinski 1986: 8, 27.

⁵⁷² Gordon & Shapiro 2004: 57.

more frequent and occurred in parts of the world that had previously been off-limits due to the Cold-War standoff.”⁵⁷³

“As the President [George Bush the Elder] often notes, the line between foreign and domestic policy has evaporated.”⁵⁷⁴ Hans Baldwin had written at the onset of the Cold War: “Foreign affairs are now our most intimate domestic concern.”⁵⁷⁵ This “domestic concern” has become even more “intimate” after the end of the Cold War.

The Soviet retreat was not accompanied by a reciprocal retreat into “Fortress America” and anticipated by some experts “Back to the Future,”⁵⁷⁶ meaning return to the traditional multipolar power politics. The overwhelming trend of military globalization was “forward”: “Forward Defense through Forward Presence” was the title of a chapter in the 1990 US National Security Strategy.⁵⁷⁷ Instead of “Back to the Future,” the world contemplated “damn the torpedo, full speed ahead,” as NATO poured into the vacuum created by the Soviet retreat:

Realists are correct to conclude that the collapse of the Soviet Union fundamentally altered the political landscape in Europe. As the Warsaw Pact crumbled and states regained their independence, a power vacuum opened in Eastern Europe. With American power unchecked, it was likely that the United States, or any country similarly situated, would try to

⁵⁷³ Robert Kagan 2012: 88.

⁵⁷⁴ Anthony Lake 1993: esnp.

⁵⁷⁵ Baldwin 1947: 7.

⁵⁷⁶ Mearsheimer 1990.

⁵⁷⁷ NSSUS 1990: 25.

take advantage of its position ... Expanding NATO eastward was in effect America's way of attempting to 'lock in' its Cold War victory.⁵⁷⁸

The line chosen by the Clinton administration was more "engagement," more "enlargement" and more "leadership." Clinton's Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney described the post-Cold War plan:

We should plan to continue a wide range of forward presence activities, including not only overseas basing of forces, but prepositioning and periodic deployments, exercises, exchanges or visits of forces. Forward basing of forces and the prepositioning of equipment facilitate rapid reinforcement and enhance the capability to project forces into critical regions.⁵⁷⁹

As it was claimed during the Cold War, Clinton's National Security Advisor Anthony Lake claimed that in the present post-Cold War period the only alternative to engagement is disaster:

[The] pulse of the planet has accelerated dramatically—and with it the pace of change in human events. Computers ... and satellites all speed the flow of information [and bytes of data] move at the speed of light ... Ultimately, the world's acceleration creates new and diverse ways for us to exert our influence if we

⁵⁷⁸ Barany & Rauchhaus 2011: 303.

⁵⁷⁹ Cheney 1993: 13.

choose to do so—but increases the likelihood that if we do not, rapid events, instantly reported, may overwhelm us. As the President has suggested, we must decide whether to make change our ally or allow ourselves to become its victims ... In such a world, our interests and ideals compel us not only to be engaged but to lead.⁵⁸⁰

Clinton's Assistant Secretary of Defense, Joseph Nye, in 1990 had published a book entitled *Bound to Lead...* Chapter subtitled "Engagement and Enlargement" of US National Security Strategy of 1996 outlined the primary goal: "First and foremost, we must exercise global leadership."⁵⁸¹ The inevitability of US "leadership" has been repeatedly stressed by all post-Cold War Presidents from George Bush the Elder until Barak Obama:

Strong and sustained American leadership is essential to a rules-based international order that promotes global security and prosperity as well as the dignity and human rights of all peoples. The question is never whether America should lead, but how we lead ...American global leadership remains indispensable.⁵⁸²

As we navigate this complex world, America cannot shirk the mantle of leadership. We can't be isolationists. It's not possible in this globalized, interconnected world ... Allowing

⁵⁸⁰ Anthony Lake 1993: esnp.

⁵⁸¹ NSSUS 1996: 11.

⁵⁸² Obama, "Preface" to NSSUS 2015.

problems to fester over there makes us less secure here.⁵⁸³

Enlargement and Engagement was not just about democracy and markets as the Clinton administration usually put it. The geostrategic sphere was not forgotten, as Anthony Lake made clear in his 1993 speech: "To be successful, a strategy of enlargement must ... combine our broad goals of fostering democracy and markets with our more traditional geostrategic interests."⁵⁸⁴ Guided by these interests, military globalization underwent a new surge, most expressed by the NATO expansion.

⁵⁸³ Obama, cited in Garamone 2016a: 1.

⁵⁸⁴ Anthony Lake 1993.

Alliances

The US global network of alliances consolidated and NATO drastically expanded eastward. During the Eisenhower administration there had been an idea of “rollback” of the Soviet sphere in Europe. It was never attempted. Suddenly, the Soviets rolled themselves back, more completely than anything envisaged by the original rollback. The chapter in the 1990 US National Security Strategy, titled "New World Order," opens: "We have within our grasp an extraordinary possibility that few generations have enjoyed..."⁵⁸⁵ A year earlier, President George Bush the Elder had assured that this “historic opportunity” would not be missed:

Today, after four decades, the international landscape is marked by change that is breath-taking in its character, dimension, and pace. The familiar moorings of postwar security policy are being loosened by developments that were barely imagined years or even months ago... [It is a] moment of historic opportunity... We will not let that opportunity pass.⁵⁸⁶

It was “breath-taking” yet before the Soviet Union itself perfectly disintegrated with all fourteen former Republics breaking apart. Implicitly, the “historical” and “extraordinary possibility that few generations have enjoyed” was to fill the strategic vacuum in East Europe. Explicitly, the Clinton administration suggested “engagement and enlargement”:

⁵⁸⁵ NSSUS 1991: V.

⁵⁸⁶ "Preface" to NSSUS 1990.

Our strategy of engagement and enlargement is central to US policy toward Europe... With the collapse of the Soviet Empire... the United States has an unparalleled opportunity... Our goal is an integrated democratic Europe cooperating with the United States...⁵⁸⁷

NATO was created to strengthen Europe's West. Now, it can do the same for Europe's East ... Countries that were once our adversaries now can become our allies.⁵⁸⁸

In four waves of “enlargement” (1990, 1997, 2004 and 2009) NATO “moved beyond Containment’s” frontier in the Fulda Gap to include eight former members of the dissolved Warsaw Pact, three former Soviet Republics, and two former Yugoslav Republics. Expansion of the NATO has given the United States access to additional bases in eastern and southern Europe.

In 2008, France returned to the integrated NATO command. This marked the end of the Gaullist attempt to restore strategic sovereignty and reverse the trend of military globalization. At the end of his career, de Gaulle published his *Mémoires d’Espoir*. Had he lived through 2008, he would probably have titled it *Mémoires de Désespoir*.

Following World War I, Halford Mackinder designed his famous *Cordon Sanitaire* as a security buffer between Germany and Russia stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.⁵⁸⁹ Today, two of Mackinder’s three components—

⁵⁸⁷ NSSUS 1996: 35.

⁵⁸⁸ NSSUS 1997: esnp.

⁵⁸⁹ Mackinder 1919.

Germany and the *Cordon Sanitaire*—are the US security zone. The eastern frontier of NATO stretched from Estonia to Bulgaria. One trend in the 2000s is some degree of drawdown in "old Europe," mostly in Germany, in favor of forward sites in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Poland.⁵⁹⁰ New Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMD) were installed in Poland and the Czech Republic, eastward of the Fulda Gap. In the course of the Operation *Atlantic Resolve* (began in 2015), US military equipment—tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and artillery—permeated the new NATO frontier from Lithuania to Bulgaria.

Along NATO, other US Cold War alliances remained intact too. Singapore and Taiwan both have complex but very different unofficial security ties with the United States, and in both cases, although for very different reasons, these ties are improving. Even though the United States has never fought alongside Israeli forces and there is no formal security arrangement, the US government has resupplied them during combat, sought to send strong deterrent messages in support of Israel during regional hostilities, and otherwise made it clear that Washington would not allow Israel to be threatened. US relations with Jordan, Egypt, and the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman—also probably can be characterized as a more informal alliance relationship. The United States also maintains quasi-colonial security responsibilities toward a host of Pacific nations, such as the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, the Marshall Islands, Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia (as well as Guam and American Samoa). Finally, the United States has

⁵⁹⁰ Harkavy 2005: 14.

established military training and cooperation programs, security dialogues, and/or limited exchange programs with many of the world's remaining countries.⁵⁹¹

Two-thirds of 192 states receive US security funds. Many that now receive such assistance are former Soviet allies and arms clients (or even former Soviet republics), who once provided Moscow basing access and overflight rights; among them are Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Angola, Mongolia, India and Cambodia.⁵⁹² The shift from bipolarity to unipolarity is acute.

As Hugh Gusterson wrote after the Cold War, "the end of the Cold War has destroyed our maps."⁵⁹³ There remained only one geopolitical bloc. By removing the last peer superpower in the American geopolitical imaginary, the end of the Cold War destroyed the bipolar cartography and the neat division of the world into geopolitical blocs.⁵⁹⁴ The US National Security Strategy from 1997 stated: "As we approach this century's end, the blocs and barriers that divided the world for fifty years largely have fallen away."⁵⁹⁵

The United States plays "the global hub to key regional spokes."⁵⁹⁶ Spokes do not directly interrelate between and among themselves but all are bound to the same hub. These

⁵⁹¹ Campbell 2004: 154-155.

⁵⁹² Harkavy 2005: 16.

⁵⁹³ Gusterson 1993: 279.

⁵⁹⁴ Dalby 2008: 418.

⁵⁹⁵ NSSUS 1997: esnp.

⁵⁹⁶ Joffe 1995: 111, 117; Nexon & Wright 2007: 258.

spokes are one of the central topics in US National Security Strategies and Quadrennial Defense Reviews: "Our first priority in foreign policy remains solidarity with our allies and friends."⁵⁹⁷ "America will implement its strategies by organizing coalitions—as broad as practicable..."⁵⁹⁸ "Sustaining existing alliances and creating new partnerships are central elements of US security strategy."⁵⁹⁹ "Enjoying alliances with a majority of the most powerful states, we will be the only nation able to globally project massive military power."⁶⁰⁰ America will "preserve" and further "expand" its alliances and partnerships.⁶⁰¹

The global network of alliances is remarkably cohesive. The "Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific" proceeds without undermining commitments to NATO and other alliances: While rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific, in "Europe, we remain steadfast in our commitment to our NATO allies."⁶⁰²

The alliance expansion takes military globalization to new levels. Today, the Finnish and Australian troops—the antipodes par excellence—are fighting side by side in Syria—an exotic and strange place for both—under a single command of the third antipode. In total, in the anti-ISIS campaign participate 69 nations and four international organizations, including the Arab League.⁶⁰³

⁵⁹⁷ NSSUS 1990: 15.

⁵⁹⁸ NSSUS 2002: 25.

⁵⁹⁹ QDR 2010: 57.

⁶⁰⁰ QDR 2014: 63.

⁶⁰¹ NSSUS 2015: 9.

⁶⁰² *Ibid*, 9.

⁶⁰³ Mattis 2017b: esnp.

The Pentagon became the “Mecca” of national defense ministers. “Welcome to the Pentagon” is the “welcome” heard by the largest number of national defense ministers, perhaps, second only to the number of times “Welcome to the Hotel California” is heard on YouTube. On May 17, 2017, US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis said to Norway’s Defense Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide at the Pentagon: “It is always a privilege for us here at the Pentagon to host NATO’s doorkeeper to the north.”⁶⁰⁴ The same day and the same place, Mattis (long working day for him) thanked the Angolan Defense Minister Joao Lourenco for guarding the Guinea Gulf and central Africa. Two antipode guardians of the arctic and torrid flanks were thanked at the global strategic center on a routine working day.

As Defense Ministers gather on each occasion, they find that they have “deepened” and “strengthened” their cooperation and expanded it into new domains – like missile defense, space and cyberspace. With insignificant variations, the summarizing formula of bilateral relationship is: “The US-X defense relationship is stronger than it’s ever been, and America’s pledge to defend X’s security remains unwavering,” where X is any developed state as well as most developing.⁶⁰⁵

President Donald Trump summarized his first overseas trip passing in Saudi Arabia, Israel and Italy: “Our travels took us to some of the holiest sites in the three Abrahamic religions, and to gatherings of both America’s oldest and newest friends ... We traveled the world to

⁶⁰⁴ Mattis 2017: 1.

⁶⁰⁵ For characteristic example, Ash Carter 2016.

strengthen longstanding alliances..."⁶⁰⁶ It happens that the centers of all three Abrahamic religions are US longstanding allies.

Some small states on the periphery of Russia and China would not ensure their security even with theoretically impossible 100% of GDP spent on defense. Allied with the unipolar power however they gain security for 1-2% of their GDP. These defense arrangements, to use former US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney's words, provide "security at lower costs and with lower risks for all."⁶⁰⁷ The bargain is particularly appealing for economically well-doing states. The alliance progress indicates the political consolidation anchored on some 50 world's most effective economies. Almost all states with the nominal GDP per capita above the world average have become US allies whether by formal alliance (such as Rio Pact, NATO, ANZUS, bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea) or informal defense partnership (such as NATO European partners, Israel, the Persian Gulf states and Taiwan). In both cases, the United States is committed to these countries' defense. As of April 2017, out of 65 states above the nominal per capita GDP world average (according to the United Nations) there were two exceptions from the rule: Equatorial Guinea and Kazakhstan (the latter just above the world average).

A single overarching geopolitical division was stressed between the "integrated core" and the "non-integrated gap" in the global economy.⁶⁰⁸ A similar division appears in the military field. Regarding the countries with the nominal

⁶⁰⁶ Garamone 2017a: 1.

⁶⁰⁷ Cheney 1993: 4.

⁶⁰⁸ Dalby 2008: 424.

per capita GDP above the world average, the United States approaches monopoly on security. A former US Diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad called the global military integrated core “the zone of peace.”⁶⁰⁹ Bradley A. Thayer calculated the alliance statistics for the periods before and after the end of the Cold War:

Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America—their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements—and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to 1..., a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to 1 of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies.⁶¹⁰

The US military obtained “the Earth's 911 force.”⁶¹¹ As President Barak Obama put it: “On just about every issue, the world looks to us to set the agenda ... When there is a problem around the world, they do not call Beijing or Moscow. They call us.”⁶¹² And, of course, if someone wants to call the European Union, the insurmountable Kissinger dilemma is “Whom do I call?”

Since the early 1950s, attack on the NATO countries, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand or the American republics “would involve the United States in

⁶⁰⁹ Khalilzad 1995: 92.

⁶¹⁰ Thayer 2006: 34.

⁶¹¹ Ibid, 36.

⁶¹² Garamone 2016a: 1.

war" with the USSR or China. "Other certain countries, such as Indo-China or Formosa, are of such strategic importance to the United States that an attack on them would probably compel the United States to react with military force either locally... or generally." Furthermore, the commitment extends to the defense of states which are not even informally allied, as "the principle of collective security through the United Nations ... should be upheld even in areas not of vital strategic importance."⁶¹³

The paradox is that even rogue and rival countries used to be defended by the United States in certain circumstances. The Carter Doctrine (1980) committed the United States to the defense of Iran (despite the events of 1979) in case of Soviet invasion, possibly using nuclear weapons.⁶¹⁴ At the same time, the United States was committed to the defense of China against another possible Soviet invasion. No matter how rogue is any state, it would be protected to contain a more threatening state.

As the commitment to allies' defense, the containment of rival powers is ironclad. Presently, US defense authorities identify five such rivals—Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and ISIS. Two details are striking. First, the opposition is small in membership: "You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States..."⁶¹⁵ Second, the rival group is strategically isolated, outbalanced and encircled by the United States and its allies. North Korea, Iran and ISIS can be disregarded outright, as these organizations would not obtain nuclear triad and aircraft carriers in any meaningful quantity

⁶¹³ NSC 162/2 1953: 9.

⁶¹⁴ Halloran 1986: 1.

⁶¹⁵ Thayer 2006: 34.

or quality. China and Russia are discussed in the following chapter.

The Containment of China and Russia

Overview

In the post-Cold War period, the most acute challenge to the unipolar military globalization is commonly linked with the economic and military rise of China. If from 2008 to 2028, according to Robert Art's estimation in 2008, the Chinese economy continues to grow at anything close to the rate between 1988 and 2008, then it will eventually rival and even surpass the United States in its GDP.⁶¹⁶ Four years later, Christopher Layne adjusted: China's share of world GDP (15%) will draw nearly even with the US share (18%) by 2014. (The US share at the end of World War II was nearly 50%.) This is particularly startling given that China's share of world GDP was only 2% in 1980 and 6% as recently as 1995. Moreover China is on course to overtake the United States as the world's largest economy (measured by market exchange rate) sometime this decade. And, as argued by economists like Arvind Subramanian, measured by purchasing-power parity, China's GDP may already be greater than that of the United States.⁶¹⁷ *The Economist* recently projected that China's defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025.⁶¹⁸ As the GDP gap is closing, many agree, China will begin to narrow the military gap with the United States in the 2020s.⁶¹⁹

China is a nuclear power possessing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). These missiles are called *Dongfeng*, meaning *East Wind* and recalling Mao Zedong's popular

⁶¹⁶ Art 2009: 340.

⁶¹⁷ Cited in Layne 2012: esnp.

⁶¹⁸ Cited in Layne 2012: esnp.

⁶¹⁹ Dobbins 2012: 22-23.

slogan from 1957, “the East wind prevails over the West wind.”⁶²⁰ Dongfeng was successfully tested in 1971 and deployed in 1981.⁶²¹ Dongfeng-5 and Dongfeng-5A have a range of 12,000-13,000 km. Dongfeng-41 missiles with a range of 12,000 and modified for multiple warheads (MIRV) were announced by the Chinese Government sources in 2014 but censored later.⁶²² In 2015-2016, Dongfeng-41 were tested using MIRV dummy warheads.⁶²³ Dongfeng-31A is capable to hold MIRV of 3-5 warheads and with a range in excess of 11,200 km can reach most locations within the continental United States.⁶²⁴ China is the only one of the five original nuclear weapon states that is quantitatively increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal. Presently China produces the JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), with four commissioned and another under construction. Each JIN will eventually carry 12 CSS-NX-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) with an estimated range of 7,200 km.⁶²⁵ Four JIN SSBNs are operational, and up to five may enter service before China begins developing and fielding its next-generation SSBN, the Type 096, over the coming decade.⁶²⁶ The JIN class and its SLBMs will give China its first reliable long-range, sea-based nuclear capability.⁶²⁷

⁶²⁰ Lewis & Di 1992: 13.

⁶²¹ Ibid, 10.

⁶²² Gertz 2014: esnp.

⁶²³ Gertz 2015: esnp.

⁶²⁴ Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC 2016: 25.

⁶²⁵ Office of the Secretary of Defense 2016: 58; Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC 2016: 57.

⁶²⁶ Office of the Secretary of Defense 2016: 26.

⁶²⁷ Ibid, 38.

The Neorealist school of International Relations (IR), led by Kenneth Waltz, claims that the unipolar concentration of power inevitably triggers counter-balancing. Waltz focused on the rise of China in his anticipation of counter-balancing: The “all-but-inevitable movement from unipolarity to multipolarity is taking place not in Europe but in Asia.”⁶²⁸ Other leading Realist theoreticians, John Mearsheimer and Christopher Layne,⁶²⁹ completely agree. For Mearsheimer “one of the key foreign policy issues facing the United States is the question of how China will behave if its rapid economic growth continues and effectively turns China into a giant Hong Kong.”⁶³⁰ The question appears rhetoric, as the clear answer immediately follows:

Unfortunately, a policy of engagement [by integrating China into world economy] is doomed to fail. If China becomes an economic powerhouse it will almost certainly translate its economic might into military might and make a run at dominating Northeast Asia. Whether China is democratic and deeply enmeshed in the global economy or autocratic and autarkic will have little effect on its behavior, because democracies care about security as much as non-democracies do, and hegemony is the best way for any state to guarantee its own survival. Of course, neither its neighbors nor the United States would stand idly by while China gained increasing increments of power. Instead, they

⁶²⁸ Waltz 2002: 56.

⁶²⁹ Layne 2010 and 2012.

⁶³⁰ Mearsheimer 2001: chapter 1, esnp.

would seek to contain China, probably by trying to form a balancing coalition. The result would be an intense security competition between China and its rivals, with the ever-present danger of great-power war hanging over them. In short, China and the United States are destined to be adversaries as China's power grows.⁶³¹

The experience of past great powers could lead to the conclusion that the iron laws of political theory and history point to some inevitable collision or conflict between the United States and China, with considerable potential for war.⁶³² In conversation with Mearsheimer, former US security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, alluded that, as of 2005, China lacks adequate military force: "But to have a real collision, China needs a military that is capable of going toe-to-toe with the United States." Mearsheimer replied: In 2025 or 2030, China will have the military muscle to take America on; China will push America out of its region and take Taiwan.⁶³³

John Ikenberry of the more pacifist institutional school of IR is equally pessimist on the unipolar matter. He outlined two future possibilities for the Far East: bipolarity with America and China or replacement of the American hegemony by the Chinese.⁶³⁴ Expert on alliances, Stephen Walt, projected the Chinese challenge in similar terms: "The rise of new powers is bringing the short-lived 'unipolar moment' to an end, and the result will be either a bipolar Sino-

⁶³¹ Mearsheimer 2001: chapter 1, esnp.

⁶³² Brzezinski & Mearsheimer 2005: 46; Mearsheimer 2006: 160.

⁶³³ Brzezinski & Mearsheimer 2005: 49.

⁶³⁴ Ikenberry 2004: 361-362.

American rivalry or a multipolar system containing several unequal great powers."⁶³⁵ Strategic expert, Colin Gray, warned:

...China is coming, make no mistake. And, all of the excellent reasons why Beijing ought to settle contentedly for a cooperative role in an American policed world order, will be shown by future history to have been a triumph of hope over experience.⁶³⁶

The White House administration shared the expectation. In 2008, Condoleezza Rice defined China's rise as "the defining geopolitical event of the Twenty-First century."⁶³⁷ Besides IR theories, the lessons of history unambiguously suggest struggle for domination: "Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers tells us that China will use its increasing wealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia."⁶³⁸ "Anti-hegemony (fan ba) remains a key Chinese imperative," previously regarding the Soviet Union and now the United States.⁶³⁹ Martin Jacques titled his 2012 book, *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order*.

Along China, there appeared a resurgent, revanchist Russia. Its foreign policy went from assertive to outright aggressive. In 2008, Georgia was invaded, causing split in its territorial integrity. In 2014, Russia conquered Crimea and

⁶³⁵ Walt 2011: 9-10.

⁶³⁶ Gray 2006: 148.

⁶³⁷ Condoleezza Rice 2008.

⁶³⁸ Layne 2010: esnp.

⁶³⁹ Scott 2013: 37.

intervened in eastern Ukraine. The Russian government shifted from democracy to autocracy. The Russian military budget has quadrupled between 2001 and 2014, with an average annual increase of 7.4%⁶⁴⁰ and between 2005 and 2015, it increased 87%.⁶⁴¹

In 1995, Alexander Yanov published a book, titled *After Eltsin: "Weimar" Russia*. Retrospectively, he wrote, it is evident that the centuries-old imperial tradition is stronger than the nascent democracy.⁶⁴² The analogy of “Weimar Russia” became popular:

It has become commonplace to draw analogy between post-Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany ... The parallels are, indeed, striking. An imperial power defeated in (cold) war and shorn of a large part of its territory... From the status of the great power, and object of universal fear and respect, [Russia declined] to object dependence on the former adversary.⁶⁴³

To the former US Secretary of State, James Baker, the Russian reaction on the defeat in the Cold War associated with the German reaction on the defeat in World War I: "The end of the Cold War was certainly not settled by anything like Versailles, but from Russia's perspective the result have been much the same—a humiliating loss of territory, power and prestige."⁶⁴⁴ “The mood of recrimination in Russia today is

⁶⁴⁰ Steff & Khoo 2014: 246.

⁶⁴¹ *Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2016*, 4.

⁶⁴² ЯНОВ 1995: 11.

⁶⁴³ Shenfield 2001: IX.

⁶⁴⁴ Baker 2002: 100.

reminiscent of Germany after World War I, when Germans complained about the 'shameful Versailles diktat' ...⁶⁴⁵

One striking parallel is that after the defeat in World War I and the humiliating peace of Versailles, the Weimar Republic proved to be fertile ground for the growth of geopolitics.⁶⁴⁶ Experts on geopolitics, Colin Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, stress the "phoenix-like rise of geopolitics in a country that formerly was in the forefront of demonizing it."⁶⁴⁷ Halford Mackinder and Karl Haushofer became candidates to replace Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Military Historian of Russia, John Erickson details:

Geopolitics, persistently demonized during the days of the Soviet Union, has returned with a vengeance to haunt post-Soviet Russia. Gone are the denunciations of geopolitics as a pseudo-science, nothing more than a heinous capitalist ideological device to promote both militarism and chauvinism among the masses... Both the term itself and the basic concept of geopolitics have been fully returned to the public domain, refurbished with a rush, together with the restoration to prominence of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Halford Mackinder, Karl Haushofer himself, coupled with the contributions of more recent practitioners including those prominent during the days of the Cold War.⁶⁴⁸

⁶⁴⁵ Kagan 2008: 16.

⁶⁴⁶ O'Tauthail 1996: 141.

⁶⁴⁷ Gray & Sloan 1999: 9.

⁶⁴⁸ Erickson 1999: 242-3; also Coones 2005: 79-80.

Since the 1990s, the geopolitical school of *Neoeurasianism* became one of the dominant.⁶⁴⁹ A fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council and Director of the Council's "Eurasia Program," Ilan Berman, observes: "The doctrine of Eurasianism, long relegated to obscurity, has returned with a vengeance, drawing a growing number of adherents to its call for a Russian revival."⁶⁵⁰ The geopolitics rose to the level of mainstream ideology:

The growing emphasis on geopolitics from all corners of the political spectrum elevates Neoeurasianism to the *level of a mainstream ideology*. Hence, when Russian geopolitics is concerned of the 'expansion of NATO', the 'Islamic threat' and 'Russian security', they speak about the future rebirth of an again Greater Russia, poised as the 'Russian idea' by those indorsing the Eurasianist approach in the Russian foreign policy praxis.⁶⁵¹

In his official speeches, Russian President Vladimir Putin traditionally defines Russia as a Eurasian country and in even more radical Neoeurasianist tone significantly states, "Russia is the very center of Eurasia." Putin elevated geopolitics above ideology: Geopolitical rivalries could not end with the fall of Communism, "because, it appears, there are geopolitical interests not related to any ideology... Our partners must also understand that such country as Russia has, and cannot not have, its own geopolitical interests..."⁶⁵² Many

⁶⁴⁹ Matti 1999; Дугин 1997b: 9-10, 1999a: 25; 2004: 439.

⁶⁵⁰ Berman 2002, also Berman 2001; Yasmann 2001; Sangtu 2004; Zapolskis 2007.

⁶⁵¹ Marketos 2007: esnp.

⁶⁵² Путин 2015: esnp.

of the Russian political elite followed suit in their geopolitical orientation.⁶⁵³

One of the main themes of the Russian geopolitics is combination of Eurasian alliances which would counter-balance the United States. The most successful attempt to establish such relation with another great Eurasian power has been the *strategic partnership* with China. At the dawn of this partnership, the leading Cold War Historian, John Lewis Gaddis, wrote: Classical balance-of-power theory tells us that Russia and China must ally.⁶⁵⁴ The same thought expressed other pundits: "On the surface, it would make sense for China and Russia to marry their fortunes together. An alliance would create exactly the type of Eurasian force that US policy is designed to thwart."⁶⁵⁵ "Washington should pay attention to the strengthening ties between Moscow and Beijing" and "do everything possible to prevent the emergence of a new Eurasian anti-American axis."⁶⁵⁶ For Charles Krauthammer, who announced the "unipolar moment"⁶⁵⁷ and extended it beyond most prognoses,⁶⁵⁸ the Sino-Russian "enhanced partnership marks the first emergence of a global coalition against American hegemony since the fall of the Berlin Wall."⁶⁵⁹

Leading offensive realist, John Mearsheimer, in his much-debated *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* presumed that Russia and China have the "wherewithal to stand up to

⁶⁵³ Berman 2002.

⁶⁵⁴ Gaddis 1998: 147.

⁶⁵⁵ Shapiro 2016: 1; also Kagan 2008: 86-87.

⁶⁵⁶ Ariel Cohen 2013: esnp.

⁶⁵⁷ Krauthammer 1990.

⁶⁵⁸ Idem, 2003.

⁶⁵⁹ Idem, 2014: 1.

the United States.”⁶⁶⁰ His later article, entitled "China's Unpeaceful Rise"⁶⁶¹ is precluded: "International politics is a nasty and dangerous business, and no amount of good will can ameliorate the intense security competition when aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia." The bottom line repeats the sentence, adding: "That is the tragedy of great power politics."⁶⁶²

The year Mearsheimer announced "China's Unpeaceful Rise," prominent Cold War security expert, Colin Gray, warned: In the 2020s, "China, possibly in alliance with Russia, will be an active global rival to the United States. We will see the return of balance of power politics. Of course, they never really died, they were merely resting."⁶⁶³ Gerald Walpin compared the Sino-Russian "Axis to the Hitler-Japan Axis that came close to defeating democracies, including [the] United States, and resulted in 50 million deaths throughout the world. The only significant difference is that this new Axis has nuclear weapons."⁶⁶⁴ Mark Levine foresees a Sino-Russian military alliance against the United States that may lead to war.⁶⁶⁵

Back in 1907, Henry Adams had imagined the huge bulk of Russia combining with that of China to constitute a "single mass which no amount of new force could henceforward deflect."⁶⁶⁶ A century later, it appeared that the two are indeed "combining" into a "single mass." Russia

⁶⁶⁰ Mearsheimer 2001: 258.

⁶⁶¹ Idem, 2006: 160.

⁶⁶² Ibid, 162.

⁶⁶³ Gray 2006: 143-144.

⁶⁶⁴ Cited in Jacques 2014: 1.

⁶⁶⁵ Bolt & Cross 2010: 5.

⁶⁶⁶ Cited in Kern 1983: 254.

rhetorically supports China's policies towards Taiwan and Tibet, while China has refrained from criticizing Russia's policies in Chechnya and among neighboring successor nations of the former Soviet Union. In a similar vein, Beijing values its relationship with Russia in that it provides a counterweight to the United States and the advance of liberalism. In 2006 and 2007, there was near 100% similarity in Chinese and Russian votes in the United Nations Security Council, including vetoes.

For China, cooperation with Russia helps to promote greater multipolarity and multilateralism, lessening US influence. Russian leaders share Chinese elites' discomfort with US power and relative predominance, in particular with the US perceived penchant for military alliances, regime change, democracy promotion, and unilateral diplomatic and military actions.⁶⁶⁷

China and Russia also call for a multipolar world order, in other words, one not dominated by the United States, where the UN Security Council plays a greater role. Thus in a speech in Moscow on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of Sino-Russian Ties, Chinese President Hu Jintao lauded both countries for their “unremitting efforts in facilitating world multipolarization and democratization of international relations.”⁶⁶⁸ The expression “democratization of international relations” became popularized in these two countries. It alludes that the United States – the champion of democracy – does not jealously follow on the international

⁶⁶⁷ Chaka Ferguson 2011: 73.

⁶⁶⁸ Bolt & Cross 2010: 7-8.

arena those democratic principles which it so ardently preaches. In 2014, Putin said that Russia needs to replace the US “power vertical” with a “democratic multipolarity.”⁶⁶⁹

Analysis in Depth

From the above overview, in the words of Ellsworth Huntington, the pulse of Eurasia is still beating. A diametrically opposite reality however appears from a deeper analysis. The strategic partnership between China and Russia does not evolve into military alliance and is sharply distinct from the 1950 Sino-Soviet military alliance:

A final way of emphasizing the limits of the current relationship that Russia and China have entered into is to present a brief, two-point comparison between the Sino-Soviet *Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance* of February 14, 1950, and the contemporary Russian-Chinese strategic partnership. The treaty was a military pact that obligated Moscow and Beijing to cooperate in resisting aggression on the part of Japan or any country collaborating with Japan, meaning the United States. It became the basis for all-around Sino-Soviet military cooperation including the assignment of thousands of Soviet advisers to Chinese military units, large-scale transfer of advanced Soviet military technology to the People’s Liberation Army... the training of Chinese officers in Soviet military academies,

⁶⁶⁹ Cited in Forsberg & Herd 2015: 43.

and the deployment of Soviet pilots and aircraft in support of Chinese involvement in the Korean War. The Russian-Chinese strategic partnership contains *no binding commitments to joint action*. It merely proclaims a commonality of outlook with respect to global politics and certain regional issues.⁶⁷⁰

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in a letter to President Dwight Eisenhower in September 7, 1958, stated: “An attack upon ... China ... is an attack upon the Soviet Union.” A couple of weeks later, he threatened to use nuclear weapons against any country which employed nuclear weapons against China.⁶⁷¹ Nothing approaching this entanglement is present in the current Sino-Russian relations: “At any rate, their ‘strategic partnership’ fails to translate into anything tangible, let alone into an alliance.”⁶⁷² “This is not a balancing alliance; it cannot fairly even be called balance at all.”⁶⁷³ Many reject the Russo-Chinese alignment as a false partnership and “empty words, substance-less jargon carefully hidden behind the veil of official statements ... Those that talk of Russia and China establishing a NATO of the East or Eurasian bloc miss the point.”⁶⁷⁴

Such Russian analysts and policymakers as Chairman of the Duma Committee on Defense, Roman Popkovich, and Chairman of the Duma Committee on Geopolitics, A. V. Mitrofanov, suggested establishing a genuine military alliance

⁶⁷⁰ Last emphasis added, Levine 2001: esnp.

⁶⁷¹ Brodie 1959: 256.

⁶⁷² Joffe 2002: 164.

⁶⁷³ Mowle & Sacko 2007: 74; also Brooks & Wohlforth 2008: 43.

⁶⁷⁴ Wilkins 2008: 374, 378.

with China. These suggestions have been consistently dismissed by representatives of both Governments. Neither Chinese nor Russian officials, nor experts on their foreign policies, describe the partnership in such terms.⁶⁷⁵ Chinese representatives repeatedly affirm that “three noes” govern their policy toward Russia: “no alliances, no oppositions and no targets against a third country.”⁶⁷⁶ China pursues self-reliant defense strategy that requires the country not to form alliances with any countries or groups of countries in the world, not to participate in any military groups, to self-reliantly make decisions and strategies, and to depend mainly on itself to develop the defense industry.⁶⁷⁷

Along Russia, China established “strategic partnership” with the European Union too. These partnerships do not amount to building an anti-US coalition to balance against US power.⁶⁷⁸ They lack the key component of military alliance stating that an attack on one would be considered an attack on the other. This marks sharp difference with all US alliances and many partnerships. Article 5 of NATO states that an attack on one would be considered an attack on all. Paul Nitze had stated for the whole of the US global network of alliances at its dawn: “An attack on one ally must be considered an attack on all.”⁶⁷⁹ Not every US alliance was formulized in reciprocal terms. The alliance with Japan, for example, does not oblige Japan to defend the United States. But in every case, the commitment of the United States to defend its ally or partner is “ironclad,” as US defense officials

⁶⁷⁵ Brooks & Wohlforth 2008: 43.

⁶⁷⁶ Cited in Weitz 2003: 53.

⁶⁷⁷ Zhang 2002: 84.

⁶⁷⁸ Madeiros 2009: 87.

⁶⁷⁹ Nitze 1956: 196.

repeatedly emphasize.⁶⁸⁰ The absence of such commitment in the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership, as well as other partnerships which exclude the United States, sincerely implies: whoever wishes to attack our partner, attack and enjoy.

The very term *strategic partnership* is quite ambiguous. Not every policy-maker, when asked, has a clear explanation. Few studies of strategic partnerships have explicitly defined what they analyze.⁶⁸¹ With all its military connotation, “strategic” just means multi-dimensional and long-range.⁶⁸² In practice, strategic partnership is expressed by joint military exercises and economic relations. “Strategic partnership” are thus “strategic” only in name. “A historical overview of documents and debates shows the total absence of strategic rationale behind the elaboration of strategic partnerships since the very beginning with no definition of the concept or of its fundamental objectives, and an ad hoc selection of partners.” This “a-strategic” thinking led to repeating failures to turn rhetoric into “policies of strategic value.”⁶⁸³ To completely complicate the picture, the Chinese use the same phrase “strategic partnership” to characterize their ties with the United States and Japan.⁶⁸⁴

The two-decades-long improvement in Russian-Chinese relations has yet to evolve into an anti-American bloc—and it probably won’t. Although both Governments denounce “hegemonism” and aspire to multipolarity, their opposition to the unipolar power on specific cases has been

⁶⁸⁰ NSSUS 2015: 25.

⁶⁸¹ Wilkins 2008: 359.

⁶⁸² Madeiros 2009: 82.

⁶⁸³ Renard 2011: IV.

⁶⁸⁴ Weitz 2003: 52.

largely uncoordinated and rhetorical. Rajan Menon summarized the Sino-Russian relations for the period 1948-2008: The "only visible pattern to the relationship between Moscow and Beijing over the past six decades is that there is no pattern." There "is no evidence that Russia and China want to transform their strategic partnership into an alliance in the strict sense of the term, and much [evidence] to suggest that they do not."⁶⁸⁵ The seventh decade passed by now, many events happened, but Menon's observation holds.

Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth conclude on "strategic partnerships" and "special relationships" between major Eurasian powers: "Yet a close look at any of these arrangements reveals their rhetorical as opposed to substantive character. Real balancing involves real economic and political costs, which neither Russia, nor China, nor indeed any other major power has shown any willingness to bear."⁶⁸⁶ At no point did the partnership between Russia and China entail any costly commitment or policy coordination against Washington that might have risked a genuine confrontation. No power, great or small, entangles itself in military alliance against the United States:

The other great powers have not attempted to constrain the United States by allying together. No counterhegemonic coalition has taken shape, and none is on the horizon ... No major power has exhibited any propensity to use military capabilities directly to contain the US

⁶⁸⁵ Rajan Menon 2009: 99, 110-111, 125.

⁶⁸⁶ Brooks & Wohlforth 2002, 27.

power. This is not the pattern of evidence balance-of-power theory predicts.⁶⁸⁷

Balancing by alliance in International Relations represents *external balancing*. Besides external, there can be *internal balancing*—by armament. In this case, the development is even more modest. With all its economic growth and increase in defense expenditure, China hardly progresses with its nuclear armament. In 2009, estimates of China’s arsenal of deployed nuclear warheads ranged from 121 to 160.⁶⁸⁸ By 2011, China’s arsenal grew to 240 nuclear warheads.⁶⁸⁹ In 2014, US intelligence agencies estimated that China has some 240 to 300 strategic nuclear warheads.⁶⁹⁰ In 2016, US intelligence settled for approximately 260 warheads.⁶⁹¹ Thus Chinese nuclear arsenal falls short even of Charles de Gaulle’s *force de frappe*.

The progress in the Chinese delivery means is even slower. According to the US Air Force 2009 intelligence study, China’s “future ICBMs probably will include some with multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles, and the number of ICBM capable of reaching the United States could expand to well over 100 within the next 15 years.”⁶⁹² In 2011, China was estimated to possess 135 ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States or its allies.⁶⁹³ As of 2013, US Intelligence estimated the Chinese active ICBM arsenal to range between 50 and 75 land and sea based missiles capable

⁶⁸⁷ Brooks & Wohlforth 2008: 23-24.

⁶⁸⁸ Fravel & Medeiros 2010: 81.

⁶⁸⁹ Giacometti 2015: 1; Swaine et al 2013: 59.

⁶⁹⁰ Gertz 2014: esnp.

⁶⁹¹ Kristensen & Norris 2015: 77; Kristensen & Norris 2016: esnp.

⁶⁹² Cited in Fravel & Medeiros 2010: 81.

⁶⁹³ Giacometti 2015: 1.

of reaching the continental United States and was expected to have about 100 such ICBMs by 2025.⁶⁹⁴ In 2016, China's nuclear inter-continental arsenal was estimated to consist of approximately 75-100 ICBMs.⁶⁹⁵ These numbers however are said to be exaggerated by US intelligence.⁶⁹⁶ US intelligence exaggerations are traditional:

During our examination of the many unclassified and declassified US government documents referenced in this report, we were struck by how exaggerated and often self-contradictory US predictions of Chinese nuclear weapons and delivery systems have been throughout the decades. Estimates about the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal were grossly overstated, sometimes by several hundred percent, and timelines for when new systems would come on line were almost always too much too soon.⁶⁹⁷

As of 2017, United States possesses ten times more land- and sea-based missiles most with multiple warheads that can reach China. Furthermore, Dongfeng-5 are vulnerable to a first strike because they are based in fixed silos, and had particularly extensive and dangerous fueling requirements.⁶⁹⁸ Due to their vulnerability, missile silos were called “missile

⁶⁹⁴ DoD 2013 China Report; Swaine et al 2013: 59; Kristensen & Norris 2015: 81; Office of the Secretary of Defense 2015: 32.

⁶⁹⁵ Office of the Secretary of Defense 2016: 58; Office of the Secretary of Defense 2016: 25.

⁶⁹⁶ Giacometti 2015: 1.

⁶⁹⁷ Kristensen & Norris & McKenzie 2006: 3-4.

⁶⁹⁸ Fravel & Medeiros 2010: 54.

tombs.”⁶⁹⁹ Launch-on-warning was dismissed by China because of its inability to build a reliable early warning system.

ICBMs represent one leg of nuclear triad, the other two being long-range bombers and submarines. “The other two legs of China’s triad are even weaker than its land-based missiles.”⁷⁰⁰ It was observed in 2006: China’s sole nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) has never gone on patrol. As a result, the crews of the new Jin-class (Type 094) SSBNs currently under construction will need to start almost from scratch to develop the operational and tactical skills and procedures that are essential if a sea-based deterrent is to be militarily effective and matter strategically. In comparison, US SSBNs have conducted more than 3,600 deterrent patrols over the past 55 years. In 2005, the United States conducted 44 patrols, more than four times the number of SSBN patrols conducted by all other nuclear weapon states combined. China may be able to build two or three new SSBNs over the next decade, but they would be highly vulnerable to US anti-submarine forces; the US Navy has 14 SSBNs and has moved the majority of them into the Pacific, where they operate with impunity.⁷⁰¹

By 2010, China was still building five Jin-class SSBNs, which would be armed with 10 to 12 JL-2 SLBMs.⁷⁰² By 2015, Jin submarines carrying SLBM capable of reaching the continental United States were not yet operational, with

⁶⁹⁹ Lewis & Di 1992: 24.

⁷⁰⁰ Fravel & Medeiros 2010: 54.

⁷⁰¹ Kristensen & Norris & McKenzie 2006: 2-3.

⁷⁰² Fravel & Medeiros 2010: 82.

four commissioned and another under construction.⁷⁰³ 2016 Report still states “four commissioned and another under construction.”⁷⁰⁴ “Office of the Secretary of Defense” of 2016 contradicts itself: China made four submarines “operational”⁷⁰⁵ but a few pages below⁷⁰⁶ these submarines are still “commissioned.”

It was observed in 1992: The SLBM system “proceeded so slowly that the JL-1 designers did not feel an immediate or compelling urgency in comparison to the Dongfeng-5 crash effort.”⁷⁰⁷ Everything is relative. In comparison to the SLBM, the progress of Dongfeng-5 described above was “crash effort.” As of 2017, the pace has not accelerated.

The Chinese Navy has one aircraft carrier—*Liaoning*. Originally Soviet *Varyag*, it was inherited by Ukraine after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and in 1998 sold to China. The technology employed is a generation behind that of Western navies. By the time of the purchase, Western analysts noted that *Varyag* had deteriorated too much to be used as an operational warship and will probably be used as tourist attraction, as were Soviet carriers *Kiev* and *Minsk*.⁷⁰⁸

The third leg of the nuclear triad—long range bombers—is yet less mature. The only long-range bomber aircraft in the Chinese Air Force is the H-6 bomber, a Cold

⁷⁰³ Office of the Secretary of Defense 2015: 32; Kristensen & Norris 2015: 77, 81.

⁷⁰⁴ Office of the Secretary of Defense 2016: 58; Rinehart 2016: 14.

⁷⁰⁵ Office of the Secretary of Defense 2016: 26.

⁷⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 38.

⁷⁰⁷ Lewis & Di 1992: 26-27.

⁷⁰⁸ Storey & Ji 2004: esnp.

War-era model that has received limited upgrades.⁷⁰⁹ With its combat radius of 3,500 kilometers (2,200 mi), these bombers can reach targets only in the Russian Far East or Japan.⁷¹⁰ Presently, Chinese intercontinental bombers exist only in perspective: "China might eventually develop a nuclear bomber capability."⁷¹¹ In the early Cold War, US strategists supposed one-way suicide missions by Soviet bombers, as those bombers lacked sufficient range to return home. From the Chinese H-6 bombers US strategists can only expect a halfway suicide mission.

Since its first nuclear test in 1964, China's development of its nuclear strategy and force structure "presents a puzzle for scholars and policymakers alike. Having developed nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities, "China built a small, unsophisticated, and, arguably, highly vulnerable nuclear force ... In retrospect, the degree of vulnerability that China was willing to accept after developing nuclear weapons is striking."⁷¹²

Despite the development of US ballistic missile defenses, the Chinese, as well as the Russian, force modernization is dominated by preference of quality over quantity. The same is true for changes in the composition of China's and Russia's nuclear forces.⁷¹³ The traditional Chinese strategy is described as "minimum deterrence" or "assured retaliation," as distinguished from "assured destruction." China, in case attacked, aims only to retaliate

⁷⁰⁹ Rinehart 2016: 13.

⁷¹⁰ Fravel & Medeiros 2010: 54.

⁷¹¹ Office of the Secretary of Defense 2016: 38.

⁷¹² Fravel & Medeiros 2010: 48, 53.

⁷¹³ Evans 2011: 112.

rather than destroy the attacker.⁷¹⁴ China remains deadly stuck on this strategy: “Despite major changes in China’s external security environment, economic resources and technological capabilities, its approach to nuclear strategy and force structure has been relatively consistent since the 1960s.”⁷¹⁵ As China’s economic growth accelerated and defense spending grew since the 1990s, no major shifts occurred in the content of nuclear strategy or force structure. “Instead, continuity with past thinking and force planning has been much greater than divergence from them.”⁷¹⁶

As of 2017, the US arsenal of warheads is twenty-five times larger than China’s. A similar proportion exists when comparing numbers and types of delivery systems, as the United States has roughly twenty to thirty times the number of ICBM launchers, many of them deployed with multiple warheads. Even greater disparities exist between China and the United States regarding bombers and SSBNs (nuclear-powered ballistic submarines). China “lags far behind the United States in all standard measures of power save population.”⁷¹⁷

China’s military spending is still less than one-third that of what the United States spends on defense. Russia’s current defense budget is even smaller. Russia’s potential defense budget, as defined by GDP, leaves Russia only superpower nostalgia. As of 2016, according to International Monetary Fund, the Russian nominal GDP is 14.5 times smaller than that of the United States and lags behind South

⁷¹⁴ Fravel & Medeiros 2010: 50-51, 79.

⁷¹⁵ Ibid, 2010: 52.

⁷¹⁶ Ibid, 75.

⁷¹⁷ Rajan Menon 2009: 110.

Korea. As of 2016, the Russian military spending is 9 times below the US spending and barely surpasses the expenditure Saudi Arabia.⁷¹⁸ Not accidentally, President Vladimir Putin insisted that Russia would not allow itself to be drawn into a new round of arms race.⁷¹⁹ Both Russia and China have no illusion that they can create an effective counterweight to the United States and its allies and bring about a multipolar world even in tandem.⁷²⁰ This partly explains their half-hearted attempts at *external balancing* short of transforming their strategic partnership into an alliance in the strict sense of the term.⁷²¹

All expectations of security competition between Russia / China and the United States are outright denied by the simple numbers of either GDP balance or military balance. Putin insisted that Russia would not allow itself to be drawn into a new round of arms race.⁷²² The Chinese traditionally assure that they would never be provoked into such race. “Neither probably wants to kick off a new Cold War, let alone hot conflicts...”⁷²³ There is little chance of China’s sudden build-up or “sprint to parity.”⁷²⁴ Russia inherited Soviet nuclear arsenal but China’s vulnerability remains shocking:

A small percentage of the US arsenal could be targeted against all Chinese strategic nuclear systems, Command and Control ... sites and major conventional military assets. Although

⁷¹⁸ *Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2016: 2.*

⁷¹⁹ Putin 2014a.

⁷²⁰ Roy 2003: 59.

⁷²¹ Rajan Menon 2009: 110-111, 125.

⁷²² Putin 2014a.

⁷²³ Gelb & Simes 2013: 1.

⁷²⁴ Swaine et al 2013: 59.

not thought to be part of the current US war plans, an even smaller percentage of the US strategic nuclear arsenal could be targeted against Chinese cities to cause massive civilian and industrial damage.⁷²⁵

Chinese strategists are aware that the US ability to locate and target China's nuclear forces, possible conventional strike and missile defenses could substantially hold at risk, if not eliminate, China's nuclear arsenal, leaving it open to coercion by the United States.⁷²⁶ They "know for sure that in the US perception, China is a nuclear target, and Taiwan is a scenario in which nuclear weapons are to be used."⁷²⁷ "Yet, to date, China's response has not been to alter radically its nuclear doctrine or force structure."⁷²⁸ Its nuclear bomber forces is unsheltered.⁷²⁹ Well-known Mao's denigration of nuclear weapons as "paper tigers" remains in force. Only people and not weapons, he assured, enable countries to win wars.⁷³⁰ No evidence exists for pursuing nuclear war fighting in case deterrence fails. And if it fails, the Chinese would have for the "assured retaliation" hardly more than the traditional "millet plus rifles," as Marshall Nie Rongzhen put it.⁷³¹

Expert of the Far Eastern Policy, Joseph Nye, advised to be patient: "It took 70 years from the time America became the world's foremost economic power to fully project its

⁷²⁵ Kristensen & Norris & McKenzie 2006: 173.

⁷²⁶ Fravel & Medeiros 2010: 86.

⁷²⁷ Yunzhu 2005: esnp.

⁷²⁸ Fravel & Medeiros 2010: 86.

⁷²⁹ Ibid, 54.

⁷³⁰ Ibid, 56, 61.

⁷³¹ Cited in Lewis & Di 1992: 19.

military strength and become a dominant factor in the global military balance."⁷³² By another analogy however, the Soviets engaged in crash armament race with their GDP twice smaller than that of the United States. Presently, the GDP gap between China and the United States is shorter. Nevertheless China clearly has not opted for Soviet-style geo-strategic competition with the United States. It has not thus far, and almost certainly will never, amass thousands of nuclear warheads on hair-trigger alert or deploy significant forces to a network of bases spanning the globe.⁷³³ As for external balancing, the contrast with the Soviet Union is striking too. China's attempts to construct anti-US alliances or undermine US alliances globally or regionally are nowhere near the degree to which the Soviets competed with the United States during the Cold War.

In 1988, Nye supposed 70-year span for the Chinese to assert themselves.⁷³⁴ With 22 out of 70 years passed, Nye observed: "Some have argued that China aims to challenge the United States' position in East Asia and, eventually, the world." But "it is doubtful that China will have the military capability to make this possible anytime soon."⁷³⁵ The Chinese challenge to the United States clearly associates with horizon—it does not get any closer. Even after full Nye's span of 70 years, we probably still would see US Fleet passing between Taiwan and China but no Chinese one between Cuba and Florida.

⁷³² Nye 1988: 119.

⁷³³ Erickson & Goldstein 2006: 955.

⁷³⁴ Nye 1988: 119.

⁷³⁵ *Idem*, 2010: esnp.

In any war in the East, America would preclude a one-sided outcome, concludes Zbigniew Brzezinski. The awareness of this "may in part be the reason why the military budgets of the Asian countries are relatively low in relation to their respective GDPs." China spends 2%, India 3% and Japan 1%; the United States 4.6%. This modest spending and nuclear arsenals suggest that neither country is "seriously contemplating the possibility of a decisive resolution by the use of force to their existing or potential differences..."⁷³⁶ US Secretary of State, John Kerry, remarked in 2013 that in Asia the United States has a lot more forward deployed forces than any other nation in the world, including China.⁷³⁷

The fact that Beijing is not accumulating a survivable nuclear capacity and is pursuing stable and non-confrontational relations with Washington suggests that real balancing is not underway. The history of China's strategic programs demonstrates their limits and lack of ambition. In the Chinese mind, these programs can only be linked to the fate of remaining on the international system as hopelessly inferior.

Already after the first post-Cold War decade, some Chinese analysts noted that, instead of multipolarization, the US "comprehensive national power" had surged. Yao Youzhi, Head of the Department of Strategic Research in the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences (the most important research arm of the People's Liberation Army) wrote that the United States "has controlled and incorporated Europe and Japan, and suppressed and contained Russia and China." Yao's colleague at the same academy, Hong Bing, concurred by

⁷³⁶ Brzezinski 2012: 160.

⁷³⁷ Green & Cooper 2014: 29.

acknowledging the vast disparity between the United States and other "weak poles," some of which have joined the US strong pole. Chinese analysts concluded that the "forces on the international arena were out of balance, and the process of multipolarization was seriously challenged." China's call for multipolarization sounds increasingly hollow and has become, according to reported Chinese leaders' own private concession, "out of touch with reality."⁷³⁸

Although out of touch, calls for multipolarization continued. "Joint Declaration by Russia and China" in 2008 proclaimed and "China's National Defense in 2010" repeated: The "trend toward a multipolar world is irreversible." "China's National Defense" (2008) proclaimed: Trends of "world-multipolarization are gaining momentum ... major powers continue to compete and hold each other in check, and groups of new emerging developing power are arising. Therefore, a profound readjustment is brewing in the international system." China's *People's Daily* announced in 2009: A "new phase of multipolar world power structure will come into being in 2009, and the international order will be correspondingly reshuffled."⁷³⁹

Amidst the above verbal proclamations, the United States "brewed" a profound Asia-Pacific "readjustment" to hold China in check. The Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific went into force. A group of other Asia-Pacific powers joined the effort. The "unipolar moment" gained another momentum.

Christopher Layne, who stood watch for the multipolar world since the end of the Cold War, celebrated in

⁷³⁸ Deng 2001: 347.

⁷³⁹ Cited in Scott 2013: 37-38.

2010: The epoch of American dominance is drawing to a close, and international politics is entering a period of transition from unipolar into multipolar.⁷⁴⁰ Layne interpreted President Barack Obama's November 2009 trip to China as both substantive and emblematic evidence of the shift. He cited the *Financial Times*:

Coming at a moment when Chinese prestige is growing and the US is facing enormous difficulties, Mr. Obama's trip has symbolized the advent of a more multipolar world where US leadership has to co-exist with several rising powers, most notably China.⁷⁴¹

Layne consistently criticizes US foreign policy for its hopeless in his view pursuit of preponderance since 1945 instead of what he calls "offshore balancing." He recalled in this context: As "my graduate school mentor, Kenneth Waltz, ...used to tell us about American foreign policy, 'When you are big, strong, and powerful, you can afford to make the same dumb mistakes over and over again. But when your power declines, you begin to pay a price for repeating your mistakes.'"⁷⁴² Within a year, the United States began, in the Waltz & Layne concept, a "re-dumb" to the Asia-Pacific, and once again successfully.

President Barak Obama proclaimed himself the US "first Pacific President."⁷⁴³ As US "Atlantic" Presidents had been since 1945, the "first Pacific President" was met with enthusiasm in the relevant region, as well as in the United

⁷⁴⁰ Layne 2010: esnp.

⁷⁴¹ Cited in Ibid.

⁷⁴² Ibid.

⁷⁴³ Stelzenmueller 2010: 13.

States. In 2014, the Center for Strategic and International studies polled strategic elites in the United States and the Asia-Pacific region except the Russian and North Korean. Only in China the majority of the strategic elite (77%) opposed. Thailand was the least supportive (54%). Other strategic elites overwhelmingly supported—98% in the Philippines; 96% in the United States and Singapore, and 92% in Japan. On average, including the Chinese, 79% supported the US Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific.⁷⁴⁴ According to the Chinese view, "demand by US allies and partners for an increased US security commitment to the region played an important role in shaping the rebalance."⁷⁴⁵

During a tour through Asia in 1997, a group of Chinese diplomatic and military officials called for the abrogation of all international alliances, declaring them unnecessary vestiges of the Cold War. According to their reasoning, alliances that were forged against the Soviet the Cold War were no longer necessary because the USSR had ceased to exist and the Cold War had ended. The attempt failed:

Beijing's calls fell on deaf ears both regionally and internationally. In fact a number of Asian governments privately but sternly told Beijing that such calls were unwelcome and that they had no intention of severing their alliances with the United States. The response officials off guard, as they apparently had not expected other countries to assertively defend their

⁷⁴⁴ Berteau & Green & Cooper 2014: 19, 26-27.

⁷⁴⁵ Saunders 2014: 38.

security ties with the United States. Within a year Beijing had cooled its public rhetoric.⁷⁴⁶

In 2011, expert on alliances, Stephen Walt, warned that China would try again to convince Asian neighbors to abandon military alliances with America.⁷⁴⁷ Just the same year, those states unanimously joined America in the Rebalance. In fact a few pages below, Walt noted: "The good news is that China's rising status is already ringing alarm bells in Asia."⁷⁴⁸

No state has formally allied with China. Russia formed the only military alliance in the post-Cold War period that excludes the United States—the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), presently counting Russia and four former Soviet Republics. US Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work noted: "The thing you see right now is that Russia and China are not accumulating allies."⁷⁴⁹ By contrast, the accumulation of allies by the United States is extraordinary. Former US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stressed after the end of the Cold War:

America's strategic position is stronger than it has been for decades. Today, there is no challenger to peaceful democratic order similar to that posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. There are no significant hostile alliances. To the contrary, the strongest and most capable countries in the world remain

⁷⁴⁶ Shambaugh 2004/5: 70.

⁷⁴⁷ Walt 2011: 9.

⁷⁴⁸ Walt 2011: 14.

⁷⁴⁹ Cited in Pellerin 2015: 1.

our friends ... We have won great depth for our strategic position.⁷⁵⁰

Cheney's successor, present US Secretary of Defense James Mattis remarked that in his long military career, he never fought in an all-American formation. "I've always fought alongside coalition partners." He added that nations with allies thrive and those without allies decline.⁷⁵¹

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2014) stresses NATO's accumulation of force potential, acquirement of global functions and the approach of its military infrastructure towards the Russian borders including by means of NATO expansion. The Chinese can state the same regarding US Asia-Pacific alliances and partnerships. Russia and China are simultaneously pressed by the "Atlantic Resolve" and the "Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific." Despite all, Russia and China do not create an anti-US or anti-NATO alliance. Their fitfully improving relationship has not presented, and is not expected to present, a major policy challenge to the United States or its allies.

While NATO stretched its defense perimeter from the Baltic to Black Seas, five bilateral US alliances and several more defense partnership formed a half-ring around China. From the position of strength, the United States, Japan, India, Australia and others can engage China, while hedging against the possibility of aggressive behavior as China's power grows.⁷⁵² Roughly 50/50% split between the Atlantic and the Pacific, US Navy and Air Force rebalanced towards Asia to a

⁷⁵⁰ Cheney 1993: 8.

⁷⁵¹ Cited in Pellerin 2017a: 1

⁷⁵² Nye 2010: esnp.

60/40 orientation.⁷⁵³ Not impressed by Chinese and Russian repeating announcement of the imminent multipolarity, 57% of the Chinese strategic experts expressed the view that, for the next ten years at least (beginning in 2014), Asia will see a US-led order.⁷⁵⁴

In Russia's perception, it was supposed, a positive consequence of the American pivot to the Far East is that Russia would have an expanded capacity to maneuver in Europe and perhaps more leverage in regions such as the Caucasus and Ukraine. The Russians anticipated having more say in the Europeans proceedings.⁷⁵⁵ Some experts supposed that the Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific could alter the transatlantic solidarity while Russia's resurgent power in the former Soviet space could result in a sustainable *modus vivendi* between the Europeans and Russia and "a structural drift" between Europe and the United States.⁷⁵⁶ On the other hand the Obama administration insisted: "Our relationship with our European allies remains the cornerstone for US engagement with the world, and a catalyst for international action."⁷⁵⁷ The Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific does not mean abandoning Europe.⁷⁵⁸

The situation was clarified the following year, when Russia conquered Crimea. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen reacted on what he called Putin's "land grab" in Ukraine:

⁷⁵³ Mayborn 2014: 81.

⁷⁵⁴ Berteau & Green & Cooper 2014: 36.

⁷⁵⁵ Herrly & Meijer 2013: 15.

⁷⁵⁶ Tocci & Alcaro 2012: 18.

⁷⁵⁷ *National Security Strategy* 2010, 41.

⁷⁵⁸ Keohane 2013: 3.

What we see in Crimea is a threat to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area ... The pledge to defend each other - Article 5 of our founding treaty - remains the bedrock of NATO. It is the basis for everything we do ... The crisis in Ukraine is the most pressing security challenge right now, also because it goes to the heart of what NATO is about.⁷⁵⁹

Rasmussen called for a greater defense industrial cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic.⁷⁶⁰ Operation *Atlantic Resolve* resulted. US National Security Strategy 2015 assured: America rebalances to the Asia-Pacific, while in "Europe, we remain steadfast in our commitment to our NATO allies."⁷⁶¹ Many NATO members have reversed the downward trend and have increased defense expenditures. "After many years with steep cuts in defense spending, we have turned a corner," the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said. "Today, I can present to you new, updated figures for 2016. Defense spending in real terms has increased by 3.8% among European allies..."⁷⁶² In the course of the Atlantic Resolve, US military equipment, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and artillery, arrived to East European states, from Estonia to Bulgaria.⁷⁶³ As of 2017, "NATO is enhancing its forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance... demonstrating the strength of the transatlantic bond."⁷⁶⁴

⁷⁵⁹ NATO Wales Summit Declaration 2014.

⁷⁶⁰ Ibid, 3.

⁷⁶¹ NSSUS 2015: 9.

⁷⁶² Garamone 2017: 1.

⁷⁶³ Ferdinando 2016: 1.

⁷⁶⁴ NATO 2017: 1.

NATO battlegroups' "presence makes clear that an attack on one Ally will be considered an attack on the whole Alliance."⁷⁶⁵ In addition, as US Secretary of Defense James Mattis put it in the 2017 NATO summit, they ensure that NATO "diplomats negotiate from a position of strength. We are not willing ... let Russia, through its actions, speak louder than anyone in this room."⁷⁶⁶

If Putin wished to consolidate the transatlantic relations, he could not do it better. Contemplating the Atlantic Resolve, Putin acknowledged: "The crisis in eastern Ukraine, which has been provoked by the West, is mainly used to resuscitate NATO."⁷⁶⁷ Naturally, the *Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation* from December 2014 elevated NATO to the first place among Russia's "main external military dangers."⁷⁶⁸

Did Putin break the hegemonic world order? Definitely. One of the foundations of any hegemony is the prohibition of territorial conquests. Hegemonic systems are characterized by territorial stability.⁷⁶⁹ In our world, the territorial status quo is guarded by international law and traditionally backed by the hegemonic power. NATO 2014 Declaration defined the violation of Ukraine sovereignty and territorial integrity as "a serious breach in international law." It declared:

This violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity is a serious breach of

⁷⁶⁵ NATO 2017: 1.

⁷⁶⁶ Cited in Idem, 2017: 1.

⁷⁶⁷ Putin 2014a.

⁷⁶⁸ *Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation* 2014: 5.

⁷⁶⁹ Ostrovsky 2006: 227-228.

international law and a major challenge to Euro-Atlantic security ... and internationally recognized borders... Russia's disregard for international law, including the UN Charter ... threatens the rules-based international order and challenges Euro-Atlantic security.⁷⁷⁰

But there was a serious complication—96% of the Crimeans voted for being conquered. In such case, to restore the status quo it is necessary to fight both the conquering power and the conquered local population. This reminds the US experience in Vietnam when it appeared that South Vietnam did not mind being ruled by Communist North Vietnam.

Russia's conquest of Crimea is another case of “empire by invitation.” However in the long-range contest of “invitations,” as in armament race, Russia cannot compete with the United States. In the past decade, Russia was invited to Abkhazia, Ossetia, Transnistria, Crimea, Donbas and Syria; the United States remains invited all over the developed world and much of developing world.

To be global “empire by invitation,” a power needs to sustain global network of bases and stand to other costly commitments. More than two-thirds of 192 sovereign nations in the world receive US security funds.⁷⁷¹ The “big brother,” Putin revealed his jealousy, is spending billions of dollars on keeping the whole world, including its own closest allies, under surveillance.⁷⁷² Russia cannot afford such investment.

⁷⁷⁰ NATO Wales Summit Declaration 2014: 4; Forsberg & Herd 2015: 51.

⁷⁷¹ Harkavy 2005: 16.

⁷⁷² Putin 2014.

Nor can China. Such investment requires both preponderant GDP and GDP per capita well above the world average. Having both, the United States exercises its dominance at incredibly low cost to its economy—some 3.5% of GDP.⁷⁷³

Summary

Alexander Yanov concluded his 1995 *Weimar Russia*: Even if the Russian Fascism “wins temporarily in Moscow, he would not have sufficient resources to seriously threaten the West. He may be cruel and repressive as much as he wishes inside the country but he would not be capable to present a real problem for the national security of the United States.”⁷⁷⁴ Marc Trachtenberg emphasized that German geopolitical considerations since 1945 much differed from those since 1918. Germany was “sandwiched” between the superpowers.⁷⁷⁵ Russian geopolitical considerations since 1991 have even more differed from the Weimar Germany: Russia has been “sandwiched,” more correctly “hot-dogged,” by the only remaining superpower from all sides.

Besides the analogy between the Weimar Germany and the post-Soviet Russia, there is another popular analogy between the present Far East and Europe prior to 1914. In 2000, Aaron Friedberg titled his article by intriguing question, “Will Europe’s Past Be Asia’s Future?” Zbigniew Brzezinski shared the analogy.⁷⁷⁶ The crucial difference however is that today the United States for Russia and China is not what Britain and France were for the Wilhelm, Weimar or Nazi

⁷⁷³ Ignatieff 2003: 53.

⁷⁷⁴ ЯНОВ 1995: 283.

⁷⁷⁵ Trachtenberg 1999: 143-144.

⁷⁷⁶ Brzezinski 2005: 226.

Germany. The United States might fight China to protect Taiwan or Russia to protect the Baltic republics, but these wars would be "more akin to the concerns of imperial powers than to sources of conflict between equal major powers."⁷⁷⁷

The day after China's surprise declaration of air traffic restrictions in the Air Defense Identification Zone of East China Sea, two B-52 bombers flied over the Zone.⁷⁷⁸ Similarly, B-52 bombers conduct a low-level flight over South Korea in response to nuclear tests by North Korea. These overflights close to China and North Korea on occasions of their "reckless behavior" (from the unipolar power's view) are "a demonstration of US resolve" and "a clear message" that the United States "has many military options to defeat any threat."⁷⁷⁹ None of the US overflying aircraft was ever shot down. The unipolar command of the global commons remains undisputed.

The present distribution of power, alliance configuration and military technology leave no room for miscalculation. Whatever the Russian and Chinese leaders are going to do, they are not going to take on the United States. They well know it, better than experts. Consequently neither Russia nor China is "provoked" into arms race and no military alliance entangles them. Russian tanks do not enter Kiev or Tbilisi—a very sharp contrast with the 1956 Budapest and the 1968 Prague. Nor China dares to step on Taiwan. Pax Americana reigns over the Eurasian land mass.

⁷⁷⁷ Jervis 2002: esnp.

⁷⁷⁸ Green et al. 2016: 120.

⁷⁷⁹ White 2017: 1.

Bases and Installations

In Latin America US bases went nearly extinct.⁷⁸⁰ Being US “strategic rear,” as the Soviets called it, Latin America turned into zone of peace with drug traffic rising to the top concern. In the Old World by contrast US bases expanded. After the 1991 Gulf War, the United States expanded a network of air base, port and command and control facilities throughout the Persian Gulf.⁷⁸¹ In 2002, *Monthly Review* wrote:

US military bases were spread over all the continents and the islands in between. Next to the US nuclear monopoly... there was no more universally recognized symbol of the nation’s superpower status than its overseas basing system.⁷⁸²

Following the wars in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, US military presence expanded more dramatically.⁷⁸³ “History is full of turning points like that terrible day [September 11] but no turning-back-points.” The United States must make “globalization truly global.”⁷⁸⁴ Regarding military globalization, the latter obligation was kept. In 2002, US military personnel were working at 13 new locations in nine countries in support of the war on terror.⁷⁸⁵ US bases and security commitments were established in Central Asia—“one of the last areas in the globe without them.”⁷⁸⁶ The US gained

⁷⁸⁰ Harkavy 2005: 16.

⁷⁸¹ Posen 2003: 17.

⁷⁸² *Monthly Review* 2002: esnp.

⁷⁸³ Dufour 2007: esnp.

⁷⁸⁴ Barnett 2003: 154.

⁷⁸⁵ Posen 2003: 17.

⁷⁸⁶ Jervis 2003: 84.

access to former Soviet air bases in the now independent states of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.⁷⁸⁷ By 2007, brand new military bases were introduced to seven more countries. 14 new bases were built in and around the Persian Gulf and 20 bases (106 structured units as a whole) were constructed and/or or reinforced in Iraq.⁷⁸⁸ Robert Kagan summarizes:

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has built or expanded bases in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia; in Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Poland and Romania in Europe; and in the Philippines, Djibouti, Oman, and Qatar.⁷⁸⁹

In general, US access all over Africa, the Persian Gulf area, Eastern Europe and Central Asia seems to be growing and solidly assured.⁷⁹⁰ American Journalist Tom Engelhardt of *Huffington Post* asks his fellow compatriots:

How many of you knew that the United States had a military installation in Kyrgyzstan? ...How many of you can even locate Kyrgyzstan? (I checked my own atlas to be sure!).⁷⁹¹

In 2002, *Monthly Review* counted US overseas military bases in almost 60 countries and separate territories. Including bases of so-called “status of forces agreements,” often classified as secret, the number of hosting countries rises

⁷⁸⁷ Posen 2003: 16-17.

⁷⁸⁸ Dufour 2007: esnp.

⁷⁸⁹ Kagan 2008: 40.

⁷⁹⁰ Harkavy 2005: 19.

⁷⁹¹ Engelhardt 2013: esnp.

to 93.⁷⁹² According to the Defense Department's annual "Base Structure Report" for fiscal year 2003, which itemizes foreign and domestic US military real estate, the Pentagon currently owns or rents 702 overseas bases in about 130 countries (132 according to Freedland; 140 according to Lal; 141 according to Carl Boggs⁷⁹³) and has another 6000 bases in the United States and its territories. US forces are operating in some 170 countries.⁷⁹⁴ The Base Structure Report for 2005 gives 737 bases; the next year (2006) Report gives 766 overseas military installations and another 77 on non-continental US territory.⁷⁹⁵ But these Reports, according to Chalmers Johnson,⁷⁹⁶ Jonathan Freedland⁷⁹⁷ and Jules Dufour⁷⁹⁸ omit many bases and the ongoing expansion, such as garrisons in Kosovo, bases in Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Qatar, and Uzbekistan. Actual numbers might reach 1000 bases and installations in 156 of the 192 current member states of the United Nations on every continent, except Antarctica:

These numbers, although staggeringly large, do not begin to cover all the actual bases we occupy globally. The 2003 Base Status Report fails to mention, for instance, any garrisons in Kosovo.... The Report similarly omits bases in Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Qatar, and Uzbekistan, although the US military has established colossal base structures throughout the so-called arc of

⁷⁹² *Monthly Review* 2002: esnp.

⁷⁹³ Freedland 2007: esnp; Lal 2003:140; Carl Boggs 2003: 344.

⁷⁹⁴ Bischof 2009: 18.

⁷⁹⁵ Cooley & Nexon 2007: 12.

⁷⁹⁶ Chalmers Johnson 2004 and 2007.

⁷⁹⁷ Freedland 2007.

⁷⁹⁸ Dufour 2007.

instability in the two-and-a-half years since 9/11. For Okinawa, the southernmost island of Japan... the report deceptively lists only one Marine base, Camp Butler, when in fact Okinawa "hosts" ten Marine Corps bases... The Pentagon similarly fails to note all of the \$5-billion-worth of military and espionage installations in Britain, which have long been conveniently disguised as Royal Air Force bases. If there were an honest count, the actual size of our military empire would probably top 1000 different bases in other people's countries, but no one—possibly not even the Pentagon—knows the exact number for sure, although it has been distinctly on the rise in recent years.⁷⁹⁹

In 2003, Carl Boggs⁸⁰⁰ counted over 250,000 US troops in foreign countries. Four years later, Jules Dufour⁸⁰¹ and Freedland⁸⁰² counted 325,000 of US military personnel hosted by foreign military bases. The same year Chalmers Johnson⁸⁰³ and Freedland⁸⁰⁴ estimated that, excluding the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, the United States stations about half a million troops, spies, contractors, dependents, and others on military bases located in foreign countries and Robert Kagan confirms this number (500,000) five years later.⁸⁰⁵ On November 11, 2015, the Defense Secretary Ash

⁷⁹⁹ Chalmers Johnson 2004: esnp.

⁸⁰⁰ Carl Boggs 2003: 344.

⁸⁰¹ Dufour 2007: esnp.

⁸⁰² Freedland 2007: esnp.

⁸⁰³ Chalmers Johnson 2007: esnp.

⁸⁰⁴ Freedland 2007: esnp.

⁸⁰⁵ Kagan 2012: esnp.

Carter mentioned the 450,000 men currently deployed "in every time zone."⁸⁰⁶ The "basing network comprises a rimless hub-and-spoke system of largely bilateral, variegated and asymmetric contracts between the US government and host governments." Core-periphery relations resemble an incomplete wheel, with a hub and spoke but no rim.⁸⁰⁷ This network is highly sophisticated and spans the globe "from Greenland to Australia":

Some of these bases are so gigantic they require as many as nine internal bus routes for soldiers and civilian contractors to get around ... That's the case at Camp Anaconda, headquarters of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division... Our armed missionaries live in a closed-off, self-contained world serviced by its own airline -- the Air Mobility Command, with its fleet of long-range C-17 Globemasters, C-5 Galaxies, C-141 Starlifters, KC-135 Stratotankers, KC-10 Extenders, and C-9 Nightingales that link our far-flung outposts from Greenland to Australia.⁸⁰⁸

In the process, the host nations concede limited, but often consequential, aspects of their sovereign authority to the United States.⁸⁰⁹ The aggregate US basing network clearly involves bargains characteristic for earlier empires:

The United States stands at the center (core) of an extensive set of asymmetric bilateral

⁸⁰⁶ Carter 2015a: 1.

⁸⁰⁷ Cooley & Nexon 2007: 3, 12.

⁸⁰⁸ Chalmers Johnson 2004: esnp.

⁸⁰⁹ Cooley & Nexon 2007: 2.

contracts in which states (peripheries) concede aspects of their sovereignty, and allow the presence of American troops on their soil, in exchange for some package of benefits, such as security guarantees or informal quid pro quos. The leadership of host countries operate, in at least some respects, as brokers (intermediaries) between the US officials and their domestic constituencies⁸¹⁰.

Vinay Lal argues that without the word empire, the vocabulary to describe the US strategic reach is lacking: “Could any empire have done more? With the entire world ringed by US military bases, do we have the vocabulary to describe the global presence and reach of the American military?”⁸¹¹ Chalmers Johnson labels the network “an empire of bases” that “encircles the planet”:

Due to government secrecy, our citizens are often ignorant of the fact that our garrisons encircle the planet. This vast network of American bases on every continent except Antarctica actually constitutes a new form of empire—an empire of bases with its own geography not likely to be taught in any high school geography class.⁸¹²

Simon Dalby associates the global network of bases with the Roman imperial system:

⁸¹⁰ Ibid, 13.

⁸¹¹ Lal 2003: 140-141.

⁸¹² Chalmers Johnson 2004: esnp.

Looking at these impressive facilities which reproduce substantial parts of American suburbia complete with movie theatres and restaurant chains, the parallels with Roman garrison towns built on the Rhine, or on Hadrian's Wall in England, where the remains are strikingly visible on the landscape, are obvious. This is partly a matter of enclave geographies where outposts of metropolitan power are imposed from afar into various hinterlands as part of the globalizing patterns of spatial change of our times ... Less visible is the sheer scale of the logistics to keep garrison troops in residence in the far-flung reaches of empire. The imposition of order is related to long-term military presence. That presence literally builds the cultural logic of the garrison troops into the landscape, a permanent reminder of imperial control⁸¹³

Robert Kaplan also associates the American military bases and outposts around the world with their Roman predecessors, but in somewhat anachronistic manner. Similarly, in his view, the Roman roads garrisons were established to defend the frontiers of the empire and for surveillance of the areas beyond.⁸¹⁴ This is the major contrast—this time there are no frontiers and no areas beyond. The global strategic reach is unprecedented in world history phenomenon.

⁸¹³ Dalby 2008: 425.

⁸¹⁴ Robert Kaplan 2005: 13.

French former Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine wondered: "The situation is unprecedented: What previous empire subjugated the entire world...?"⁸¹⁵ Historian Paul Kennedy compared:

Napoleon's France and Philip II's Spain had powerful foes and were part of a multipolar system. Charlemagne's empire was merely western European in stretch. The Roman Empire stretched further afield, but there was another great empire in Persia and a larger one in China. There is ... no comparison.⁸¹⁶

For its global strategic reach, the United States is named the first global empire in world history: "The US is by circumstance and design an emergent global empire, the first in the history of the world. Prior empires have had frontiers and boundaries..."⁸¹⁷ Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Leeds, Zygmunt Bauman, concludes that due to its planetary dimension, the new empire cannot be drawn on a map:

The new 'empire' is not an entity that could be drawn on a map... Drawing a map of the empire would also be a pointless exercise because the most conspicuously 'imperial' trait of the new empire's mode of being consists in viewing and treating the whole of the planet ... as a potential grazing ground...⁸¹⁸

⁸¹⁵ Vedrine & Moisi 2001: 2.

⁸¹⁶ Kennedy 2002: esnp.

⁸¹⁷ Falk 2003: 22-23.

⁸¹⁸ Bauman 2004: 55-56.

Jules Dufour emphasizes the function of worldwide strategic control: "The Earth surface is being conceived as a wide battlefield which can be patrolled or steadfastly supervised from the Bases."⁸¹⁹ Thomas Barnett in "The Pentagon's New Map" tells: "Show me a part of the world where major war is inconceivable and I will show you permanent US military bases and long-term security alliances."⁸²⁰ And Tom Engelhardt takes a geographic *tour d'horizon*: There are installations "you've probably never heard of" in places like Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger and the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean. He encourages his compatriots:

Hey, don't beat up yourself. We Americans have next to no idea what's being done in our name globally ... Set foot just about anywhere on this planet other than China, Russia and Iran, and you are likely to find some kind of US base, installation, or shared facility.⁸²¹

⁸¹⁹ Dufour 2007: esnp.

⁸²⁰ Barnett 2003: 154.

⁸²¹ Engelhardt 2013: esnp.

The Global Force Posture

The missile defense underwent globalization too. In 1991, President George Bush the Elder introduced the GPALS – Global Protection against Limited Strikes. As the name implies, the protection went *global*. The globalization was continued a decade later by President George Bush the Younger. In 2001, he called for an integration of National (NMD) and Theater (TMD) Missile Defenses into “a new framework” that would simultaneously protect the United States and its overseas allies. In the age of military globalization, it became hard to distinguish between “national” and “theater” defenses. Their fusion means that US national defense became global defense. The following year Michael Hirsh⁸²² commented that a world the Americans “had wished to keep at ocean’s length became largely their world.”

Former Russian current Deputy Chief, Valeriy Gerasimov, observed that the evolving US missile defense architecture is "global in nature" and its assets in Europe and the Asia-Pacific are all elements of a single "global system."⁸²³ Gerasimov’s observation was not revelation. In 2003, Stratcom Commander, Admiral James O. Ellis, had spoken about "integrated missile defense on a global scale."⁸²⁴ This missile defense would be combined with space domination and Prompt Global Strike.⁸²⁵

The currently developing Prompt Global Strike (PGS) is the conventional supplement of the nuclear-armed Global Strike. It is designed to combine ICBMs and hypersonic cruise

⁸²² Hirsh 2002: 31.

⁸²³ Cited in Zadra 2014: 53-54.

⁸²⁴ Cited in Kristensen 2006: 88.

⁸²⁵ Cited in Zadra 2014: 53-54.

missiles with a kinetic weapon launched from an orbiting space platform. The system would be capable of delivering a precision conventional weapon strike anywhere in the world within one hour. Within the Global Operations Center (GOC), will be performed “space operations including space control, space support, and force enhancement.”⁸²⁶ The 2002 Defense Planning Guidance called “for prompt global strike space systems with the capability to directly apply force from or through space against terrestrial targets.” The military is also directed to develop cyber, laser, and electronic warfare capabilities to deny any adversary use of space.⁸²⁷

In 2004, the Global Strike was supplemented with the Global Persistent Attack (GPA). The GPA is a capability for persistent and sustained operations once access conditions are established through Global Strike.⁸²⁸ To sum up, Global Strike would be followed by Global Persistent Attack and accompanied by Prompt Global Strike. All three offensives are “Global.”

Along the new conventional global offensive system, the traditional nuclear triad remains intact. Though intercontinental bombers were removed from day-to-day alert in 1991, land-based missiles and strategic submarines have maintained a Cold War level of operation, ready for launch on any given time.⁸²⁹ ICBMs, and the people who operate them, have remained on continuous, around-the-clock alert since 1959.⁸³⁰ Four to five US nuclear-armed submarines are on

⁸²⁶ Cited in Kristensen 2006: 85.

⁸²⁷ Cited in Ibid, 85, 96, 110.

⁸²⁸ Ibid, 55.

⁸²⁹ McKenzie et al. 2001: 13.

⁸³⁰ *Global Strike Command* 2012; AFGSC 2014: 10.

hard alert in their patrol areas, awaiting orders for launch and ready to launch within 15 minutes.

Since 2004, Air Force bombers such as the B-1, the B-52 and the B-2 Spirit have been in "Continuous Bomber Presence" rotations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.⁸³¹ In 2016 and 2017, the US Air Force Global Strike Command deployed two series of B-1B Lancer bombers from Texas to Guam in support of US Pacific Command's continuous bomber presence mission. They took over continuous bomber presence operations from B-52 Stratofortress bomber squadrons from North Dakota and Louisiana.⁸³² The B-2 Spirit is capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear munitions. It brings massive firepower to bear, in a short time, anywhere on the globe through previously impenetrable defenses.

The Air Force's nuclear and conventional forces effectively hold "any target on the planet at risk and, if necessary, disabling or destroying targets promptly, even from bases in the continental United States."⁸³³ Air Force's mission is to "fly, fight, and win...in air, space, and cyberspace."⁸³⁴ Disregarding the Mutually Assured Destruction paradigm, "winning" is included in the mission. Also included is the "decisive defeat" of any adversary. US National Security Strategy of 2015 twice warns the world of its "highest state of readiness" for "decisively defeating adversaries":

Forward deployed, rotational, and globally responsive forces regularly demonstrate the

⁸³¹ AFGSC 2014: 8.

⁸³² Ebensberger 2017: 1.

⁸³³ AFGSC 2014: 1.

⁸³⁴ Ibid, 2.

capability and will to act. Should deterrence fail to prevent aggression, the US military stands ready to project power to deny an adversary's objectives and decisively defeat any actor that threatens the US homeland, our national interests, or our allies and partners ... We are prepared to project power across all domains to stop aggression and win our Nation's wars by decisively defeating adversaries...

US strategic forces are kept at the highest state of readiness, always prepared to respond to threats to the homeland and our vital interests ... In the event of an attack against the United States or one of its allies, the US military along with allies and partners will project power across multiple domains to decisively defeat the adversary by compelling it to cease hostilities or render its military incapable of further aggression.⁸³⁵

The worldwide control of humanity is under the helm of US military power. The global supervision is supported by an integrated network of military installations which cover and orbit the Planet. The system is operated by the Unified Combatant Command.

⁸³⁵ NSSUS 2015: 7. 10-11.

The Unified Combatant Command

The term “unified combatant command” means a military command which has broad, continuing missions and which is composed of forces from two or more military departments. It is distinguished from “specified combatant command”—a military command which has broad, continuing missions and which is normally composed of forces from a single military department.

The Unified Combatant Command (UCC) annually updates Unified Command Plan (UCP). The current UCP is classified document with declassified highlights.⁸³⁶ The US Department of Defense (DoD) defines the UCP as the document, approved by the President, that sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility (AoR) for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders.⁸³⁷

There are presently six geographic and three functional commands. Each command is under the Combatant Commander who is a four-star General or Admiral. The chain of command for operational purposes goes from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commanders.

The origins of the UCP and the UCC are rooted in World War II with its global scale and two main theaters half-a-world apart. Such challenges had not been faced during the eighteen-month US involvement in the First World War.

⁸³⁶ Feickert 2013: 8.

⁸³⁷ Ibid, 1.

While World War I was fought in a variety of theaters, such as Europe, Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East, US involvement was primarily limited to Europe and was predominately land-centric. In terms of strategic planning and command relationships, the United States played a supporting role. The United States' experience in World War II bore little resemblance to that of the Great War. The European and Pacific theaters of the Second World War varied significantly, with the European Theater being a land-centric conflict supported by naval operations whereas the Pacific Theater was naval-centric and supported by Marine and Army ground forces. Both theaters also featured extensive supporting air force operations, including long-range strategic bombing campaigns unprecedented in both size and scope. In terms of relationships with allies, the United States assumed the leadership role in both the Pacific and European theaters - largely due to its unmatched military and industrial resources—despite insistence that the US was “co-equal partners” with Great Britain, France and Russia. Unlike 1918, after 1945 US global military presence was viewed as a guarantee against unfettered communist expansion, and this presence necessitated an effective, geographically focused, long term, joint command arrangement.⁸³⁸

The first version of the UCP was approved by Truman in December 1946 as the "Outline Command Plan." The National Security Act of 1947 created the US Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the office of the Secretary of Defense and the Unified Combatant Command (UCC) system. The latter system signified the recognition by

⁸³⁸ Ibid, 3, 9-11.

the United States that it would continue to have a worldwide, continuous global military presence.⁸³⁹

The UCC and the UCP were barely touched by the passing of the Cold War: "The end of the Cold War triggered dramatic changes in the US military establishment but not in the UCP..."⁸⁴⁰ Vice President Dick Cheney announced in 1993: "The strategic command, control and communications system should continue to evolve toward a joint global structure..."⁸⁴¹ The continuation of the pattern represents "mute testimony" that the "United States would hold on to its accidental hegemony."⁸⁴²

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 1997 UCP (approved in January 1998) determined the Soviet "succession": The Western Slavic and Caucasus states—Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan—were assigned to US Eucom and Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan—came under US Centcom's aegis in the. In 2002, the Joint Staff recommended that Russia west of the 100° meridian East be assigned to Eucom and Russia east of that meridian go to Pacom. Since the geopolitical center of Russia faced the West, the whole of Russia was assigned to Eucom with Pacom "in support for the Russian Far East."⁸⁴³ US Eucom stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

On January 21, 2002, for the first time the entire surface of the Earth was divided among the US geographic

⁸³⁹ Ibid, 4.

⁸⁴⁰ Drea et al 2013: 69.

⁸⁴¹ Cheney 1993: 11.

⁸⁴² Posen 2003: 19.

⁸⁴³ Drea et al 2013: 5, 75, 84.


commands. The last Earth inhabitants to enter the US strategic orbit were... penguins. Secretary Rumsfeld assigned the last unassigned region of the world—Antarctica—to Pacific Command’s (Pacom) to make sure peer competitors and terrorist networks do not rise in that Area of Responsibility.⁸⁴⁴ Pacom stretched from Pole to Pole. On the opposite Pole, Pacom coincided with the newly created Northern Command (Northcom) and European Command (Eucom). As Pacom Commander, Admiral Harry B. Harris, put it: “Pacom's Area of Responsibility covers half the globe, from polar bears to penguins, and from Hollywood to Bollywood.”⁸⁴⁵ The rest of branches covers the other half. General Thomas Horlander contemplated at the Department of Defense press briefing: “As you can see from the map before you, a large portion of America's Army continues to serve around the world in virtually every corner of the globe” and the “forward presence of US Army soldiers across the globe” is growing.⁸⁴⁶ Approved in April 2002, the first universal UCP became effective October 1, 2002.⁸⁴⁷ Last geographic adjustments were made by UCP 2011. The latter produced the current world map of the UCP:

⁸⁴⁴ Ibid, 83.

⁸⁴⁵ Harry Harris 2016.

⁸⁴⁶ Horlander 2016: 1.

⁸⁴⁷ Feickert 2013: 48.



Unified Command Plan, US Department of Defense, 2017.

Precisely a century after Halford Mackinder presented his famous Pivot paper, proclaiming the end of the geographic exploration and the completion of the world's political map. Rumsfeld presented to President George Bush the Younger the completed UCP world map. "The President agreed to all recommendations."⁸⁴⁸ The whole globe became divided on strategically controlled branches unified under a single command. The strategic *globality*⁸⁴⁹ of the map is striking.

The UN mosaic world map of 192 colors is opéra bouffe; the United Nations is the scenarist; the above map is the scene. It is the foundation of the world order, explaining how, for the first time in world history, 192 “sovereign” states

⁸⁴⁸ Drea et al 2013: 84.

⁸⁴⁹ *Globality* is the end-state of globalization – a hypothetical condition in which the process of globalization is complete or nearly so, barriers have fallen, and a new global reality is emerging.

peacefully coexist without a single state disappearing by conquest for 72 years (by now).

It is impossible to understand the global order, or the sense in which it is an order at all, without understanding the permanently structuring role of American global power projection ... The well-known maps indicating the division of the globe into the “areas of responsibility” of Centcom, Northcom, and all the other “coms” convey an idea of the architecture underlying the entire global order. This is a different vision of global order than Europe’s—that of a multilateral world ordered by international law. There is a great deal about international law that can be admired, but it seems to miss the fundamental point—the extent to which global order is sustained by American power.⁸⁵⁰

Along six geographic commands, the UCC has three functional commands—Strategic, Special Operation and Transportation. The Strategic Command incorporates Global Strike Command and Space Command. Stratcom Commander, Air Force Gen. John E. Hyten, describes Stratcom as the most global of all commands. Its dominion stretches from under the sea to 2,300 miles above the Earth.⁸⁵¹ The primary mission of Special Operation Command is anti-terrorism. Functional commands operate worldwide

⁸⁵⁰ Ignatieff 2003: 54.

⁸⁵¹ Pellerin 2017: 1.

across geographic boundaries. Rumsfeld called the Special Operation Command "global warfighter."⁸⁵²

The Quadrennial Defense Review of 2014 refers to "our *global* Combatant Commanders."⁸⁵³ The UCP coordinates the global network of military bases and alliances.⁸⁵⁴ It performs other "global" missions, such as "Global Missile Defence Concept of Operations" and "global distribution operations." In case of necessity, the UCC "can generate significant combat power in the far corners of the world on relatively short notice."⁸⁵⁵

The Combatant Commanders exercise heavy international influence. "Their standing in their regions has usually dwarfed that of ambassadors and assistant secretaries of state."⁸⁵⁶ The European Combatant Commander is dual-hatted as Supreme Allied Commander Europe.⁸⁵⁷ "The Supreme Allied Commander, always an American, was an appropriate title for the American proconsul whose reputation and influence outweighed those of European premiers, presidents, and chancellors"⁸⁵⁸ Other combatant commanders are associated with the Roman proconsuls too.⁸⁵⁹ In 1995, Southcom headquarters were relocated from Panama to Miami. Consequently Miami became the major Latin

⁸⁵² Drea et al 2013: 94.

⁸⁵³ emphasis added, *QDR* 2014: 39.

⁸⁵⁴ Dufour 2007.

⁸⁵⁵ Posen 2003: 19.

⁸⁵⁶ Eliot A. Cohen 2004: 61; also Bischof 2009: 18; Feickert 2013: 59.

⁸⁵⁷ Drea et al 2013: 107.

⁸⁵⁸ Lawrence Kaplan 1982: 115.

⁸⁵⁹ Eliot A. Cohen 2004: 60; Niall Ferguson 2005: 17; Bischof 2009: 18; Feickert 2013: 59.

American city, where Commander in Chief Southcom hosts his Latin American counterparts.⁸⁶⁰

Notably, “the right to command,” translated into Latin, renders *imperium*. In a similar linguistic manner, in the medieval Europe from “command” was derived “commandery” designating region placed in charge of knight. Those medieval commanderies were not seen on the world map with unarmored eye. Today, due to the inexorable and explosive military globalization, the globe has been divided on six US commanderies, all under single command of the “knight in chief.”

In 2006-2007, President George Bush authorized creation the new African Command (Africom). It became the sixth and the last so far geographical Command. Africa was the last continent to be divided on colonies (in 1884-85); it also became the last continent to receive separate US Command.

In the German – Soviet talks in 1940, Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop introduced the *Southern Motif*—separation of the globe on four spheres stretching along meridians. Four Powers—the United States, Germany/Italy, the Soviet Union and Japan coexist and expand southward.⁸⁶¹ After Germany attacked Russia, Russia was excluded from the Motif and the number of spheres reduced to three, similarly running southward. Sixty years later, in 2001, US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, proposed his version of the Southern Motif along very similar

⁸⁶⁰ Drea et al 2013: 73.

⁸⁶¹ Memorandum 1940.

geographic lines. The world would be divided on three US mega-commands running mostly from north to south:

1. Americas;
2. Europe including Russia, the Middle East and north Africa;
3. the east Asia, Australia and south Africa.⁸⁶²

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Germany and Japan in January 1942 designed to divide the Old World between themselves along the meridian 70° East.⁸⁶³ Eventually, this meridian was crossed by the frontier between US Centcom and US Pacom. In the Indian Ocean, the Axis “missed” just by two meridians: the 2008 UCP divided the Indian Ocean between US Pacom and the newly formed US Africom along the meridian 68° East.⁸⁶⁴ As Franklin Roosevelt had promised, Hitler got lebensraum, a global American one.⁸⁶⁵

The American eagle, Franklin Roosevelt inspired, must be “flying high and striking hard.”⁸⁶⁶ Walt Disney animated the idea in *Victory through Air Power* (1943)—at the end of the film, the victorious United States (represented as eagle) flies off and lands nobly on top of a globe. The UCC kept the eagle on that place. Four of the current six geographic branches have emblems of eagle presiding or flying over the globe. The emblem of the Air Force Global Strike Command (a sub-branch of the Strategic Command) has wings

⁸⁶² The plan was not accepted because the US Army leaders found smaller divisions more effective. Drea et al 2013: 81-82.

⁸⁶³ Irving 1977: 354.

⁸⁶⁴ Feickert 2013: 48.

⁸⁶⁵ Neil Smith 2003: 27-28.

⁸⁶⁶ Roosevelt 1942.

(supposedly of eagle too) over the globe. Six former UCC branches displayed on their emblems a similar combination of eagle or eagle's wings over the globe.

The official site of the Northern Command (2017) explains the mission of the eagle: "The eagle symbolizes our great nation and our alertness, ready to defend our homeland." The Northern Command is responsible for the defense of the continental United States. But the same eagle is present above three current overseas global branches. In terms of "defense," globe appears to be the "homeland." As Stratcom Commander, General James E. Cartwright, put it, "The intent is to meet ... *national* security objectives *globally*."⁸⁶⁷

The Global Strike Command explains the meaning of the globe on its emblem: "The globe reflects the command's global capabilities."⁸⁶⁸ The ultimate Global Strike Commander's intent is to "shape the future by providing modern nuclear and conventional global strike capabilities to the President and the combatant commanders."⁸⁶⁹ Air Force's mission is to "fly, fight, and win...in air, space, and cyberspace."⁸⁷⁰ The overall message is evident and corresponds to the testament of FDR & Disney: the American eagle is "flying high" (high enough to see the entire globe) and (if necessary) "striking hard" (anywhere on the globe). Alternatively, one present functional branch of the UCC displays on its emblem an iron punch over the globe holding one peace branch and three thunders.

⁸⁶⁷ Emphases added, cited in Kristensen 2006: 52.

⁸⁶⁸ *Global Strike Command* 2012.

⁸⁶⁹ AFGSC 2014: 2.

⁸⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 2.

To sum up, the Earth surface has become a unit under strategic control and/or coordination by the only remaining superpower. The world map of the UCC split up into geographic command units vividly illustrates this underlying geopolitical reality. Robert Kagan inscribed over the map of the global US forces' deployment, "The Sun Never Sets."⁸⁷¹ In fact the 55th Wing of the Air Force has a motto: "The sun never sets on the Fightin' 55th," reflecting "the wing's ability to collect critical time-sensitive intelligence in every corner of the world, at any time."⁸⁷² What "America will need to consider in the next 10 or 15 years," said Cambridge classicist Christopher Kelly in 2002, "is what is the optimum size for a non-territorial empire..."⁸⁷³ Precisely that year, the UCC supplied a precise answer: 510 million km² (i.e. total surface of the Earth).

⁸⁷¹ Kagan 1998: 29.

⁸⁷² Stafford 2015: 1.

⁸⁷³ Cited in Freedland 2002: esnp.

Global Guidelines

The adjective *global* became key word in the US strategic vocabulary. In the 1990s - 2010s, US Stratcom tested a series of nuclear strike exercises called "Global Lightning," "Global Thunder," "Global Storm" and "Global Archer."⁸⁷⁴ In 2003, Stratcom introduced the Global Operations Center (GOC). The GOC “will develop and leverage *global* battlefield situational awareness...”⁸⁷⁵ The same year, four new missions were assigned to Stratcom:

- Global Strike,
- global missile defense,
- information operations
- and global C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance).

Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, General Richard Myers, spoke of these new missions:

Notice the word ‘global’ in three of the four missions. Today we live in a globalized world, obviously. We’re at war with terrorists that have global reach, and our military must have a global perspective.⁸⁷⁶

US Secretary of Defense James Mattis shared his thought on the strategic conduct: “I think ... we have to look at how we conduct in the future global strike, close air support, global intelligence, global mobility, global surveillance [and]

⁸⁷⁴ Kristensen 2006: 5, 12, 18, 23, 36, 47, 155; US Strategic Command Public Affairs 2015: 1.

⁸⁷⁵ Emphasis added, cited in Kristensen 2006: 85.

⁸⁷⁶ Cited in Kristensen 2006: 53.

global command and control.”⁸⁷⁷ Five out of six stated conducts are "global."

The 2012 Department of Defense’s (DoD) guidance is titled "Sustaining US Global Leadership." It calls for "global responsibilities" and promises "global presence" to cope with "threats worldwide" and "aggression anywhere in the world." In 2011, US Department of Defense issued *Joint Operation Planning*. The whole document is written from the “global perspective,” as it explicitly states several times.⁸⁷⁸ DoD developed “Global Force Management Board” (GFMB) headed by “global force manager” and “global synchronizer.” These and associated “global” persons

- coordinates various defense agencies to integrate the execution of DoD “global campaign plans”;
- provide comprehensive insights into the “global availability” of US military resources and “global allocation” of US forces;
- “monitor global situation,” and “global security”;
- estimate “global force visibility requirements,” “global defense posture,” “global shaping,” and “global demand”;
- design “global force management,” various “global plans” including “global campaign plans,” “global concept of operation,” and “global force visibility requirement.”
- develop “a cohesive global concept of operation” and “a global CoA (Course of Action),” and engage in “global activities and operation” with “global reach,

⁸⁷⁷ Pellerin 2017a: 1

⁸⁷⁸ *Joint Operation Planning* 2011: 64-65.

access, and effectiveness” against “global crises” and “global threats” in order to reach their “global strategic end states.”⁸⁷⁹

One Appendix of the document is titled: “Global Force Management”⁸⁸⁰ and its “Glossary” list⁸⁸¹ impresses with abbreviations containing *G* for *global*: GFMAP (Global Force Management Allocation Plan), GFMB (Global Force Management Board), and GFMIG (Global Force Management Implementation Guidance).

The President or Secretary of Defense implements so-called *Global Campaign Plans*.⁸⁸² The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Combatant Commander “issues initial *global* planning guidance based on national strategic objectives and priorities; and develops *global* CoAs.” The CoAs are unambiguously “global” indeed:

The purpose of this *global* CoA is to mitigate operational gaps, seams, and vulnerabilities from a *global* perspective... This will be achieved through a recommendation for the optimal allocation, prioritization, or reallocation of forces and capabilities required to develop a cohesive *global* concept of operation.⁸⁸³

DoD’s periodical document—the *Global Posture*—provides “*global* defense posture... Posture plans align basing

⁸⁷⁹ "Sustaining US Global Leadership," 2012: 15, 41, 42, 53, 54, 64-66, 111, 117, 119, 175, 177, 193, 219, 221, 230 232-233, 234-238.

⁸⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 229.

⁸⁸¹ *Ibid*, 246.

⁸⁸² *Joint Operation Planning*, 2011: 59-60, 63.

⁸⁸³ Emphases added, *Joint Operation Planning*, 2011: 15.

and forces to ensure theater and *global* security...”⁸⁸⁴ Another DoD’s document—*Global Force Management Implementation Guidance*—is a force planning and execution, providing “comprehensive insights into the *global* availability of US military resources.”⁸⁸⁵ The force requests of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are supported by Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) which “serves as the deployment order for all *global* allocations.”⁸⁸⁶

The US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006 makes it clear that Pentagon planners are building an infrastructure to quickly move troops and air power to any corner of the globe that may require the use of military force.⁸⁸⁷ The same can be said for the two subsequent QDRs (2010 and 2014). “The United States is a *global* power with *global* responsibilities, maintaining secure access to the *global* commons.”⁸⁸⁸

The QDR of 2014 uses the term *global* 91 times. 7 more times the term *worldwide* is used. The document states: “The United States exercises *global* leadership,” “underwrites *global* security by exercising leadership...” and “remains committed to protecting its interests, sustaining US leadership, and preserving *global* stability, security, and peace” It repeatedly emphasizes “our role as a *global* leader” and “our responsibilities as a *global* power.”⁸⁸⁹ One chapter is

⁸⁸⁴ Emphases added, Ibid, 66.

⁸⁸⁵ Emphasis added, Ibid, 15.

⁸⁸⁶ Emphasis added, Ibid, 44, 55.

⁸⁸⁷ Dalby 2008: 424.

⁸⁸⁸ Emphases added, QDR 2010: XIV, 103.

⁸⁸⁹ Emphases added, QDR 2014: 11-12, 38, 56, 59.

entitled, "The Reality of Global Responsibilities."⁸⁹⁰ The outlined strategic aims are:

- "Build security *globally*";
- "[p]rovide a *global*, stabilizing presence";
- "project power *globally*";
- the "Department [of Defense] will also continue to rebalance and sustain our *global* posture" and "presence";
- "[m]aintaining an Air Force with *global* power projection capabilities...";
- "[p]reserving naval capacity to build security *globally*..."⁸⁹¹

US intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance "support *global* situational awareness," predicting "*global* threats." "*Global* prevention, detection, and response efforts are essential..." The United States "will ensure that our military remains *global*..." responding to "*global* challenges," influencing or shaping "global events" and "*global* trends" and maintaining "a worldwide approach to countering" terrorism and "promoting security worldwide." US forces must "be *globally* present to deter conflict" and "protect the *global* commons."⁸⁹²

To achieve these "*global* objectives," the United States must "support military operations *worldwide*," "sustain a *global* effort," "*global* engagement," "*global* cooperation," "*global* operations" and "*global* infrastructure."⁸⁹³ The

⁸⁹⁰ Emphases added, Ibid, 63.

⁸⁹¹ Emphases added, Ibid, V, VIII, IX, XIV, 3, 5, 7, 9, 12, 13, 16, 28, 30, 31, 34, 54, 61, 63.

⁸⁹² Emphases added, Ibid, III, VII, XI, 5-6, 11-12, 21, 36, 38, 54, 66.

⁸⁹³ Emphases added, Ibid, X, 12, 16, 18-19, 23, 29, 33, 44, 48, 56.

document describes the prevailing pattern of military globalization in the postwar period:

Our posture of global engagement is the foundation from which the United States responds to crises when required. For more than sixty years, the United States has maintained unmatched capabilities to project large-scale military power over great distances. Our power projection capabilities include ready and trained forces in the United States, the ability of our forces to move rapidly from place to place, and our forces' ability to operate anywhere around the world.⁸⁹⁴

⁸⁹⁴ Ibid, 19.

THE END OF GREATNESS

Jules Dufour and Chalmers Johnson summarize the accomplishment of military globalization:

The United States has established its control over 192 governments which are members of the United Nations. The conquest, occupation and/or otherwise supervision of these various regions of the World is supported by an integrated network of military bases and installations which covers the entire Planet (Continents, Oceans and Outer Space).⁸⁹⁵

Our military deploys well over half a million soldiers, spies, technicians, teachers, dependents, and civilian contractors in other nations. To dominate the oceans and seas of the world, we are creating some thirteen naval task forces built around aircraft carriers... We operate numerous secret bases outside our territory to monitor what the people of the world, including our own citizens, are saying, faxing, or e-mailing to one another.⁸⁹⁶

Barry Posen stresses that the US obtained an unchallenged “command of the commons”—global neutral sea, area, air, and space—which provides unprecedented global military projection.⁸⁹⁷ “The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale operations over extended distances.”⁸⁹⁸ William Thompson labeled it

⁸⁹⁵ Dufour: 2007: esnp.

⁸⁹⁶ Chalmers Johnson 2004: esnp.

⁸⁹⁷ Posen 2003.

⁸⁹⁸ QDR 2010: IV, 1.

military global reach monopoly: "Most evident is the persistent monopoly in global reach capabilities. One state continues to have a superior ability to project military power throughout the globe."⁸⁹⁹ US strategic "global reach is clearly unrivalled by any other military."⁹⁰⁰ *Global Reach* is identified as "anywhere on the globe."⁹⁰¹

President Barak Obama expressed his pride: "We possess a military whose might, technology, and geostrategic reach is unrivaled in human history."⁹⁰² And his Russian colleague, Vladimir Putin, expressed his frustration: "...publish the world map in your newspaper and to mark all the US military bases on it. You will see the difference" between the United States and Russia.⁹⁰³

The global power projection and the global network of alliances are mutually reinforcing:

[US] forward presence will remain a critical part of our defense posture for the foreseeable future. Our overseas bases serve as an integral part of our alliances and foster cooperation against common threats. There is no better assurance of a US security commitment than the presence of US forces.⁹⁰⁴

[US forces are] forward deployed or stationed in key overseas regions" in peacetime as "a credible overseas presence" to deter

⁸⁹⁹ Thompson 2006: 19.

⁹⁰⁰ Dalby 2008: 425.

⁹⁰¹ Kristensen 2006: 20.

⁹⁰² Obama, "Preface" to NSSUS 2015: 2.

⁹⁰³ Putin 2016: esnp.

⁹⁰⁴ NSSUS 1990: 25.

aggression and advance US strategic interests. “Such overseas presence demonstrates our commitment to allies and friends, underwrites regional stability, ensures familiarity with overseas operating environments, promotes combined training among the forces of friendly countries and provides timely initial response capabilities.”⁹⁰⁵

In the absence of dominant US power projection capabilities, the integrity of US alliances and security partnerships could be called into question, reducing US security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict.⁹⁰⁶

The Obama administration insisted: “Our relationship with our European allies remains the cornerstone for US engagement with the world, and a catalyst for international action.”⁹⁰⁷ America will preserve and expand its alliances and partnerships, and maintain a “global stabilizing presence” of “US military forces in key locations around the world.” This presence “underpins the security of our allies and partners...”⁹⁰⁸

Counterpart to the bases on land are carrier battle groups on sea: “US military bases and carrier battle groups ring the world.”⁹⁰⁹ Gone is the Washington Naval Conference with its ratio 5:5:3 between the US, British and Japanese

⁹⁰⁵ NSSUS 1996: 13.

⁹⁰⁶ QDR 2010: IX.

⁹⁰⁷ NSSUS 2010: 41.

⁹⁰⁸ NSSUS 2015: 9, 11.

⁹⁰⁹ Ikenberry 2004: 144.

respectively fleets. Today, the ratio is 1:1 between the US Navy and the rest of the world Navies combined. Similar ratios exist in defense budgets, nuclear warheads and their delivery means—the nuclear triad (missiles, bombers and submarines). To emphasize the unprecedented world military balance, Barry Posen referred to the level of military globalization during the peak of the British Empire a century earlier:

When Nineteenth-century Britain had command of the sea, its timely power projection capability ended at the maximum range of the Royal Navy's shipboard guns. The Royal Navy could deliver an army many places around the globe, but the army's journey inland was usually difficult and slow; without such a journey, Britain's ability to influence events was limited.⁹¹⁰

The technological progress changed all that. The United States enjoys the same command of the sea that Britain once did but it can also faster move larger and heavier forces around the globe. Command of space allows the United States to see the whole surface of the world. And air power, ashore and afloat, can reach targets deep inland and destroy them. "Command of the commons provides the United States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy than any other offshore power has ever had."⁹¹¹

Hundreds of thousands of US service members are continuously on guard around the world, ensuring no peer

⁹¹⁰ Posen 2003: 9.

⁹¹¹ Ibid, 9.

competitor rises anywhere. "Including operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, according to Quadrennial Defense Review of 2010,⁹¹² approximately 400,000 US military personnel are forward-stationed or rotationally deployed every day around the world to help sustain US capacity for global reach and power projection." US service members are forward deployed in more than 100 countries on every continent, except Antarctica, at sea and under sea, and guarding assets in space and cyberspace. "It is truly a global force."⁹¹³

Leaving aside global commons and overseas bases, US air power ashore in North America and Guam can reach and destroy targets all over the Eurasian land mass. B-2 and B-52 bombers can fly at high subsonic speeds at stratospheric altitudes that can reach 50,000 feet. Their unrefueled range is over 6000 and 8000 respectively nautical miles. A total of nine squadrons of B-52, B-1 and B-2 are all based in the continental United States (CONUS), in Missouri, Louisiana, Texas and both Dakotas. In addition, 159 inter-continental bombers are tasked to the Global Strike Command. From the continental bases, US Air Force holds at risk strategic and tactical centers of gravity worldwide.⁹¹⁴ It carries massive firepower, in a short time, anywhere on the globe.⁹¹⁵ The United States is capable "to deploy its forces almost anywhere on the planet at lightning speed,"⁹¹⁶ as no power had been capable before:

The "Uber-Gulliver" is different from its predecessors. Unlike Rome et al., he can

⁹¹² QDR 2010: 62.

⁹¹³ Garamone 2016: 1.

⁹¹⁴ AFGSC 2014: 1; Michael Green et al. 2016: 119.

⁹¹⁵ *Global Strike Command* 2012.

⁹¹⁶ Freedland 2002: esnp.

intervene - without the help of allies -
anywhere in the world, and almost in real-time
... No other power could ever project so much
might so far so fast and so devastatingly.⁹¹⁷

B-1 and B-2 bomber missions in Operations *Desert Storm*, *Enduring Freedom* and *Iraqi Freedom* mounted from Barksdale (Louisiana) and Whiteman (Kansas) Air Force bases in the continental United States reached the Gulf region, fired cruise missile and returned to their home bases.⁹¹⁸ In the 1991 Gulf War, they were refueled by 57 aerial tankers based in the Azores and Spain.⁹¹⁹ In 1996, B-52s based in Guam attacked targets in Iraq in 24-hour flight.⁹²⁰ In 1999, B-52 strategic and stealth bombers took off from the continental heart of the United States, flew 5500 miles to deposit their military payloads on Serbian targets, and returned to home base. For their pilots, it was 32-hour work period that enabled them to take off on noontime and be home for dinner the next evening. Two years later, these and B-1 bombers rose in Missouri, dropped their bomb load over Afghanistan and then returned home, all in one fell swoop.⁹²¹ Under Secretary of Defense Rudy de Leon described the “revolutionary warfare” used in the war against Yugoslavia:

In the skies over Kosovo, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles hunted for Serbian forces. In space, satellites focused on Serbian targets no matter what the weather or the time of day. In their first combat missions, B-2s stunningly defined

⁹¹⁷ Joffe 2003: esnp.

⁹¹⁸ Harkavy 2005: 20.

⁹¹⁹ Kennedy 2002: 10.

⁹²⁰ ÓTuathail 1997: 48.

⁹²¹ Kennedy 2002: 10.

the term "global strike," flying non-stop to hit targets halfway around the world. We can look back on 38,000 sorties, not a single combat casualty, and the most precise campaign in the history of warfare.⁹²²

The pattern is expected to last in the policy relevant future, as former US Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter, promised in the context of the developing B-21:

Over the past century, no nation has used air power to accomplish its global reach—to compress time and space—like the United States... Building this bomber ... demonstrates our commitment to our allies and our determination to potential adversaries, making it crystal clear that the United States will continue to retain the ability to project power throughout the globe long into the future.⁹²³

To the four freedoms of FDR, two more were added by US Air Force: "Freedom from attack and freedom to attack."⁹²⁴ Another added freedom is freedom of supervision. When US diplomat Richard Holbrooke met with Milosevic in October 1998 to negotiate over the status of Kosovo, Holbrooke brought along Air Force Lieutenant General Michael Short, who would command the air war against Serbia. At their first meeting, Milosevic greeted Short by remarking: "So you are the man who is going to bomb me." Michael Short replied the Serbian President that he had "U-2s in one hand and B-52s in the other, and the choice [of which I

⁹²² Cited in Kristensen 2006: 109.

⁹²³ Carter 2015: 1.

⁹²⁴ Cited in Green et al. 2016: 118.

use] is up to you.”⁹²⁵ The prominent detail of the conversation is the ultimate alternative: even if B-52s are not used, U2s are inevitable.

The planet is closely supervised and controlled. Always-on C3I (Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence) have been maintained at Cold War levels. The “unspoken military policy of the United States in the twelve years since the Cold War ended ... accepts as given that the United States will retain overwhelming control over the planet, retaining in the process the sole right to maintain 24-hour space-based reconnaissance network to monitor the globe.”⁹²⁶ “The sun never sets on the Fightin' 55th,” says the motto of the 55th Wing of the Air Force whose mission includes intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.⁹²⁷

Strategically, the world consists of two parts. One and the larger part is allied with the United States, whether formally or informally. This part is strategically coordinated. The other and smaller part of the world is non-allied but firmly contained. Both components are closely supervised and controlled. By protecting the allied part of the world, the United States also protects that part against itself.

The post-Cold War NATO “Enlargement” represented the “enlarged” version of NATO’s “threefold purpose” as defined by Lord Ismay: to keep the Americans further in, the Russians further out and the Germans deeper down. George Kennan already in 1949 noted that what the West is trying to do is containing both Russia and Germany. He criticized this policy because the West, in his estimation, lacks the sufficient

⁹²⁵ Cited in Walt 2004: 2.

⁹²⁶ Wirbel 2003: 78.

⁹²⁷ Stafford 2015: 1.

power to contain both. Marc Trachtenberg comments: "Kennan, it seemed, had simply been wrong: one *could* contain both Germany and Russia at the same time."⁹²⁸ Christopher Layne calls it "double containment."⁹²⁹

Along Germany, other main US allies, such as France, Japan and South Korea are listed among the "contained" parties.⁹³⁰ The "United States used its new security institutions to control its allies-most notably by embedding Japan and Germany into the Western, US-led system and restricting their military capabilities."⁹³¹ Layne's chapter devoted to the Cold War era is titled "The Containment of Europe..."⁹³² The United States, as John Mearsheimer put it, "protects NATO countries from each other."⁹³³ Noam Chomsky expresses a similar view:

It was always understood that Europe might choose to follow an independent course, perhaps the Gaullist vision of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. NATO was partially intended to counter this threat. For similar reasons, Washington strongly favors expansion of NATO to include small states more likely to heed Washington's demands, thus diluting the influence of the 'Old Europe...' Expansion of NATO, and assigning

⁹²⁸Trachtenberg 1997: esnp.

⁹²⁹ Layne 1997: 89-91 and 2006: 81-82, 89-90.

⁹³⁰ Joffe 1984: 67-72; Leffler 1992: 497, 500; Idem. 1993: 6; Idem. 2006: 47; Layne & Schwartz 1993, 8; Layne 1998: 11-12; Ikenberry 2002, 288; Brzezinski 2005: 127; Mearsheimer 2010: 388-389; Wainwright 2016: 4.

⁹³¹ David Lake 2000: 50-51.

⁹³² Idem, 2006: 94.

⁹³³ Mearsheimer 2010: 389.

new tasks to it, also furthers this goal of controlling Europe.⁹³⁴

Chinese analysts noted that neither Europe nor Japan had made a credible attempt to become independent poles. Instead, the US "comprehensive national power" had surged. To maintain its unipolar dominance, the United States has pursued varying strategies to "contain, control, incorporate and suppress those countries and regions that might become one of the multiple poles." It "has controlled and incorporated Europe and Japan, and suppressed and contained Russia and China."⁹³⁵ Chinese Academy of Military Sciences researcher, Yao Youzhi, concluded in 1999 that the US had "controlled and incorporated Europe and Japan, and suppressed and contained Russia and China," thus precluding competition from other potential poles.⁹³⁶

Thus, Lord Ismay's famous statement for the mission of NATO can be extended globally: the global network of alliances keeps the rivals out, America in and the allies down. "The US Navy circles the world bristling with nuclear and conventional arms, warning nations everywhere, friend and foe, New Zealand and Lebanon, of the power it possesses."⁹³⁷

Stalin put the point well at the end of World War II: "Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise."⁹³⁸ Today, it is not otherwise too. The only difference is that a certain army obtained a

⁹³⁴ Chomsky 2010: 173-174.

⁹³⁵ Deng 2001: 347.

⁹³⁶ Cited in Roy 2003: 58.

⁹³⁷ Clarck 1987: VII.

⁹³⁸ Cited in Mearsheimer 2001: chapter 2, esnp.

global reach. Two millennia ago, Seneca the Younger envisaged what we would call globalization:

All boundaries have shifted, and cities have set
Their walls in a new land; the all-travelled world
Let's nothing remain in its previous station;
The Indian drinks from Araxes' cold waters,
The Persians drink from the Elbe and Rhine...
An age shall come in later years,
When Ocean shall loose creation's bonds,
When the great planet shall stand revealed
And Tethis shall disclose new worlds,
Nor shall Thule be ultima among lands.⁹³⁹

The vision came true nearly verbatim. Today we contemplate the *globality* in the economic, cultural and, omitted for some reasons, military spheres. All US strategic boundaries have shifted, and bases have set their walls in new lands. US marines and allied troops drink from Rhine, Elbe and Araxes. Ocean lost creation's bonds, the great planet stands revealed and Thule is a strategic transit point. Elsewhere Seneca feared the unknown in his days' world and favored isolation:

No land is so far distant that it cannot send out
some evil of its own contriving. How can I
know whether even now some chief of a great
nation in some hidden place ... ceases to
restrain his armies within their borders or
makes ready his fleets in quest of parts
unknown? ...The greatest contribution to

⁹³⁹ Seneca the Younger, *Medea*, 2:364-380.

human peace would be for the seas to be closed off.⁹⁴⁰

No hidden places are left, all chiefs are known, as well as all their capabilities, only one “great nation” remains, and the “greatest contribution to human peace” seems to be its control of all seas and other global commons. In my earlier work, I drew a hyperbolic macro-historic development:

Depicting the function of the relation of the largest in any given time territory controlled by any single center to the total surface of the Earth, we receive a hyperbolic curve. In prehistory, the largest territory controlled by a single center was equal to the size of a cave; similar sizes of space controlled other species throughout the evolution. Backward, the graph is never at absolute zero but endlessly strives to. Today somewhere in the Afghan mountains there is the cave of Bin Laden which is still beyond the control of Washington. Forward the graph will never reach the absolute surface of the Earth but will always strive to.⁹⁴¹

Since the publication of that work, military globalization advanced. Bin Laden was detected and eliminated. The military control thus approached a bit the absolute global surface.

Egyptian King Narmer (c. 3000 BC) was the first to project power over an area visible on the world map; the sphere controlled by US Commander-in-Chief has not left an

⁹⁴⁰ Idem, *Natural Questions*, 5:18:12.

⁹⁴¹ Ostrovsky 2006: 363.

area visible on the world map. The United States has attained the strategic *end of greatness*.⁹⁴² No larger space can be controlled in a strategic sense.

⁹⁴² The *end of greatness* is astronomical term meaning size limit which any cosmic structure cannot exceed.

POWER PROJECTION POTENTIAL

This chapter theoretically estimates what would have been the limit of the modern power projection had it not been restricted by the size of this Earth. It is sometimes analogized with the ancient Roman “technological prowess”:

In each case, military strength both fosters and is fostered by technological prowess: while Roman armies built the straight roads that served as the arteries of their conquered lands, so the US Department of Defense incubated the information superhighway, the Internet that now girdles the globe.⁹⁴³

The system of roads for which Rome is famous allowed for the movement of the legions of heavy infantry from one part of the empire to another relatively quickly... [US Navy is somewhat similar] but airpower, space surveillance and communication are now also part of American strategic power...⁹⁴⁴

That “technological prowess”—the Roman “straight roads”—allowed the legions to move at most 50 km per day. With that “relative quickness,” Rome controlled 5 million km². Today, Globemasters move modern legions 20,000 km per day. Extrapolating mathematically, the ratio gives $20,000 / 50 * 5,000,000 = 2,000,000,000$ (2 billion) km². The total dry land area of the Earth is 135,000,000 (135 million) km², or 14.8 times smaller. Thus the modern transportation allows

⁹⁴³ Freedland 2007: esnp.

⁹⁴⁴ Dalby 2008: 424-425.

military control of a planet 14.8 times larger than this Earth (would be a planet the size of Neptune).

Regarding information speed, the progress is even more dramatic. In the past century, it equaled the speed of light. Just two centuries ago, the battlefield was closer to the ancient world than to ours: “The miracle of radio has fundamentally altered the art of generalship. War has changed indeed from the days when Napoleon stood upon a hill and controlled visually and by couriers his entire armies.”⁹⁴⁵ 200 years after the battle of Jena, US Commander, General James E. Cartwright, explained the cyber type capability of Global Strike: "If we're talking about non-kinetic [=non-striking capabilities], we can move pretty much anyplace on the Earth at the speed of light in cyber type capabilities."⁹⁴⁶

Rome was not the only ancient empire to impress with its roads. Two Inca royal highways 2000-miles long and 25-foot wide crossing the Empire from north to south impressed the Spaniards.⁹⁴⁷ That “technological prowess” allowed the speed of military information to move 20 km per hour (running man). With that communication speed, the Inca Empire controlled over two million km². Extrapolating by the same token (speed of light / 20 km per hour * 2,000,000 = 216,000,000,000,000 or 216 trillion km², compared to 510 km² of the Earth surface including oceans), the modern information speed would allow control of a planet 423,000 times larger than our world (more correctly, a star 35.25 times larger than our Sun).

⁹⁴⁵ Baldwin 1950: 42.

⁹⁴⁶ Cited in Kristensen 2006: 33.

⁹⁴⁷ Garcilasco, *Royal Commentaries*, vol I, p 569-571.

Calculations in terms of population controlled (instead of territory) yield similar results. The range of power, of course, does not increase with technological progress in mathematical proportion. Nevertheless the extrapolation is sufficient to assume that modern technology allows control of space or population exceeding those of this world several times.

It is stressed in our days that prior empires exerted control from a distant center that, owing to available technologies of communication and transportation, was further away in time than is any part of the globe from Washington. "In purely temporal terms, the American empire is thus smaller than earlier great empires..."⁹⁴⁸

John Mearsheimer counter-argues that "there has never been a global hegemon, and there is not likely to be one anytime soon," because of geographic barriers, mainly oceans.⁹⁴⁹ His "stopping power of water" hypothesis has been intensively cited and debated. Disregarding recent (since 1492 AD) events, the hypothesis makes sense. In 1281, water and the "good wind" (*Kamikaze*) indeed stopped the Mongols on the way to Japan. Later however even with all sorts of *Kamikaze*, water ceased to stop. In 1945, the citizens of Hamburg and Dresden, Berlin and Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki (those who survived), would not describe water power as stopping; certainly not the *double habakusha*—those who survived in Hiroshima on August 6 and within next two days managed to reach Nagasaki. Had Mearsheimer arranged a poll of *double habakushas* on August 10, "Does, in your opinion, water power stop?" he would have collected

⁹⁴⁸ Falk 2003: 22-23.

⁹⁴⁹ Mearsheimer 2001: 41.

unanimous negative, not necessarily literal, replies. Just the day before the anniversary of the original Kamikaze (August 15), the Japanese announced the unconditional surrender. They knew: water will not stop. Not this time.

The main lesson of 1945 is that defense and distance no longer exist. Whatever was left of them was annihilated by strategic technological breakthroughs which occurred at breakneck pace during the early Cold War. Writing in 1949, Bernard Brodie stated that the potential destruction relatively to World War II was “telescoped in time and multiplied in magnitude.”⁹⁵⁰ Barriers, either geographic or artificial, no longer stop. Paraphrasing Stanley Baldwin for the missile age, the missile will always get through—or at least enough of the missiles would to inflict catastrophic losses on the target nation. Military globalization is a triumph of offence over defense⁹⁵¹ and distance, that is, over all artificial and natural barriers.

Mearsheimer’s “stopping power of water” hypothesis logically led to analogously anachronistic but accidentally correct conclusion: A global hegemony “is not likely to be anytime soon”⁹⁵² because it already is. Reviewing Mearsheimer’s *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Peter Gowan noted that “from the time of its entry into the Second World War, the United States has pursued not regional, but global hegemony – which it has now finally achieved.”⁹⁵³ Mearsheimer represents the mainstream Western tradition which recognizes neither the fact, nor even the theoretical

⁹⁵⁰ Cited in Steiner 1984: 388.

⁹⁵¹ Shaw 1999: esnp.

⁹⁵² Mearsheimer 2001: 41.

⁹⁵³ Gowan 2002: 7.

possibility of global hegemony. Yet there are exceptions. A classic of Realism, Hans Morgenthau, recognized that “modern technology makes it possible to extend the control of mind and action to every corner of the globe regardless of geography and season.”⁹⁵⁴ Writing yet during World War II, Geographer and expert on geopolitics, Derwent Whittlesey, had stated that modern technology turned world domination from “futile medieval ideal” into conceivable goal:

The grandiose concept of the world domination became possible as a practical objective only with the rise of science and its application to mechanical invention. By these means, the Earth’s scattered land units and territories became accessible and complementary to each other, and for the first time the world state, so long a futile medieval ideal, became a goal that might conceivably be reached.⁹⁵⁵

Though the “world state” has remained unconceivable, world coalition has not.

⁹⁵⁴ Morgenthau 1967: 365.

⁹⁵⁵ Whittlesey 1942: 13.

COALITION NOW

The famous *Union Now* by Clarence Streit⁹⁵⁶ dismissed as unviable the possibilities of both international League and Alliance. It called instead for the federal Union of fifteen contemporary democracies (English-speaking and West European). Although they did not form federal Union as designed by Streit, all of them entered a wider unipolar “global alliance of democracies”⁹⁵⁷ or a “Global Network of Allies and Partners.” The Network comprises a “unique strength that provides the foundation for international security and stability”⁹⁵⁸ with America as “the leader” and “the connecting link.”⁹⁵⁹ What NSSUS called network, had been defined by NSC-162/2 as the “Coalition.”⁹⁶⁰ It has a chapter titled “Present State of the Coalition.” A note explains the meaning of the “Coalition”:

The term ... refers to those states which are parties to the network of security treaties and regional alliances of which the United States is the member (NATO, OAS, ANZUS, Japan, etc.), or are otherwise actively associated in the defense of the free world.

During the course of the Cold War, the United States invested enormous amounts of financial and political capital in these relationships. Maintaining and tending to them came to be seen as the bedrock of the conduct of US foreign

⁹⁵⁶ Streit 1940, initially published in 1939.

⁹⁵⁷ NSSUS 1990: 2.

⁹⁵⁸ NSSUS 2015: 9.

⁹⁵⁹ NSSUS 1990: 2.

⁹⁶⁰ NSC 162/2 1953: 10.

policy.⁹⁶¹ The effort only accelerated with the end of the Cold War, as US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney emphasized: One US foreign policy "goal is to strengthen and extend the system of defense arrangements that binds democratic and like-minded nations together..."⁹⁶² Alliances, he said, are our first enduring requirement:

Our alliance structure is perhaps our nation's most significant achievement since the Second World War. It represents a silent victory of building long-standing alliances and friendships with nations that constitute a prosperous, largely democratic, market-oriented zone of peace and prosperity that encompasses more than two-thirds of the world's economy.⁹⁶³

US Diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad also called the Coalition the "zone of peace" and stressed its central significance for the post-Cold War period:

[In] the post-cold war era, it is clear that, given continued unity, these nations will be strong enough to overpower any threat from outside their ranks. Thus, this community of nations may be called the "zone of peace." Maintaining, strengthening and extending the zone of peace should be the central feature of US post-Cold War grand strategy.⁹⁶⁴

⁹⁶¹ Campbell 2004: 156.

⁹⁶² Cheney 1993: 4.

⁹⁶³ Ibid, 9.

⁹⁶⁴ Khalilzad 1995: 92.

Today, the Rio Pact contains 16 US allies; NATO counts 28 US allies; other US formal allies and informal defense-partners number probably more than the Rio Pact and NATO together. 17 states are Major Non-NATO [and Non-Rio] Allies and 7 more are candidates. US National Security Strategy of 1997 mentions "NATO and 42 other defense arrangements." Bradley A. Thayer gives a total number of 84 allies worldwide.⁹⁶⁵

The exact number of US allies is undefined because there are no clear criteria for counting unofficial defense partnerships. Organization of American States counts 35 current members and entails collective defense.⁹⁶⁶ 40 European nations (including at least 14 non-NATO members) contributed their forces to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.⁹⁶⁷ Thus only Americas and Europe combine for 75 allies and partners. Adding to them African, Asian and Pacific allies and partners,⁹⁶⁸ the total number exceeds 100.

130⁹⁶⁹ or even more⁹⁷⁰ countries host US bases. Most host countries are either formal allies or informal defense partners. In addition, many states provide "cooperative security locations." These are facilities with little or no

⁹⁶⁵ Thayer 2006: 34.

⁹⁶⁶ Article II states eight purposes including provision for common action on the part of those states in the event of aggression.

⁹⁶⁷ QDR 2010: 58.

⁹⁶⁸ 6 Gulf States, 5 Asian-Pacific bilateral alliances, 7 other countries actively cooperating in the "Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific," 4 Pacific archipelagoes, Taiwan, New Zealand, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Jordan, Israel, Egypt, Djibouti, Tunis, Morocco to the least.

⁹⁶⁹ According to the Defense Department's annual "Base Structure Report" for fiscal year 2003.

⁹⁷⁰ Carl Boggs (2003), Chalmers Johnson (2004 and 2007) and Jonathan Freedland (2007) count more host countries.

permanent American presence. Instead, they are maintained with "periodic service, contractor, or host-nation support."⁹⁷¹ Cheney assured: "The United States will maintain and nurture its friendships and alliances in Europe, East Asia/Pacific, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, Latin America and elsewhere."⁹⁷² Remarkably, not much is left for "elsewhere." Streit estimated the combined power of his fifteen democracies:

Together these fifteen own almost half the Earth, rule all its oceans, govern nearly half mankind. They do two-thirds of the world's trade, and most of this would be called their domestic trade once they united, for it is among themselves. They have more than 50% control of nearly every essential material. They have more than 60 per cent of such war essentials as oil, copper, lead, steel, iron, coal, tin, cotton, wool, wood pulp, shipping tonnage. They have almost complete control of such keys as nickel, rubber and automobile production. They possess practically all the world's gold and banked wealth. Their existing armed strength is such that, once they united it, they could reduce their armaments and yet gain a two-power standard of security.⁹⁷³

The present Coalition vastly exceeds Streit's numbers. It comprises an overwhelming military preponderance, both existent (approximately 70% of the world defense spending) and potential (approximately 70% of the nominal World

⁹⁷¹ Harkavy 2005: 13.

⁹⁷² Cheney 1993: 9.

⁹⁷³ Streit 1940: 10.

Gross Product). The original G-7 group consisted of the United States and its six allies. 12 out of 15 top military spenders in 2016 belong to the Coalition.⁹⁷⁴ The aggregate of alliances is named “unrivalled in the history of nations,” augmenting the unipolar power projection and integrating the international order:

US global alliance network remains an integral feature of the international order and one of the most important dimensions of US global power. The United States, with more than 50 allies, is the hub of alliances unrivalled in the history of nations. The United States and its Asia-Pacific allies alone account for one-third of the global economy, at US\$25 trillion. The US global alliance network dominates global military spending, comprising 65-70% of the total. This aggregation of capability augments US power projection.⁹⁷⁵

In the strategic sphere, as indicated by defense spending, there is no tendency towards multipolarity. On the contrary, the evidence indicates strengthening unipolarity. The unipolar trend was not interrupted by the end of the Cold War:

In 1986 ... the United States and its allies controlled about 49% of global military expenditures while our various adversaries combined for some 42%. Today, the United States and its allies are responsible for nearly

⁹⁷⁴ *Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2016*, 2.

⁹⁷⁵ Wainwright 2016: 3.

70% of military spending; all our adversaries put together total less than 15% ".⁹⁷⁶

Streit presented a table of 30 essentials⁹⁷⁷ demonstrating that the Union of fifteen democracies would be preponderant military force over the rival camp. That rival camp consisted of the Axis powers and the Soviet Union. If one lumps Soviet Russia with Germany, Japan and Italy, the four together are outproduced.⁹⁷⁸ Streit concludes: "The facts are: Fifteen democracies together practically own this Earth..."⁹⁷⁹

Today, the former Axis powers are members of the Coalition, as well as three former Soviet republics. Two more former republics are NATO partners with aspirations to become members. The Coalition includes most current UN member states including almost all economically developed states. The aim of NSC-162/2 "to have aligned on its side ... the armed forces and economic resources and materials of the major highly-industrialized non-communist states"⁹⁸⁰ has been completely attained and preserved beyond the Cold War. Streit expected regarding his Union:

The attraction membership in The Union would have for outsiders would be so powerful, and the possibility of conquering The Union would be so hopeless that, once The Union was formed, the problem the absolutist powers now present could be safely left to

⁹⁷⁶ Walt 2011: 16.

⁹⁷⁷ Streit 1940: 71.

⁹⁷⁸ Ibid, 72.

⁹⁷⁹ Ibid, 75.

⁹⁸⁰ NSC 162/2 1953: 8.

solve itself. As their citizens turned these governments into democracies and entered The Union, the arms burden on everyone would dwindle until it soon disappeared.⁹⁸¹

Streit analyzed several possibilities, including “alliance” but he was skeptical about “alliance” of so many (fifteen) democracies and estimated this option as even less perspective than the League:

But an alliance is simply a looser, more primitive form of league, one that operates secretly through diplomatic tunnels rather than openly through regular assemblies. It is based on the same unit as a league—the state—and on the same principle—that the maintenance of the freedom of the state is the be-all and the end-all of political and economic policy. It is at most an association (instead of a government) of governments, by governments, for governments. It has all the faults of a league with most of them intensified and with some more of its own added... Though possible as a temporary stopgap, an alliance, as a permanent organization, has never been achieved and is practically impossible to achieve among as many as fifteen states.⁹⁸²

Streit was also skeptical that democracies organized as an “alliance” can establish world peace because they would be too divided and too cumbersome:

⁹⁸¹ Streit 1940: 14.

⁹⁸² Ibid, 17-18.

The best way to prevent war is to make attack hopeless. It will not be hopeless while the autocrats, who by their nature are gamblers with abnormal confidence in themselves and their luck, have any ground left to gamble either that the democracies can be divided or that the inter-democracy organization is too cumbersome and loose to resist surprise attack.⁹⁸³

Streit's arguments were plausible in those days. Alliances in history were unstable and short-lived organizations and badly maintained peace. The potential of alliance however appeared much greater. The present Coalition exceeds Streit's Union several times in the number of members, remains stable and prevents large-scale wars for 72 years by now. Streit explained why such "an alliance of democracies" was unimaginable in his days:

The basic flaw in an alliance of democracies is the nationalist philosophy responsible for it. If the desire to avoid commitments is strong enough to prevent a democracy from forming a union or even a league with others, it will also prevent its allying with them until the danger is so great and imminent that the alliance comes too late to prevent war.⁹⁸⁴

In fact we witness what Streit's could not imagine. Disregarding "nationalist philosophy," large number of states host hegemonic bases, partly cover the expenses for running

⁹⁸³ Ibid, 17-18.

⁹⁸⁴ Streit 1940: 18.

them (“host nation support”), integrate their strategic forces under the hegemonic command, contribute 1-2% of their GDP to those forces and tip military, economic and humanitarian contributions in case of the hegemonic operations worldwide. Actually, these states, some of them recent great powers, surrender their strategic sovereignties *en mass*.

More incredibly, since 1945 the process is by cooperation rather than coercion. "What is unusual, then, is that the American imperial presence was largely welcomed."⁹⁸⁵ Michael Ignatieff confessed: Some other nations "like Canada (I happen to be a Canadian citizen), are happy to shelter under American imperial protection."⁹⁸⁶ The Coalition can correctly be called “empire by invitation.”⁹⁸⁷ Although all earlier empires, especially persistent empires, were in a measure by bargain, cooperation and invitation,⁹⁸⁸ in the postwar world this took extreme form. Many thinkers since the late 1940s, and some even earlier, advocated or anticipated a change in the international pattern. In 1936, Lionel Curtis concluded:

In the story told in these pages I can point to no time which appears so fraught with disaster to the human race as a whole as the present, the moment at which I am bringing this book to a close ... We have now reached a stage in the growth of civilization which cannot go further, and is doomed to go back, until we discover the

⁹⁸⁵ Bischof 2009: 17.

⁹⁸⁶ Ignatieff 2003: 53.

⁹⁸⁷ Lundestad 1986.

⁹⁸⁸ Cooley & Nexon 2007: 13.

means of passing from the national to the international state.⁹⁸⁹

The phenomenon of the Coalition seems to indicate what form that expected “international state” eventually took. Besides Streit, another thinker to anticipate the Coalition of democracies was the founder of the Pan-European movement, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi:

I understood that the period of continental isolation was definitely over and that the Atlantic Clipper had opened a new page of history: the chapter of a united Atlantic world, including Pan-America, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the future European federation... And beyond and above Pan-Europe I conceived the vision of a New Atlantis, bringing peace and prosperity and liberty to all men and women and nations of good will throughout the globe.⁹⁹⁰

Two later thinkers—Karl Deutsch and Hans Morgenthau—perceived the already evolving Coalition. Deutsch introduced the term “pluralistic security-community,” meaning a group of peoples that has not merged but preserving “legally independent” governments has become integrated. By “integration” they have attained institutions and practices assuring peaceful coexistence.⁹⁹¹

With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, many IR scholars were puzzled why US alliances do not dissolve.

⁹⁸⁹ Cited in Streit 1940: 168.

⁹⁹⁰ Coudenhove-Kalergi 1943: 219.

⁹⁹¹ Deutsch 1957: 5-6, 30-31, 65.

Deutsch would not be surprised. Foreign military threats, he wrote in 1957, have helped toward integration but are not essential. This indicates that opportunities to integrate the North Atlantic area do not necessarily depend upon the continuation of the Soviet military threat.⁹⁹²

Security-community does not function on a balance of power. Instead, the development of a strong core, or nucleus, seems to promote integration if the core area had two overlapping capabilities—to act (a function of power in all its manifestations) and to respond to other units involved, considering their needs.⁹⁹³ This combination of “power” and “responsiveness” determined the success or failure.⁹⁹⁴ Deutsch detailed several historical analogies:

Larger, stronger, more politically, administratively, economically and educationally advanced political units were found to form cores of strength around which in most cases the integrative process developed... Political amalgamation, in particular, usually turned out to be a nuclear process. It often occurred around single cores, as in the case of England, Piedmont, Prussia, and Sweden. Each of these came to form the core of a larger amalgamated political community...⁹⁹⁵

⁹⁹² Ibid, 202.

⁹⁹³ Ibid, 40, 137-138.

⁹⁹⁴ Ibid, 40.

⁹⁹⁵ Ibid, 38.

Regarding the present time, Deutsch explicitly defined the United States as the “core” generating the North Atlantic security-community:

These core areas were larger, stronger, more advanced political units around which integration developed ... Furthermore, not only the existing capabilities, but the growth in those capabilities, seemed important... By almost any measure, the United States today is the ‘core area’ for the North Atlantic area.⁹⁹⁶

Thus the security-community constitutes a proof of the possibility of peace through strength with central authority. Because the unipolar power is in class of power of its own and the rest of countries of the community are particularly helpless, the community poses a fundamental confirmation to our understanding of world politics and our expectations of future possibilities. Robert Jervis adopted Deutsch’s security-community and stresses that “nothing in the short period since the end of the Cold War points to an unraveling.”⁹⁹⁷

Morgenthau, having recognized in the prospect of nuclear annihilation not just a novel threat, but also a novel possibility, outlined an opportunity to effect a fundamental transformation of humanity. An inchoate “awareness of the unity of mankind” has been greatly strengthened in the nuclear age “by the desire, innate in all men, for self-preservation.” This desire could now be harnessed, in a way that had previously been impossible, to abolish “international relations

⁹⁹⁶ Ibid, 138.

⁹⁹⁷ Jervis 2002: esnp.

itself through the merger of all national sovereignties” into a different world organization.⁹⁹⁸

Between the late 1940s and early 1960, Morgenthau supposed world state as a new organization. In the 1960s, however he analyzed additional alternatives including an American-led “free association” of liberal democratic states that would exercise supranational control over nuclear weapons.⁹⁹⁹ Morgenthau got it very close. Liberal democratic states, as well as some non-democratic, merge their strategic sovereignties in an American-led Coalition that exercises global control over the rest of the world. The “desire, innate in all men, for self-preservation” indeed has been harnessed, in a way that had previously been impossible, to accept strategic subordination.

Obviously the present stage of military globalization—the extreme triumph of offence over defense and distance—left no better practical alternative. Paul Nitze described the relations between the superpowers in the early Cold War: “The situation is analogous to a game of chess. The atomic queens may never be brought into play; they may never actually take one of the opponent's pieces.”¹⁰⁰⁰

The same principle seems to be behind the formation of the hierarchic American-led Coalition. Developing Nitze’s analogy, in chess, we seldom see checkmates. Usually, one player surrenders several moves before. World politics under the global unipolarity differs from chess in the initial position: instead of balance of power, there is hopeless preponderance of power, multiplied by modern technology. In these

⁹⁹⁸ Cited in McQueen 2013: 40.

⁹⁹⁹ Ibid, 41-42.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Nitze 1956: 195.

conditions, players “surrender” (accept strategic subordination) before they make first move. In the process, the global Coalition with a single center has evolved.

The decision to “surrender” is relatively easy since the “surrender” is not unconditional. Indeed it is more conditional than surrenders demanded by previous great powers. The US policy is more multilateral and more restrained by international norms than were the policies of preceding empires or would have been the policies of alternative powers.

This is one of the reasons why US security institutions outlive their *raison d'être*. The Cold War alliances created to contain the Soviet Union expand and consolidate quarter-a-century after the Soviet threat disappeared. The Monroe Doctrine, announced to cope with the threat of the Holy Alliance, remains intact for Americas and went global (globalized by the Truman Doctrine) but who today, besides Historians, knows what the Holy Alliance was?

Some scholars¹⁰⁰¹ explain the propensity of states to coalesce with the United States geopolitically. As an offshore power, the United States less threatens Eurasian states than they are threatened by each other. This hypothesis works only one way and completely fails the other: Mexico and Canada do not ally with Russia or China for protection against the United States. Hence, the American *strategic culture*, rather than its geopolitical position, has been strong centripetal factor in military globalization.

This strategic culture explains the unipolar alliance formation. Britain preferred strategic subordination to the

¹⁰⁰¹ Most notably John Mearsheimer 2001; also Levy & Thompson 2005: 1; Walt 2011: 8.

United States over equal partnership with the Nazi Germany. The Nazi Germany, when defeat appeared inevitable, shifted its forces from the western to eastern fronts so that Germany might be conquered by America rather than Russia. In the postwar period, European powers and Japan consistently prefer strategic subordination to the United States over equal partnership with Russia or China. At last, defying both wide historical experience and the mainstream IR theory (Realism), the US alliances have not disintegrated after the disappearance of the Soviet threat which had wielded them. On the contrary, they have been expanded, redefined and rejuvenated.

In plausible counterfactual, had the alliance configuration favored the Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or Soviet Russia, military globalization would have been a more violent process and, considering their strategic cultures, probably culminated with global conquest by one of them. When the centripetal force of military globalization appeared irresistible, the choice became not “whether” subordination but “to whom.” And the world made its choice.

Nevertheless strategic culture explains only why that particular hegemon was preferred over others. It does not explain why the choice of hegemon became necessary at that particular time. More basic centripetal forces were at work in the process, such as the global closure and technological and industrial progress. With the size of the global system remaining constant, the military power projected ever farther, ever faster and ever more massively, and the offense ever more overwhelming distance and defense, military globalization had been bound to *centralization*. In the political field, nominal independence of states has been preserved, expressed by national flags, other national emblems and the

mosaic world map of 192 different colors. In the strategic field however such is not the case. In this field there is only one “unified” world map—that of the Unified Combatant Command. Strategically, the world is one.

CONCLUSION

Military globalization entailed the dramatic reduction of time necessary to project power over distance and accomplish military objective. In Bernard Brodie's words, the potential destruction has progressively been "telescoped in time and multiplied in magnitude."¹⁰⁰² The compression of time-space factor was repeatedly stressed after major wars and technological breakthroughs.¹⁰⁰³

The process of military globalization appears irreversible. On the eve of World War II, US Senator Robert A. Taft predicted that, once sent off to the war, American forces would never come home again.¹⁰⁰⁴ They never did. Chalmers Johnson noted that the global network of bases is growing ever-larger.¹⁰⁰⁵

More impressive is the growth of what NSC-162/2 called "the Coalition"—the global unipolar network of alliances. The Coalition is coordinated by a single US command (hub-and-spokes system). Strategically, the network integrates, consolidates, increases inter-operability and develops division of labor (specialization). The phenomenon of the Coalition is unprecedented in its expansion and persistence. The US alliance system has remained "remarkably intact after half a century."¹⁰⁰⁶ After

¹⁰⁰² Cited in Steiner 1984: 388.

¹⁰⁰³ Karl Haushofer in Dorpalen 1942: 208; Heinz Soffner in Barney 2011: 90-91; Thomas Power 1964: 30; Mearsheimer 2001: 64.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Cited in Robert Kagan 2014: esnp.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Chalmers Johnson 2004: esnp.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Ikenberry 2004: 148.

one more decade, President Obama stated: "We have renewed our alliances from Europe to Asia."¹⁰⁰⁷

Writing yet in 1985, William C. Sherman already remarked that in 1945 few would have dared to predict that Japan and the United States—the wartime enemies—would "forge during the next four decades one of the world's strongest and healthiest alliances, and one that continues to grow in importance not only to the United States and Japan themselves, but also to the world."¹⁰⁰⁸ The alliance persists twice longer (by now) in ever stronger and healthier state.

If this persistence is surprising for a bilateral alliance, such a persistence for a highly multilateral NATO alliance is astonishing. NATO is correctly described by some leading experts on alliances as the most successful alliance in history.¹⁰⁰⁹ This historical record had been announced for NATO of only sixteen members.¹⁰¹⁰ Today, it counts twenty-nine and strengthens:

NATO is stronger and more cohesive than at any point in its history... NATO is the strongest alliance the world has ever known and is the hub of an expanding global security network.¹⁰¹¹

Alliances in earlier history counted less members and lived shorter. The alliance pattern appears very different in the global unipolarity. Contrary to economic globalization,

¹⁰⁰⁷ "Preface," NSSUS 2015: 2.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Sherman 1985: 191-192.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Asmus & Blackwill & Larrabee 1996: 80; Walt 1998/9: 3; Gordon & Shapiro 2004: 182.

¹⁰¹⁰ Wörner 1990: esnp.

¹⁰¹¹ NSSUS 2015: 7, 25.

military globalization is not just about interrelation and interdependence of the global system. In addition, military globalization demonstrates remarkable centralization. Militarily interrelated global system appeared c. 1900. Within less than a century, the system underwent drastic reduction of the number of poles and the emergence of unipolarity. The unipolarity has been further strengthened by the unipolar agglomeration of alliances.

This defies both theory and history. The mainstream International Relations theory expects counter-balancing. Counter-balancing occurs but merely verbal. It looks as the world accepts unipolarity, provided America is the “uni.” US National Security Strategy of 2002 was loudly criticized worldwide for its concept of preventive wars but not for its prevention of peer competitors from rising.

From the macro-historic point of view, we witness unprecedented sensation. Hegemony is as old as the recorded history. According to the Mesopotamian tradition, city Kish established its hegemony immediately after the Flood. The anti-hegemony is equally old—the *Epic of Gilgamesh* exalts the anti-hegemonic war and the overthrow of the hegemon. In our time, for the first time in world history, hegemony does not produce anti-hegemony. The world has permanently settled for the hegemonic order, midway between states system and universal empire.

Such system-wide hegemony is unprecedented in the modern world. Earlier civilizations produced two similar system-wide hegemonies—Rome of the late Republic and Qin during 364-221 BC.¹⁰¹² Both were unstable and in the course

¹⁰¹² Ostrovsky 2006.

of wars evolved into universal empires. At this point, world history runs out of samples. World history does not know instance of system-wide hegemony which eschewed large-scale wars for 72 years (by now). There were civilizations with longer periods of peace but they all were universal empires which pacified their worlds by universal conquest and annexation. In this case, the American “exceptionalism” is mathematical fact.

The most optimistic prognoses of unipolarity equal the bipolar period.¹⁰¹³ This represents a huge time leap relatively to most experts, who interpret the “unipolar moment” in its literal sense—“moment.” Many others, of course, refuse even to recognize the fact of unipolarity. The “declinism” is still our dominant paradigm. Consistently are stated as fact, or predicted as imminent, the declines of the West, NATO, or “American Empire.” And *anarchy* remains the sacrosanct concept of International Relations science.

Historian Paul Kennedy, who made his name in 1987 with his prediction of the imminent US “imperial overstretch,” fifteen years later entitled his article “The Greatest Superpower Ever.” He wondered on the US global military reach: “What does all this mean?”¹⁰¹⁴ One apparent meaning is that our paradigms lag behind the real world which had moved to hierarchic unipolar organization.

When de Gaulle announced his decision to withdraw from the integrated NATO command, President Lyndon Johnson suggested that when de Gaulle “comes rushing down like a locomotive on the track, why the Germans and

¹⁰¹³ Wohlforth 1999; Krauthammer 2003.

¹⁰¹⁴ Kennedy 2002: 10.

ourselves, we just stand aside and let him go on by, then we are back together again."¹⁰¹⁵ There is indeed one element common for the “track” and the modern world—both are closed systems.

Columnist Russell Baker on the same occasion mused on "the General's announcement that France would withdraw from Earth."¹⁰¹⁶ The irony has a measure of truth. At that stage of military globalization, for many states the alternative of withdrawal from the Coalition had become hardly more practical than “withdrawal from Earth.” The condition of the “global closure,” combined with technological progress, seems to exert an inexorable centripetal force on military globalization.

We live in a time of global strategic convergence. Extremely violent between the formation of the world system and the end of World War II, henceforth the convergence has been ever more orderly, evolving into global alliance-cluster with a single center. This unipolar bloc concentration is unlikely to evaporate within a couple of decades. Its global scale, level of integration and ongoing consolidation seem to imply that the phenomenon is here to stay beyond the most optimistic predictions. More probably, it will eventually make the bipolar period look as a blip on the horizon of the unipolar “moment,” or as a brief transit between two much longer periods of military globalization—multipolar and unipolar.

¹⁰¹⁵ Cited in Hitchcock 2008: 67.

¹⁰¹⁶ Cited in Ibid. 66.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The author is a former PhD candidate at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in International Relations. He completed his BA and MA (distinguished) in General History. Three of his works submitted during the studies received awards for creativity and originality. His magnum opus is *The Hyperbola of the World Order* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). Following his PhD thesis disqualification in 2008, he became independent scholar. Working as hotel reception clerk and security guard, with Web and Word available at his front-desks, he devotes most of his working time to research.

